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ABSTRACT 
 
Between 1873 and 1945 Japan and Mongolia had a complex and important relationship 
that has been largely overlooked in post-war studies of Japan’s imperial era.  In fact, 
Japanese-Mongolian relations in the modern period provide a rich field of enquiry into 
the nature of Japanese imperialism as well as further evidence of the complexity of 
Japan’s relationships with other Asian countries in the decades before 1945.  This 
thesis examines the relationship from the Japanese perspective, drawing on a diverse 
range of contemporary materials, both official and unofficial, including military 
documents, government reports, travel guides and academic works, many of which have 
been neglected in earlier studies.  In previous analyses, the strategic dimension has 
been seen as overwhelming and Mongolia has often been regarded as merely a minor 
addendum to Japan’s relationship with Manchuria.  In fact, however, Japan’s 
connection with Mongolia itself was a crucial part of its interaction with the Chinese 
continent from the 1870s to 1945.  Though undeniably coveted for strategic reasons, 
Mongolia also offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major 
aspects of the discourses that made up Japan’s evolving claim to solidarity with and 
leadership of Asia.  It also functioned as a showcase for Japan’s supposedly 
benevolent intentions towards Asia.  In some ways, moreover, the relationship with 
Mongolia was presented as distinctive, particularly because of the common faith in 
Buddhism and a supposedly shared ancestry in ethnic terms.  In turn, the military, 
political, ideological and cultural opportunities apparently provided by Mongolia 
account for the wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed 
Mongolian connections and for the often close relations between these groups and 
individuals on the one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on 
the other.      
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the years immediately following the Meiji Restoration, Japanese leaders struggled 
not only to modernise their country, but also to engage in new ways both with the 
dominant European powers and with the countries of their own region.  In the case of 
the Western powers, the priority was to parry the threat they posed to Japan.  At the 
same time, some members of the Japanese elites regarded East Asia as an area where 
Japan could perhaps carry out some imperialist projects of its own, or at least as a 
region in which Japan had important strategic and other objectives.    One target area of 
Japanese ambition was ‘Mongolia’, an ambiguous geopolitical label that covered a vast 
swathe of sparsely populated territory strategically positioned between Russia and 
China.  The term potentially included both Inner and Outer Mongolia, together with a 
number of other adjacent regions, stretching from the Hsingan Ranges in western 
Manchuria to the Altai Mountains in the west (bordering Kazakhstan), south as far as 
the Great Wall of China, only a few hundred kilometres from Peking, and north to the 
boundary between Russia and China.     
Mongolia has usually been regarded by historians of modern Japan as, at best, a 
minor arena of Japanese activity on the Chinese continent in the years before 1945.  
Yet the history of Japanese activity there is just as rich a field of enquiry as 
corresponding activity in Manchuria has proved to be.  Japanese soldiers, 
businessmen, religious leaders, scholars and others engaged in a wide array of projects 
in Mongolia in the modern period.  Japanese activity in Mongolia before the 1930s, 
however, has attracted little notice among researchers, apart from Robert Valliant, who 
in 1972 examined the independence movements of the 1910s.
1  Subsequent  scholarship 
                                                 
1 Robert B. Valliant, ‘Japanese Involvement in Mongolian Independence Movements, 
1912-1919’, Mongolia Society Bulletin, vol. 11, no. 2, 1972, pp. 1-32.      
2
on the 1930s has at least recognised that when the Kwantung Army created the ‘new 
nation’ of ‘Manchukuo’ in 1932, it in fact aimed to construct a ‘Manchurian-
Mongolian’ kingdom;
2 but nevertheless, researchers have not seriously considered the 
attention paid by both military and civilian elites to the parts of Mongolia that lay 
outside the borders of Manchukuo.  Contemporary sources show, on the other hand, 
that Japanese who were active in the region at the time usually intended considerable 
new portions of Mongolia to be added to Manchukuo,
3 even if that goal was not 
realised.    From at least the early twentieth century onwards, the conviction that Japan’s 
area of interest encompassed large parts of Mongolia as well as Manchuria was 
reflected in the frequent use in Japanese sources of the term ‘Man-M’, or ‘Manchuria-
Mongolia’, to refer to a supposed single geographical entity whose exact boundaries 
underwent continual adjustment.  To ignore Mongolia as a potential or actual part of 
‘Man-M’ is thus to overlook the separate significance of Mongolia to Japanese 
military and civilian ideologues of the decades before 1945, and the distinctive nature of 
the Japanese experience there.     
This thesis investigates the perceived significance of Mongolia for Japan in the 
late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century.  I demonstrate that 
between the 1870s and 1945, a variety of groups and individuals in Japan focused 
considerable attention on Mongolia.  I seek to answer the question of how and why 
they did so, and how their activities impacted on the larger framework of Japanese 
policy in the region.     
 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria:  The Making of 
Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931-1932, Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1964, 
pp. 41-7; Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire:  Manchuria and the Culture of 
Wartime Imperialism, Berkeley:    University of California Press, 1998, pp. 40-6.     
3 See, for example, Kawashima Naniwa, ‘Man-M kenkoku jsbun oyobi ikensho 
yaku’, in Aida Tsutomu, Kawashima Naniwa-, Tky:  Bunsuikaku, 1936, reprinted 
Tky:  zorasha, 1997, pp. 378-90.      
3
 
Figure 1:    Mongolia in the 1860s, 
reproduced from Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbanks (eds), The 
Cambridge History of China, vol. 10:   Late Ch’ing 1800-1911, Part 1, 
Cambridge:    Cambridge University Press, 1978, p. 55.     
 
Mongolia in Historical Context 
What today is known as the sovereign state of ‘Mongolia’, and was formerly termed the 
Mongolian People’s Republic or Outer Mongolia, is only one part of the far larger 
region that once covered more than three and a half million square kilometres of 
sparsely inhabited territory, roughly the same area as that of France and Germany 
combined
4  (Figure 1).    From 1644 until 1912 this territory was nominally ruled by the 
Ch’ing dynasty, and included both ‘Outer’ and ‘Inner’ Mongolia.  ‘Outer Mongolia’ 
was the term applied (until the 1990s) to the more or less unified area occupied by the 
Khalkha Mongols in the north.  Because of its geographical position, far enough from 
Peking to retain a semblance of independence, and its single tribal group, who could be 
relatively easily unified, this region was not completely dominated by the Manchu 
rulers of China and even achieved a degree of formal independence from the Ch’ing  
4
empire in November 1911, shortly before the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty.  Soviet 
Russia, however, was a powerful neighbour and from 1921 until 1990 Outer Mongolia 
was under its political sway.
5   
‘Inner Mongolia’ in the south, by contrast, had been ruled by a disparate group of 
Mongol princes since before the rise of the Ch’ing dynasty.  Partly because of their 
proximity to Peking, these princes came more directly under Manchu control between 
1644 and 1912.  As for the composition of the population, Inner Mongolia was very 
varied in ethnic terms.  Within its vast expanse there roamed a multitude of tribes:  
among them Kharachin, Khorchin, Chahar, Tumed and Ordos.    Many of these peoples 
appended the word ‘Mongol’ to their name, as in ‘Chahar Mongol’, yet had a very weak 
sense of alliance with each other and of their relation to ‘Mongolia’ as an entity.
6   
Following the collapse of the Ch’ing empire in 1912, Inner Mongolia was first 
controlled by Han Chinese warlords and then by governors appointed by the Chinese 
Republican government.  After seizing Manchuria in 1931-2, however, Japanese 
forces penetrated Inner Mongolia as part of an attempt to gain control of the region.  
This aim was largely achieved following the start of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 
July 1937, with the subsequent Japanese occupation of North China and the 
establishment of the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian regime of ‘Mengchiang’.  In 
the aftermath of the Second World War, Inner Mongolia was re-incorporated into China 
and now forms part of the People’s Republic of China.
7  Throughout this thesis, I use 
                                                                                                                                              
4 Tennyson  Tan,  Political Status of Mongolia, Shanghai:    Mercury Press, 1932, p. 11.     
5 See Gerard M. Friters, Outer Mongolia and its International Position, London:  
George Allen & Unwin, 1951; George G. S. Murphy, Soviet Mongolia:   A Study of the 
Oldest Political Satellite, Berkeley:    University of California Press, 1966.     
6 See Narangoa Li and Robert Cribb, ‘Introduction:  Japan and the Transformation of 
National Identities in Asia in the Imperial Era’, in Narangoa Li and Robert Cribb (eds), 
Imperial Japan and National Identities in Asia, 1895-1945, London:   
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, p. 5, for further discussion of this point.     
7 See Alan J. K. Sanders, Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, 2
nd edn, Lanham, Md:  
Scarecrow Press, 2003, pp. 203-5, for further details.      
5
the term ‘Mongolia’ to refer to the larger area known by this term during the Ch’ing 
dynasty (see Figure 1), using the terms ‘Outer Mongolia’ and ‘Inner Mongolia’ to 
distinguish between the northern and southern regions where necessary.     
Long before the modern period, Mongolia had been a significant power in the 
region, and at the time of the great khans, from the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries, it 
had been at the centre of the world stage.    By the late seventeenth century, however, it 
was essentially a vassal state of Imperial China, with the Manchus pursuing a policy of 
‘divide and rule’ over it.
8  In the late nineteenth century, when Japanese elites were 
turning their attention to the region, Mongolia was a shadow of its former self, with its 
empire long gone.  Nevertheless, nineteenth-century Mongolia was still perceived to 
occupy an important geo-political position, lying as it did between the advancing Tsarist 
Russian Empire of the Romanovs in the north and the decaying Ch’ing dynasty in the 
south.    In practice, it was subject by that time to considerable influence from Russia as 
well as China.  Meanwhile, the important border between Russia and the territory 
ostensibly controlled by the Ch’ing dynasty, including Mongolia, had been delineated 
by a series of treaties, notably the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, which fixed the boundary 
between the two, and the 1728 Treaty of Kyakhta, by which Tsarist Russia signalled its 
acceptance of the Ch’ing dynasty’s control over both Inner and Outer Mongolia.
9   
Thus by the mid-nineteenth century, Mongolia had been largely reduced from a 
major power to a hotly contested buffer zone between Russia and China.  It was into 
this equation that Japan advanced, tentatively during the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, but with more vigour from the beginning of the twentieth, as Japanese leaders 
pursued their own continental policies and goals.  In short, the arrival of Japan turned 
the bilateral Romanov-Ch’ing tussle over borders into a trilateral contest, in which 
                                                 
8 See Sechin Jagchid and Paul Hyer, Mongolia’s Culture and Society, Boulder, Colo.:  
Westview Press, 1979, pp. 274-82, for further details.      
6
Japanese leaders sought to carve out their own sphere of influence, in the process 
challenging the perceived domains within Mongolia of their larger neighbours.
10   
Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japanese leaders 
negotiated a series of diplomatic agreements with Russia and China within which their 
objectives in Mongolia were first outlined and then confirmed.  Elements within the 
Japanese military and political elites were, at times, united in the pursuit of their shared 
objective in Mongolia, namely either direct or indirect control of the region; when 
diplomatic means failed to achieve the desired ends, they resorted to military force.  
Japanese leaders, however, never considered their relations with Mongolia except as 
part of a complex web of objectives in the region as a whole.  The attitude of the 
Japanese elites towards Mongolia is shown by the way in which they referred to the 
region:  the conviction among certain groups that Japan should gain strategic control 
over Mongolia, in addition to Manchuria, was expressed from the 1910s onwards in 
Japanese sources, frequently through reference to the supposed region of ‘Man-M’.   
The threat that Tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union might pose to Japan’s 
perceived strategic goals was crucial in military thinking, particularly from the end of 
the nineteenth century onwards, as Russia expanded eastwards.  Tsarist Russia had 
established a presence in Mongolia by the turn of the century, and used the excuse of 
the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 to seize much of Manchuria as well.  While official 
Japan’s attention, both military and diplomatic, was largely focused on Korea, the 
‘dagger poised at the heart of Japan’,
11  part of the problem for the Japanese government 
                                                                                                                                              
9 See  Sanders,  Historical Dictionary of Mongolia, pp. 177-8, 246-7, for further details.     
10  See S. C. M. Paine, The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895:   Perceptions, Power, and 
Primacy, Cambridge:    Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 3-6.     
11 Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword:  The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 1895-
1910, Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1995, p. 49; Carol Gluck, Japan’s 
Modern Myths:  Ideology in the Late Meiji Period, Princeton:  Princeton University 
Press, 1985, p. 118.  Also Hilary Conroy, The Japanese Seizure of Korea:  1868- 
7
was that Korea might be especially vulnerable in light of Russia’s expansion into 
Northeast Asia.  Accordingly, from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 through to the 
catastrophic encounter in 1939 between Japanese and Soviet forces at Nomonhan on the 
Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian border, Japanese military leaders sought to gain control 
of the northwestern region of the Chinese continent to block their northern nemesis.  
The steps that the Japanese military took to ensure control first of Korea, and then later 
of Manchuria, have been well documented.
12  The role that Mongolia played in this 
equation, however, particularly following the annexation of Korea in 1910, has usually 
been neglected.     
 
Japan and Mongolia in the Modern Period 
Between at least 1873 and 1945, a period of almost seventy-five years, a variety of 
Japanese groups was connected to Mongolia.  After 1905, the most important of them 
was the Kwantung Army.    Key figures within this force regarded Mongolia as a region 
of crucial strategic importance, especially in a period when neighbouring Manchuria 
was increasingly controlled by Japanese troops as a result of the Russo-Japanese War.  
From the 1870s onwards, however, other groups and individuals also worked actively to 
further relations between Japan and Mongolia, and to raise the profile of Mongolia 
within Japan, employing official, semi-official and non-official channels and engaging 
in a range of discourses and activities that could be classed as ‘cultural diplomacy’.  
They included business groups, certain academics, right-wing political activists and 
Buddhist leaders.    After 1905, their activities functioned to strengthen Japanese control 
                                                                                                                                              
1910:  A Study of Realism and Idealism in International Relations, Philadelphia:  
University of Philadelphia Press, 1960.     
12 For example, Conroy, Japanese Seizure of Korea; Duus, Abacus and the Sword; 
Ogata,  Defiance in Manchuria; Takehiko Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden:  The 
Rise of the Japanese Military, New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1963; James B.  
8
in Mongolia, and to reinforce its legitimacy by providing a non-military face to the 
Japanese presence there.  These groups often sympathized with the military’s 
expansionist aims.    Yet, they had their own separate agendas as well.     
Japanese groups connected to Mongolia produced a variety of documents and 
records.    The range of such writings provides strong evidence that Mongolia was more 
than just a region of minor importance to be absorbed, if possible, into the growing 
Japanese empire.  Some in Japan believed that ties of race, culture, history, religion 
and custom bound the Mongols and Japanese closely together.  The evidence extends 
from the romantic musings of Meiji politician Suematsu Kench, with his theories that 
Genghis Khan had actually been Japanese,
13 through to the extensive research done by 
academics such as the anthropologist Torii Ryz and the Sinologist Shiratori 
Kurakichi into the nature of the relationship between the two peoples.
14  The eventual 
outcome of this emphasis on the ties between Japan and Mongolia was an assertion 
from some quarters that it was the ‘sacred duty’ of the Japanese to rescue their 
‘brothers’ from their current state of oppression by the Han Chinese or Russians, either 
Tsarist or Soviet.  Major-General Doihara Kenji of the Kwantung Army, at the time 
Mukden Special Intelligence Agency chief, dramatically articulated this view in late 
1935, when he stated that it was Japan’s mission to save the Mongols.
15  Such a view 
certainly justified Japanese intervention in Mongolia, but even during the 1930s and 
                                                                                                                                              
Crowley,  Japan’s Quest for Autonomy, National Security and Foreign Policy 1930-
1938, Princeton:    Princeton University Press, 1966.     
13 Suyematz [Suematsu] Kencho, Identity of Great Conqueror Genghis Khan with the 
Japanese Hero Yoshitsune:  An Historical Thesis, London:  W. H. and L. 
Collingridge, 1879.     
14 See, for example, the following works by Torii Ryz:  Mko ryok, Tky:  
Hakubunkan, 1911; Mko oyobi Mansh, Tky:  Tomiyama b, 1915; Man-M no 
tansa, Tky:  Manrikaku shob, 1928; Shiberia kara Man-M e , Tky:  saka 
yag shoten, 1929; Man-M sonota no omoide, Tky:  Okakura shob, 1936.  See 
also Shiratori Kurakichi, T-A bunka ronsh, Tky:  T-A bunka kykai, 1935.     
15 Quoted in Guenther Stein, Far East in Ferment, London:  Methuen, 1936, pp. 162-
3.    
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1940s, the Japanese presence there was not solely military in character; it also sought to 
provide the Mongols and others with medical assistance and educational support, for 
example.   
Japanese military and non-military activities in Mongolia, in fact, were closely 
intertwined and, by the 1930s, even interdependent.  Such interdependence is shown 
most clearly in the establishment in 1933 of the Zenrin kykai (Good Neighbour 
Association), an ostensibly humanitarian organisation that was the chief means through 
which Japan’s semi-official cultural diplomacy was implemented in Mongolia in the 
1930s and 1940s.    Given Mongolia’s position, sandwiched between Russia and China, 
and the long-term tensions between Japan and both of those countries, such cultural 
diplomacy was arguably necessary or at least desirable.  Any overt move by Japanese 
forces to seize Mongolia might well have destabilised the region and worked against 
Japanese ambitions for it.  The Japanese military did in fact make a number of covert 
attempts to seize Mongolia, especially in the decade after the collapse of the Ch’ing 
dynasty in 1912 and again in the 1930s, but these attempts were always handled in such 
a way that ‘official’ Japanese involvement could be denied.     
The Zenrin kykai represents a synthesis of the various groups — military, 
religious, academic and other — that sought to increase Japanese control over Mongolia.   
It undertook a range of activities in Inner Mongolia, including the provision of medical 
services and educational opportunities to the Inner Mongol population of Chahar and 
Suiyuan provinces, beginning at a point when these areas were still technically under 
Han Chinese Republican rule.  Like the South Manchurian Railway Company 
Research Department, it appears to have attracted a number of idealistic young Japanese 
to live and work in the region,
16  and it also engaged in a concerted campaign to educate 
the Japanese reading public about the importance of Mongolia to Japan.  Yet the  
10
Zenrin kykai has largely eluded attention in scholarly comment on Japan’s forays into 
Inner Mongolia, and when it has been mentioned, it is in passing and with the 
suggestion that it was merely a front for the intelligence-gathering activities of the 
Kwantung Army.
17  While there is no doubt that the Zenrin kykai was used to gather 
information, to dismiss it as simply a front ignores its other, less military, activities.  
As this thesis will show, the Zenrin kykai represented the fusion of at least two broad 
groupings that wished to further the Japanese claim to Mongolia, the military and the 
religious.  It also attracted the attention of academics, business groups and politicians.  
As such, it is crucial to our understanding of how Japanese groups and individuals with 
ambitions in Mongolia coalesced and, at times, acted together.     
As we have seen, Mongolia attracted Japanese leaders and various kinds of 
activists for a number of reasons.  Mongolia’s military significance has been well 
recognised.  Both in retrospect and in contemporary Japanese perceptions, however, 
the military dimension is broader than has usually been acknowledged.    Most scholarly 
analyses concentrate on fairly narrow issues of strategy,
18 whereas in fact, Japanese 
Army operations in Mongolia are also of considerable importance for historians seeking 
to understand the actual conduct of the military in the pre-war period.  Japanese 
military actions in Mongolia appear, for example, to have provided a model in some 
respects for later actions elsewhere.    A notable case in point is instances of ‘gekokuj’, 
                                                                                                                                              
16 See  Young,  Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 241-303.     
17 Sechin Jagchid, The Last Mongol Prince:  The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 
1902-1966, Bellingham, Wash.:  Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington 
University, 1999, p. 127; Mori Hisao, Toku- no kenky, Tokorozawa, Saitama:  
Sdsha, 2000, pp. 112-13; Katsumi Nakao, ‘Japanese Colonial Policy and 
Anthropology in Manchuria’, in Jan van Bremen and Akitoshi Shimizu (eds), 
Anthropology and Colonialism in Asia and Oceania, Richmond, Surrey:  Curzon 
Press, 1999, p. 249.     
18 See, for example, Daniel A. Weissich, ‘The Role of Inner Mongolia in the Japanese 
Invasion of China’, unpublished MA thesis, University of Hawaii, 1950, pp. 5-6; 
Friters, Outer Mongolia, pp. 142-6; Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan, Japan Against Russia, 
1939, Stanford:    Stanford University Press, 1985, pp. 3-11, 22-3.      
11
or ‘overthrow of the senior by the junior’, which plagued Japan’s military and political 
hierarchies in the late 1920s and early 1930s.  Well-known examples included the 
assassination of the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian 
Incident of September 1931, both engineered by elements of the Kwantung Army, as 
well as the various attempted military coups at home that continued through to the 26 
February Incident in 1936.    There has been extensive research into the phenomenon of 
gekokuj and its impact on developments within Japan.
19    Its origins are usually held to 
lie in the factional politics of the military, in which the Tsei-ha (Control faction) and 
Kd-ha (Imperial Way faction) competed to gain control of the military decision-
making process; most historians would thus emphasise the importance of the 1930s.   I 
do not dispute this explanation.  I do, however, highlight the earlier instances of 
gekokuj found during the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian independence 
movements of 1912 and 1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22.  I argue that 
these actions established the pattern of ‘patriotic’ insubordination by officers in the field, 
as well as a willingness by senior officers to ignore such instances of insubordination 
when it suited them, well before the assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928.     
In terms of contemporary perceptions, Mongolia was an integral part of Japanese 
military thinking in another way that is often overlooked:    as a source of horses, which 
were then a basic military requirement.  Until the Second World War, and even after, 
armies relied heavily on horsepower to move men and supplies across large distances in 
order to maintain empires.  Cavalry also served as ‘shock’ troops used to break up 
                                                 
19 See, for example, James B. Crowley, ‘Japanese Army Factionalism in the Early 
1930s’, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 21, no. 3, May 1962, pp. 309-26; Ogata, Defiance 
in Manchuria; Alvin D. Coox, ‘High Command and Field Army:  The Kwantung 
Army and the Nomonhan Incident, 1939’, Military Affairs, vol. 33, no. 2, October 1969, 
pp. 302-12; Ben-Ami Shillony, Revolt In Japan:   The Young Officers and the February 
26, 1936 Incident, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1973; Kitaoka Shin’ichi, 
‘The Army as a Bureaucracy:  Japanese Militarism Revisited’, Journal of Military 
History, vol. 57, no. 5, October 1993, pp. 67-86.      
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resistance within empires, as well as to carry out long-range reconnaissance of enemy 
movements.    Mongolia had been famous for its horses since the time of Genghis Khan, 
with the smaller Mongolian horses being sturdier than their European counterparts, as 
well as seemingly untiring.
20  In addition, the Mongolian horse was not only able to 
survive in far colder climates than other breeds, it was also able to feed itself even in 
deep winter, using its hooves to uncover grass up to fifty centimetres under the snow.
21  
This ability to forage for itself would make the Mongolian horse an ideal mount for the 
Japanese military in the event of an assault on the inhospitable Russian Far East, as an 
attacking force would have been less troubled by the need to supply forage for its horses.   
As this thesis will illustrate, there is ample evidence that in the decade prior to the 
Manchurian Incident of September 1931, as well as earlier, the capacity of Mongolia to 
meet the Japanese Army’s need for mounts was thoroughly examined by the Army 
General Staff.     
Mongolia’s significance for Japanese leaders, however, went well beyond military 
and strategic considerations.  I will show that Japanese ambitions in Mongolia began 
far earlier than the creation of the Kwantung Army, and were not limited to any 
particular group in Japan.    In fact, almost immediately following the Meiji Restoration, 
and the lifting of the ban on travel abroad, Japanese visitors to the Chinese continent 
penetrated deep into Mongolia.  On their return to Japan, a number of these travellers 
came to hold important positions in the Japanese military, political, academic and 
religious worlds, and were therefore able to influence Japanese thinking in a range of 
areas.  By the 1930s, the cultural ramifications of a close relationship between Japan 
                                                 
20 Elwyn H. Edwards, A Standard Guide to Horse and Pony Breeds, London:  
Macmillan, 1980, pp. 316-17, 333; Daphne Machin Goodall, Horses of the World:  An 
Illustrated Survey, With Over 320 Photographs of Breeds of Horses and Ponies, 
Melbourne:    Wren Publishing, 1973, p. 167.     
21 Anthony Karasulas, Mounted Archers of the Steppe 600BC–AD1300, Oxford:  
Osprey Publishing, 2004, pp. 41-2.      
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and Mongolia were at the heart of the project to present Japan as the natural leader of 
Asia:  Mongolia was by then integral to broad Japanese claims of cultural, political 
and religious solidarity with the peoples of the region.     
Throughout the period covered by this thesis, both military and non-military 
groups and individuals attempted to portray Japan’s relationship with Mongolia as a 
special one.  In truth, the claim was not entirely without foundation.  Mongolia did 
indeed have a distinctive connection with Japan, and thus it offered significant 
opportunities for Japanese propaganda to exploit.    Moreover, there were also particular 
conditions in Mongolia that made it easier for Japanese forces to exert control, and 
these, too, were thoroughly exploited.  The chief features favouring the success of 
Japanese efforts to control Mongolia were the existence of politically active individuals 
and groups seeking independence from Han Chinese authority; the practice of 
Buddhism, as in Japan; and a supposedly shared racial heritage with Japan.     
Taken together, these and other circumstances differentiated Mongolia from 
Japan’s other colonies and spheres of influence, allowing the construction of a 
distinctive discourse about the past, present and future of Japanese-Mongolian relations.   
Accordingly, Japanese ideologues of all kinds presented the connection as 
fundamentally different from the relationship Japan had with other countries in the 
region.  Their claims rested in part on a pseudo-scientific basis that was strongly 
influenced by Social Darwinism:  thus, leading Japanese academics claimed that the 
Mongols and Japanese were genetically related, and that the two peoples shared a 
number of distinctive traits that made them superior to other Asians.
22  Other groups 
subsequently hijacked this theory and used it to champion the idea that the historic 
‘decline’ of the Mongols, which was supposedly both caused and demonstrated by Han 
                                                 
22  See, for example, Shiratori, T-A bunka ronsh.    
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Chinese discrimination against them, could only be halted through Japanese 
intervention and support.
23   
To an extent, then, discourses about Japan’s relationship with Mongolia 
resembled those elaborated to justify Japanese domination of Korea.    In his analysis of 
this topic, Peter Duus highlights a marked emphasis on the shared history and shared 
cultural heritage of the Japanese and Korean peoples.
24  In the case of Mongolia, 
however, there were extra elements.  One was an apparent religious affinity that 
prompted leading religious figures to seek to forge closer ties between Japanese and 
Mongolian Buddhism at a number of points.
25    Although Korea was also Buddhist, this 
fact does not appear to have been emphasised, for whatever reason, by those Japanese 
who called for greater control of Korea, judging from Duus’ analysis.    Other aspects of 
discourses on Mongolia that differed from those on Korea included the need to assist 
indigenous activists to break away from Chinese control and a distinct tendency to 
romanticise the region, which contrasts starkly with the pessimistic views of Korea 
described by Duus.    Moreover, while Japanese writers regarded the Koreans, as well as 
the Chinese, as ‘dirty’ and ‘uncivilised’,
26 the Mongols were never portrayed in this 
fashion.    Instead, the Mongols were usually presented as a people exhibiting a kind of 
faded nobility, a nobility that could be restored with Japanese help.    While the Chinese, 
too, were sometimes presented as representatives of a great civilisation that had now 
declined, such images were often paired with highly contemptuous descriptions:  
                                                 
23 See, for example, Major-General Doihara Kenji’s pronouncement, quoted in Stein, 
Far East in Ferment, pp. 162-3.     
24 See  Duus,  Abacus and the Sword, pp. 397-423.     
25 See, for example, Narangoa Li, ‘Japanese Imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism, 
1932-1945’, Critical Asian Studies, vol. 35, no. 4, 2003, pp. 498-9.     
26 For discussion of how Japanese writers viewed the Koreans and Chinese, see Duus, 
Abacus and the Sword, pp. 399-406; Donald Keene, ‘The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-
95 and Its Cultural Effects in Japan’, in Donald H. Shively (ed.), Tradition and 
Modernization in Japanese Culture, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1971, pp.  
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various epithets linking the Chinese with pigs, for example, had circulated since the late 
nineteenth century.
27  It is striking that Japanese writers did not describe the Mongols 
in this insulting manner.  Perhaps the urge to distinguish them from the Han Chinese, 
and ultimately to separate the two peoples politically, provided an impetus to treat the 
Mongols with more respect on a rhetorical level.     
The overall point is that favourable concrete conditions combined with powerful 
rhetorical arguments to raise the profile of Mongolia in Japan, and diversify Japanese 
activities in Mongolia.  The relationship, however, was not just a matter of top-down 
Japanese exploitation of a passive Mongolian populace.  At least some level of co-
operation from the Mongols was always needed to legitimise the Japanese presence, 
given the sensitivity of Mongolia’s location and the realities of power politics in the 
region.  Moreover, on occasions, Mongol leaders actively sought Japanese aid, either 
tangible, in the form of arms, munitions and money, or intangible, as in the provision of 
education, or diplomatic recognition of Mongolia.  The case of Mongolia thus 
confirms the recent trend in studies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism towards 
recognition of the complexity of Japan’s relationships with other Asian countries in the 
decades before 1945.
28  While Japan’s engagement with Mongolia was unequally 
balanced in terms of power, it was also one in which certain Mongols played an active 
part, pursuing their own agendas with varying degrees of success.     
Moreover, a closer examination of the networks that supported Japanese actions 
in Mongolia serves to illustrate the mechanisms through which Japanese expansionism 
operated more generally.  This was not necessarily evident at the time in question.  
As noted above, official Japanese ambitions relating to Mongolia were furthered not 
                                                                                                                                              
133-43; Tan’o Yasunori and Kawada Akihisa, Imji no naka no sens:  Nisshin · 
Nichiro kara reisen made, Tky:    Iwanami shoten, 1996, pp. 13-14.     
27  Tan’o and Kawada, Imji no naka no sens, pp. 13-14.      
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just by the military, but also by a variety of civilian agents, both as individuals and in 
groups.  Such agents, however, operated away from the spotlight and received 
comparatively little international attention, at least prior to the 1930s.  In this respect, 
Japanese actions in Mongolia are distinct from those in Taiwan, Korea or Manchuria, 
which attracted notice almost from the very beginning.  Furthermore, the groups and 
individuals active in Mongolia were often ‘lone wolves’, operating with less supervision 
than was the norm in other parts of Japan’s expanding imperial domain.    Nevertheless, 
they were often highly integrated with establishment institutions and figures at home, 
who sponsored and encouraged their activities.  Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, 
then, provides a good case study in that it lays bare the mechanisms through which 
Japanese imperialism was supported and furthered from the early Meiji period to the 
end of the Second World War.     
While the specific goals of those members of the Japanese elites who were 
attracted to Mongolia varied, certain elements remained constant.  One was 
undoubtedly an appreciation of the strategic value of the region.    Another factor was a 
more or less romantic notion of the physical nature of Mongolia, of its history, and its 
supposed past and future connections with Japan through shared ethnicity, religion and 
perhaps a common political destiny.  From the early twentieth century through until 
the end of the Second World War, Japanese visitors to Mongolia, whether travelling for 
military, business or academic purposes, were keen to pass on what they had 
experienced, and thus wrote of their travels for an audience back home.    While most of 
the visitors were men, a few women, as we will see, also played prominent roles in the 
construction, promotion and dissemination in Japan of the romantic myth about 
Mongolia, suggesting, through their endeavours, that Japanese women could play an 
                                                                                                                                              
28 See Sandra Wilson, ‘Bridging the Gaps:  New Views of Japanese Colonialism, 
1931-1945’, Japanese Studies, vol. 25, no. 3, December 2005, pp. 287-99.      
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active part within the mythologised terrain that apparently constituted Mongolia.  
Mark Elliot has noted that Japanese authors in the 1930s and 1940s tended to produce 
romanticised accounts of ‘Man-M’, portraying it as a land of abundance and 
opportunity,
29 but this trend was already evident at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. 
Moreover, Mongolia seemed to many Japanese observers to be a virtually 
unclaimed land.    Throughout the period examined in this thesis, Japanese sources refer 
often to the vast expanse of sparsely inhabited territory that was Mongolia, suggesting 
that size and relative emptiness formed part of the attraction of the region to Japanese 
eyes.    At a time when Japan was perceived to be overpopulated, Mongolia was widely 
imagined, in much the same way that Manchuria was, as a vast, lush, uninhabited 
paradise into which the overflow of the Japanese populace could spill.
30  While in the 
case of Manchuria such a perception was partly false, given the Han Chinese population 
of around thirty million as well as the presence of many Koreans by the 1930s, it was 
more accurate in relation to Mongolia.    Population estimates for Mongolia in the early 
twentieth century are sketchy, but one source puts the 1912 Mongol population of Inner 
Mongolia at less than one million,
31 and it is unlikely that the population of Outer 
Mongolia was significantly larger than this at the time.     
Apart from the lure of wide, open spaces, the structure of the Mongol 
administrative system, with its ‘leagues’ and ‘banners’, that is, the administrative 
                                                 
29 Mark C. Elliot, ‘The Limits of Tartary:  Manchuria in Imperial and National 
Geographies’, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 59, no. 3, August 2000, p. 639, n. 33.     
30 See Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-1933, 
London:  Routledge, 2002, pp. 57-9, for further discussion of Japanese perceptions of 
Manchuria.  See Sandra Wilson, ‘The “New Paradise”:  Japanese Emigration to 
Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s’, International History Review, vol. 17, no. 2, May 
1995, pp. 249-86, for discussion of ‘overpopulation’ and Japanese emigration to 
Manchuria as a solution.     
31 Uradyn E. Bulag, The Mongols at China’s Edge:  History and the Politics of 
National Unity, Lanham, Md:    Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, p. 108.      
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regions through which Mongolia was ruled, may have attracted Japanese observers as a 
nostalgic echo of their own pre-Meiji Restoration political system, with its fiefs and 
liege lords.  In addition, the sense of romance surrounding Mongolia is often 
connected with horses:    there is a common image of a lone horseman riding across the 
endless plains, and horses also feature strongly in references to Genghis Khan and his 
horde.  Some Meiji leaders in particular may even have seen the Mongol people 
themselves as romantic, ‘noble horsemen’.  Certainly, the idea that the Mongols and 
the Mongolian horse were in some way important to Japan has found voice in the 
writings of the well-known historian and archeologist Egami Namio.    Having done his 
fieldwork in Mongolia in the 1930s and 1940s, Egami produced a controversial book in 
1967 entitled Kiba minzoku kokka:  Nihon kodaishi e no apurchi (The People of the 
Horseriding Nation:  An Approach to Ancient Japanese History), in which he argued 
that the Mongols and their horses had played a vital role in the development of 
prehistoric Japan.
32  Whichever elements of the discourse were uppermost for any 
individual observer, it is clear from the evidence that the romantic lure of Mongolia 
drifted through the corridors of power and elsewhere in Japan from the 1870s to the end 
of the Second World War, if not beyond.
33  It can still be felt today:  Egami’s book 
remains in print and is in its sixth paperback edition.     
In order to examine Japan’s relationship with Mongolia from the second half of 
the nineteenth century onwards, it is necessary first to clarify exactly what ‘Mongolia’ 
was considered to be.  By the second decade of the twentieth century the compound 
‘Man-M’ appeared frequently in Japanese-language materials, whether official or 
                                                 
32 Egami Namio, Kiba minzoku kokka:  Nihon kodaishi e no apurchi, Tky:  Ch 
kron, 1998; for discussion of Egami’s theory, see Gari Ledyard, ‘Galloping Along 
With the Horseriders:  Looking for the Founders of Japan’, Journal of Japanese 
Studies, vol. 1, no. 1, 1975, pp. 217-54.      
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otherwise, but its exact meaning was by no means fixed.  The geographical area 
perceived to be encompassed by the term was constantly in a state of flux and could 
change within the space of a single paragraph in any one source, allowing both writers 
and readers to make their own interpretations of what it meant.  The fluidity of this 
term provides a useful indication that Japanese objectives in Mongolia were unstable 
and constantly evolving.  By the same token, the periodic attempts by contemporary 
Japanese writers to determine what was meant by ‘Man-M’ often seem to reflect 
official or other Japanese claims as to what constituted Japan’s rightful sphere of 
influence in the region.  Accordingly, any discussion of this point of terminology 
relates in significant ways to a larger geopolitical context.     
 
The Region of ‘Man-M’ 
At the beginning of the twentieth century a number of different labels were applied 
simultaneously to the region of the Ch’ing empire north of the Great Wall.  As we 
have seen, the geopolitical construct often termed ‘Mongolia’ was further divided into 
‘Inner Mongolia’ (also known as ‘Southern Mongolia’) and ‘Outer Mongolia’ (also 
known as ‘Northern Mongolia’), the latter being the region that achieved nominal 
independence from the Ch’ing empire in November 1911.  Moreover, the Ch’ing, and 
later Republican, geographical construct of ‘Mongolia’ was further complicated by the 
simultaneous use of the term ‘Eastern Mongolia’ to refer to the eastern regions of both 
Inner and Outer Mongolia, and by the fact that ‘Eastern Mongolia’ contained some 
provinces that had been established in the late Ch’ing dynasty and others created by 
Republican China.  In both cases the authorities had established these provinces in an 
attempt to bring the region more directly under central control, first of the Ch’ing and 
                                                                                                                                              
33  See Junko Miyawaki-Okada, ‘The Japanese Origins of the Chinggis Khan Legends’, 
Inner Asia, vol. 8, 2006, pp. 124-5, 134, for discussion of the post-war romantic image  
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then of the Han Chinese regime.  At the same time, the older, Mongolian governing 
structures also remained in place.     
In 1907, the Ch’ing administration created the three provinces of Heilungkiang, 
Kirin and Fengtien, in the area that was the homeland of the Manchus and was known 
by both Westerners and Han Chinese as ‘Manchuria’.
34    The aim was not only to bring 
the northeastern region of the empire under more direct control, but also to counter 
Tsarist Russian expansion.  Despite the establishment of these provinces, the existing 
Mongolian administrative structure of leagues and banners remained in place in 
Heilungkiang and Fengtien (see Figure 2).  Then, in 1914, the government of 
Republican China divided ‘Inner Mongolia’ into the four ‘special administrative 
districts’ of Ninghsia, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol (see Figure 3).   Fourteen years later, 
in 1928, these districts were formally recognised by the Republican Chinese 
government as fully-fledged provinces.
35  While the four new provinces were now 
technically under central control, once again, alongside the Republican administration 
there continued to exist the older, Mongolian governing structures through which the 
Mongol princes maintained some control, even after the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty 
in 1912.  The overlap of either Ch’ing control or Republican administration at the 
national level with the Mongol leagues and banners at the local level resulted in 
confusion in the geographical terms used for parts of the region, a confusion that was 
subsequently both reflected and exploited by the Japanese elites as they sought to 
implement Japanese control there.     
In the first decade of the twentieth century, Japanese occupation in the region 
covered only a comparatively small part of Southern Manchuria, an area of some 3,500 
square kilometres located on the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula, known as the Kwantung 
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34  See Elliot, ‘Limits of Tartary’, pp. 603-46, for further discussion of this point.      
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Leased Territory.
36    From this perch, gained by Japan following its victory over Tsarist 
Russia in the war of 1904-5, Japanese observers looked north towards the area of 
Manchuria that Russia had occupied during the Boxer Rebellion, which remained under 
Russian control even after 1905.     
Even before the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese observers had already coined the 
term ‘Man-M’.
37    The term was applied to a geographically vague area including both 
Manchuria and Mongolia, although how much of either was unclear.  Over the course 
of the two decades following Japan’s victory over Russia, the area encompassed by the 
term changed, so that for some observers it came to include the Mongol leagues and 
banners within Jehol province, lying to the west of Manchuria.  The area covered by 
the term grew even larger to include, by the 1920s, sections of Suiyuan and Chahar, 
even further to the west. By 1915, as W. G. Beasley has noted, Manchuria and Inner 
Mongolia were ‘customarily elided in Japanese drafting’, with the compound ‘Man-M’ 
commonly used by Japanese officials.
38  It is significant that the term ‘Man-M’ or 
‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ is found only in Japanese sources, unlike ‘Manchuria’, a label 
found also in Chinese and Western sources.  This suggests that, consciously or 
otherwise, the term ‘Man-M’ was associated with Japanese interests and, ultimately, 
Japanese imperialism.     
 
                                                                                                                                              
35 Friters,  Outer Mongolia,  p.  199.   
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Figure 2:    Map of Manchuria and adjacent regions showing Chinese 
provinces in the late Ch’ing/Republican era, with Mongol leagues and 
banners shaded, adapted from Owen Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria:  
Their Tribal Divisions, Geographical Distribution, Historical Relations 
with Manchus and Chinese, and Present Political Problems, New York:   
John Day, 1934, reprinted New York:    Howard Fertig, 1969, p. 14.      
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Figure 3:    Map of North China, showing the provinces established in 1928, 
with areas of significant Mongol population shaded.    The names of the 
four new provinces are underlined, and the position of the Great Wall is 
marked.   
 
It is possible to encounter widely different interpretations of what ‘Man-M’ 
encompassed in contemporary sources written even over the short space of twenty years 
or so.
39    Furthermore, the label appears sometimes to overlap with other terms, such as 
‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’.    In other words, the fluid nature of the term 
‘Man-M’ allowed it to be applied to an area of territory that always included 
‘Manchuria’, but also covered a varying portion of ‘Mongolia’.  All three terms — 
‘Man-M’, ‘Inner Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’ — included parts of Mongolia 
that certain representatives of the Japanese government and military, and some outside 
the state, presumably sought to claim as Japan’s sphere of influence, although often 
with no clear definition of what precise area was encompassed.  Widely differing 
                                                 
39 For examples of the different labels used to describe the region, see A. M. Pooley, 
Japan’s Foreign Policies, p. 77, quoted in C. Walter Young, Japan’s Special Position 
in Manchuria, Baltimore:    Johns Hopkins University Press, 1931, reprinted New York:    
24
perceptions of what the region covered can be seen in Figures 4 to 8 inclusive, which I 
have drawn to represent the various opinions in the sources discussed in this section.  
The approximate position of the Great Wall is shown on each map, because both 
Chinese and Westerners regarded the wall as the boundary between ‘China proper’ and 
the region outside,
40  a point to which Japanese writers would repeatedly draw attention 
as well.     
In scholarly works as well as contemporary materials, the label ‘Man-M’ is used 
differently, largely reflecting the different time periods studied.  For example, 
Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka notes that during the early years of the South Manchurian 
Railway Company (founded in 1906), when Japanese commentators used either the 
technically narrower term ‘Mansh’ (Manchuria), or the more expansive ‘Man-M’, 
they included, to all intents and purposes, certain sections of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, that is, 
those parts lying in North Manchuria.  What this meant, according to Matsusaka, was 
that the terms ‘Mansh’ and ‘Man-M’ both referred to the region encompassing the 
three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien,
41 within which lay part of 
‘Eastern Mongolia’.  Thus there was no real difference between the area covered by 
the two terms, so that ‘Man-M’ equalled ‘Manchuria’ at this time.  As there were 
Mongol leagues and banners within the borders of Heilungkiang and Fengtien provinces 
in ‘Manchuria’, this position is technically correct:  the area in question was 
simultaneously both ‘Manchuria’  and  ‘Mongolia’.    
According to Gavan McCormack, however, by the autumn of 1921 Japanese 
politicians and military leaders considered the term ‘Man-M’ to comprise not only the 
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three provinces of Heilungkiang, Kirin and Fengtien, but also the ‘special 
administrative districts’ of Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan,
42 created in 1914, within which 
were also found Mongol leagues and banners.  This amounts to a far larger region.  
Adding even more confusion to the term ‘Man-M’, Onon Urgunge and Derrick 
Pritchatt, when writing about the period after the end of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912, 
imply that Eastern Mongolia and Northern Manchuria were one and the same region,
43 
an accurate observation, to the extent that within this region there existed concurrently 
both Manchurian provinces and Mongolian leagues and banners, particularly within 
Heilungkiang province.     
Thus, the term ‘Man-M’ encompasses different regions according to the writer 
and the period.  The ambiguity of the geopolitical labels given to the region can be 
seen in the writings of the famous Japanese poet Yosano Akiko about her 1912 journey 
along the Trans-Siberian Railway, in which she referred to the town of ‘Manchuli’ as 
being in Outer Mongolia.
44    Manchuli, however, clearly lay within the northern part of 
Manchuria on most maps, at least in 1930, when her book was published.    The failure 
of the Japanese authorities to properly define what they meant by ‘Man-M’ was 
specifically noted by Owen Lattimore in the early 1930s.
45   
                                                                                                                                              
41   Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904-1932, 
Cambridge, Mass.:  Harvard University Asia Center, Harvard University Press, 2001, 
pp. 422-3, n. 1.     
42 Gavan McCormack, Chang Tso-Lin in Northeast China, 1911-1928:  China, Japan 
and the Manchurian Idea, Folkstone, Kent:  Wm Dawson & Sons Ltd, 1977, pp. 58-
60.   
43 Urgunge Onon and Derrick Pritchatt, Asia’s First Modern Revolution:  Mongolia 
Proclaims its Independence in 1911, Leiden:    E. J. Brill, 1989, p. 124.     
44  Yosano Satoru and Yosano Akiko, Man-M yki, Tky:  saka yag shoten, 1930, 
p. 133.  The map at the front of T-A shinzen kijkai (ed.), Nichi-Man-Mkan chto 
kij tettei sanzen ri, Tky:  T-A shinzen kijkai, 1929, also places Manchuli in 
Mongolia, indicating that Yosano was not alone in making this assertion.     
45 Owen Lattimore, ‘The Unknown Frontier of Manchuria’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 11, 
no. 2, January 1933, pp. 315-30.      
26
In short, unless a contemporary source gives a clear definition of the term, modern 
readers must be cautious about what is designated by ‘Man-M’, and acknowledge that 
the fluid nature of the label allowed different groups to work on the basis of different 
understandings.  More importantly, as noted above, the discussion of what constituted 
‘Man-M’ was not simply a matter of geographical labels.  Throughout much of the 
pre-1945 period, the instability in meaning of this term was determined in part by the 
political and imperialist nature of Japan’s relationship with the region, as state 
authorities and others sought, under shifting circumstances, to delineate what they saw 
as Japan’s proper sphere of influence.     
That there was always a fair degree of confusion as to what the different terms 
meant is apparent, for example, from reports of Diet deliberations relating to Japanese 
railway construction in ‘Eastern Mongolia’ in May 1915, with a Diet member asking 
what was ‘the line of demarcation in Eastern Mongolia?’
46    In context, the focus at this 
time by some Diet members on ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and their desire to clarify the 
meaning of the term suggests they considered the region to be important to Japan’s 
continental ambitions, especially in connection with railway construction, at this point 
one of the principal means of imperial expansion.
47  The same sense of uncertainty 
about the geographical labels was echoed shortly after, in press reports concerning a 
planned visit in the summer of 1915 by a group of Tokyo high school students to the 
region.  One report commented that ‘Perhaps the students will succeed in locating 
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Eastern Inner Mongolia, about the position of which there was recently so much 
uncertainty expressed in the Diet’.
48   
 
 
 
Figure 4:    Torii Ryz’s perception of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, 1915.     
 
                                                 
48 ‘Students’ Educational Tour – Visit to China’, Japan Chronicle Weekly Edition, 15 
July 1915, p. 120.      
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Figure 5:    Torii Ryz’s perception of Japan’s sphere   
of influence in ‘Inner Mongolia’, 1928.     
 
 
Figure 6:    Kawase Tatsuo’s perception of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, 1926.     
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Figure 7:    Japanese Army’s apparent perception of Japan’s sphere of 
influence (‘Inner Mongolia’), March 1931, based on Sanb honbu, Chaharu, 
Suien sh heiy chishi, Tky:  n.  publ.,  1931,  p.  1.   
 
 
Figure 8:    Sat Yasunosuke’s perception of ‘Man-M’, May 1931.     
 
Neither was there a fixed view among academics as to how to define ‘Inner 
Mongolia’ and ‘Eastern Mongolia’.  In July 1915, the year of the question in the Diet  
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mentioned above, Torii Ryz, the pioneer Japanese anthropologist and a Mongolist on 
par with the American Owen Lattimore, attempted to elucidate the term ‘Man-M’.  In 
so doing, he explained that what Japan called ‘Eastern Mongolia’ was actually the same 
as ‘Inner Mongolia’.
49    Torii’s assertion that ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and ‘Inner Mongolia’ 
were interchangeable is problematic, as ‘Inner Mongolia’ traditionally includes Suiyuan 
and Ninghsia provinces, which are not in the east of Mongolia by any stretch of the 
imagination.  Torii claimed, as part of his explanation, that Japan had a ‘relation’ or 
‘connection’ (kankei) with four of the six leagues within Inner Mongolia, namely the 
Cherim, Chosotu, Chao-Uda and Silingol leagues,
50 located in Jehol and the northern 
half of Chahar provinces (see Figure 4).  His omission here of Suiyuan and Ninghsia 
was most likely because, with Diet deliberations and news reports discussing the 
apparent confusion surrounding the meaning of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ and ‘Inner 
Mongolia’, Torii’s focus was only on the area adjacent to Manchuria.  Possibly, in 
asserting that Japan had ‘ties’ with parts of Inner Mongolia, Torii was implying that 
Japan had a potential economic or political claim that stretched, or should stretch, deep 
into the then ‘special administrative region’ of Chahar.  Torii was an important 
individual in Japanese academia, whose career extended from the 1890s to 1953.  He 
eventually became Professor of Anthropology at Tokyo Imperial University, the apex of 
Japan’s academic world; and he had an ongoing relationship with both the Japanese 
Army and the Foreign Ministry.  Thus his pronouncements as to what ‘Man-M’ 
encompassed may have carried particular weight.     
Nevertheless, even Torii’s own definition of ‘Eastern’ or ‘Inner’ Mongolia did not 
remain unchanged.  In 1928 he stated that of the six leagues that comprised Inner 
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Ajia kokusai kankeishi no shiten kara’, in Mongoru kenkyjo (ed.), Kingendai Uchi-
Mongoru tbu no heny, Tky:    Yuzankaku, 2007, pp. 21-46.      
31
Mongolia, only three, Cherim, Chosotu and Chao-Uda, all located in Jehol province, 
were part of ‘Japan’s so-called sphere of influence’ (Nihon no iwayuru seiryoku han-i) 
in the region
51 (see Figure 5).  Compared with the area that Torii had earlier claimed 
as having a ‘relation’ or ‘connection’ with Japan, the Silingol league in Chahar province 
was removed.    It seems probable that the change in Torii’s position was influenced by 
views circulating among military and political elites as to the extent of Japan’s proper 
sphere of influence, as discussed below, a factor that may also have shaped his position 
in  1915.   
On the other hand, Kawase Tatsuo, in his 1926 Shina oyobi Shina mondai jiten (A 
Dictionary of China and the China Problem), defined ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ as ‘the 
eastern region of Inner Mongolia’, and included within his definition much of Chahar 
province, including the part below the Great Wall
52 (see Figure 6).  While Kawase’s 
background and position at the time of publication are not known, in the Foreword he 
acknowledged the help given him by Okano Masujir,
53 an advisor to the Chinese 
warlord Wu P’ei-fu.  Okano had ties to the Japanese military,
54 and although not 
conclusive, his links to Kawase suggest that Kawase himself may have either been a 
former military man or have had other links to the military.     
Kawase claimed that, ‘Generally speaking, what Japanese mean when they talk 
about Inner Mongolia, in the context of “Man-M”, is this “Eastern Inner Mongolia”’.
55  
Kawase’s perception of what ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ comprised was significantly 
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larger than the region that Torii had delineated in either 1915 or 1928.  Moreover, 
while there is no direct evidence that Kawase regarded the area covered by his 
definition as a potential Japanese ‘sphere of influence’, it seems probable that he did.  
Books of this nature, that is, those dealing with areas that were ‘problematic’ for Japan, 
seem usually to have been produced with a specific agenda in mind, often in order to 
lay claim to a region that the author considered should be brought under Japanese 
control.  Kawase’s probable connection with the military makes it even more likely 
that he wrote with some such purpose in mind.     
Nor was Kawase alone in his assertion that Chahar province fell within ‘Eastern 
Inner Mongolia’.  A year later, in a book discussing the railway system of Manchuria 
and Mongolia, shima Yokichi made a similar claim.
56  shima had carried out 
intelligence-gathering missions in Mongolia for the Japanese Army prior to the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5, served as a member of one of the special operations teams 
(tokubetsu ninmuha) dispatched during the war for espionage and sabotage, and 
subsequently published a book about these operations.
57   
This, however, was not the final word on the matter.  Even the Japanese Army 
itself offered different interpretations of the area considered to be Japan’s ‘sphere of 
influence’ in this region, as shown by two examples from the early 1930s.  In March 
1931, six months prior to the Manchurian Incident, the Army General Staff produced a 
lengthy secret report outlining the strategic importance of Suiyuan and Chahar and 
openly asserting the need to seize control of both provinces to facilitate a possible strike 
either north into Outer Mongolia, or west, deeper into the Han Chinese Republic.
58  
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The report stated on the very first page that ‘Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, together 
with Jehol province, are the so-called Inner Mongolia’
59 (see Figure 7), a view that 
would not have been particularly unusual, except for the omission of Ninghsia.  Why 
the army omitted Ninghsia from its definition of ‘Inner Mongolia’ is not known.    What 
is notable, however, is that the Army General Staff identified the need for Japanese 
control of this large area.    Rather than focusing its military ambitions on ‘Man-M’ as 
usually defined, which generally would not extend west of Chahar, the Army General 
Staff had apparently begun to consider the strategic importance of a far more extensive 
region, namely ‘Inner Mongolia’, which in this case included Suiyuan and Chahar 
provinces if not Ninghsia.     
An alternative and much more restricted definition, however, was offered just two 
months later, in May 1931, when former Major-General Sat Yasunosuke, writing for a 
general audience on ‘Sino-Japanese Relations with a Focus on the Manchuria-Mongolia 
Problem’, asserted that although most Japanese took the term ‘Man-M’ to mean 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, in actuality the term applied only to 
Manchuria
60  (see Figure 8).    It will be recalled that this was a tenable position, insofar 
as ‘Manchuria’ included some Mongol leagues and banners.  Sat had served as the 
representative of the Japanese Army General Staff at the Peking Consulate-General just 
prior to the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1912, and a few years later had acted as 
the go-between in negotiating Japanese government loans to a number of Mongolian 
princes, before moving into journalism.
61  It is highly unlikely that a former officer of 
Sat’s background and senior position would have produced such a statement about the 
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limits of ‘Man-M’ without solid reason.  The inference is that one aim of his book 
was to ‘define’ the army’s goal at that particular stage, only four months before the 
Manchurian Incident, perhaps restricting the area claimed to one that could reasonably 
be seized at one time.     
 
Scholarly Context 
Most scholars who have considered Japan’s relationship with Mongolia before 1945 
have focused on how the region was positioned strategically vis-à-vis Manchuria, and 
hence how it affected Japanese strategic aims there.
62    This is an important but limited 
factor.  For one thing, as I will illustrate, Japanese ambitions in Mongolia were much 
broader than such a view suggests.  Even before the region began to attract military 
attention at the end of the nineteenth century, religious, cultural, academic and 
economic considerations had already spurred certain groups and individuals in Japan 
actively to seek ties with Mongolia.     
Moreover, many scholars of Japan’s relationship with Manchuria do not in fact 
pay much attention at all to the impact of Mongolia on Japanese ambitions there.  
Sadako Ogata, Gavan McCormack, Louise Young and Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka, for 
example, have all examined aspects of Japan’s relations with Manchuria before 1945 
without making substantive reference to Mongolia.
63  As noted in some detail above, 
however, Japanese observers during the period under examination did not actually view 
Manchuria and Mongolia as distinct geographical regions, but usually grouped them 
together instead into the geographically amorphous entity known as ‘Man-M’.  
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Accordingly, examining Japanese ambitions in Manchuria without considering 
Mongolia is inadequate as an approach.     
Some research has specifically considered the role of Mongolia in Japan’s 
continental policy, but invariably the focus has been limited to a particular aspect or 
period.  For example, S. T. Leong discussed the official Japanese stance on Mongolia 
in his examination of Sino-Soviet relations, but only for the period between 1917 and 
1926 and, of course, with a principal focus on the relationship between China and 
Russia.
64    Nakami Tatsuo has written extensively on Japanese-Mongolian relations, but 
has concentrated on the period around the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911-12, and in 
particular on the role played by the Mongol prince, Güngsangnorbu.
65  Narangoa Li’s 
study of the links between Japanese imperialism and Mongolian Buddhism has dealt 
chiefly with attempts by the Japanese military during the 1930s and 1940s to subvert 
Mongolian Buddhism for its own ends.
66  As all of these works treat quite specific 
topics, they have limited capacity to consider developments over time, and the interplay 
among the different organisations and individuals involved in Japan’s relationship with 
Mongolia.    The full complexity of that relationship therefore remains obscured.     
From the Mongolian point of view, Uradyn E. Bulag has charted Japan’s 
contribution to the development of nationalism in both Inner and Outer Mongolia 
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during the 1911 Chinese Revolution and again during the 1930s.
67  Mongolian 
historian Baabar (Bat-Erdene Batbayar) has discussed the contribution of Japan’s ties 
with Outer Mongolia to the development of Mongolia as a nation, both prior to the 
declaration of independence from the Ch’ing dynasty in 1911 and in the decade 
following.  He focuses especially on the various Russo-Japanese agreements signed 
between 1907 and 1916, with particular reference to the establishment of Russian and 
Japanese spheres of influence in Mongolia, and on Japanese military support between 
1918 and 1922 for the Pan-Mongol movement, which called for the union of all the 
various Mongol peoples into one ‘Greater Mongolia’.
68  Baabar, however, pays little 
attention to the wider ramifications of Japanese religious, business and academic 
activities in the region.     
One of the most important commentators on the broader Japanese involvement in 
Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945 is the American scholar Owen Lattimore, the 
pioneer of Mongolian studies in the West.  Lattimore’s work spans the Second World 
War, but tends to concentrate on Japan’s relationship with Russia and China during the 
1930s and 1940s.
69  Historians David Sneath and Christopher Atwood have also 
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written from the Mongolian perspective, both focusing narrowly on the relationship 
between Inner Mongolia and China proper during the twentieth century, and in the case 
of Atwood, restricting himself to a period of just twenty years, from 1911 to 1931.
70  
The main focus of Sneath’s and Atwood’s works, as in the cases of Bulag and Baabar, 
is naturally on Mongolia itself; when the Japanese-Mongol relationship is considered, it 
is from the perspective of the Mongols, and not the Japanese.    While such scholarship 
is crucial in adding to our understanding of how the Mongols viewed their relationship 
with Japan, it cannot explain what it was that drew the Japanese to Mongolia.     
The majority of works that consider the importance of Mongolia to Japan within 
the larger question of Sino-Japanese relations, whether by Western, Chinese or Japanese 
academics, focus principally on the 1930s.    Such studies therefore cannot highlight the 
long and complex nature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship from the 1870s to 
1945.  Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai, Parks M. Coble and Sun Youli, for 
instance, writing from a Chinese perspective, have concentrated particularly on the 
impact of Japanese expansion into Inner Mongolia on Sino-Japanese relations prior to 
and during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-45.
71  Coble also considers the 
                                                                                                                                              
Ltd, 1941; Pivot of Asia:  Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontier of China and Russia, 
Boston:    Little, Brown and Company, 1950, reprinted New York:    AMS Press, 1975; 
Nomads and Commissars:    Mongolia Revisited, New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1962; Inner Asian Frontiers of China, Boston:  Beacon Press, 1962.  See also Diluv 
Khutagt, Owen Lattimore and Isono Fujiko (eds), The Diluv Khutagt:  Memoirs and 
Autobiography of a Mongol Buddhist Reincarnation in Religion and Revolution, 
Wiesbaden:  Otto Harrassowitz, 1982; Owen Lattimore (compiled by Fujiko Isono), 
China Memoirs:  Chiang Kai-shek and the War Against Japan, Tokyo:  University of 
Tokyo Press, 1990.     
70 David Sneath, Changing Inner Mongolia:  Pastoral Mongolian Society and the 
Chinese State, Oxford:    Oxford University Press, 2000; Christopher P. Atwood, Young 
Mongols and Vigilantes in Inner Mongolia’s Interregnum Decades, 1911-1931, 2 vols, 
Leiden:  Brill,  2002.   
71 Hsu Long-hsuen and Chang Ming-kai (comps), History of the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937-1945), Taipei:  Chung Wu Publishing Co., 1971; Parks M. Coble, Facing 
Japan:  Chinese Politics and Japanese Imperialism, 1931-1937, Cambridge, Mass.:  
Harvard University Press, 1991; Sun Youli, China and the Origins of the Pacific War 
1931-1941, New York:    St Martin’s Press, 1993.      
38
effect of Japanese attempts to woo the Inner Mongols before 1937, concluding that on 
the whole, the Inner Mongols were compelled as a result of various Kwantung Army 
schemes to side with the Japanese.
72  In general, however, works written from the 
Chinese perspective contain little analysis of why some Mongols were willing to side 
with the Japanese.     
The issue of Mongol collaboration with the Japanese in the 1930s has received 
some scholarly attention from other writers, and recent analysis of Sino-Japanese 
collaboration in other parts of China is also suggestive.    John Boyle concluded in 1972 
that those Inner Mongols who sided with the Japanese did so more because of 
frustration with Han Chinese rule than from a positive desire to support Japan.
73  Rana 
Mitter’s much more recent examination of Sino-Japanese collaboration in Manchuria 
during the existence of the puppet state of Manchukuo provides comparative examples 
through which the actions of the Inner Mongols can also be evaluated, as does Timothy 
Brook’s study of collaboration in central China.
74  Both Mitter and Brook conclude 
that whether an individual chose to collaborate or not depended on a variety of factors.  
According to Mitter, some in Manchuria were encouraged to collaborate by the 
Confucian world view that gave high priority to the efficient management of society — 
in other words, they collaborated because the Japanese were perceived as better 
managers than the Chinese.  Furthermore, Mitter states that ‘traditional Chinese 
thought contributed to [the] sanctioning [of] elite collaboration’ in particular.
75  Brook 
notes that people often collaborated simply to survive, as it was easier and safer than 
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resistance.
76  This thesis is chiefly concerned with Japanese rather than Mongolian 
perspectives.  In general, however, I concur with Boyle:  I suggest that those 
Mongols in positions of authority who chose to side with the Japanese did so because 
they sought independence from Han Chinese domination, even though what they 
eventually got was simply a change of overlord.     
The military dimension is fundamental to any examination of Japan’s relationship 
with Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945, as we have seen, and accordingly, this 
thesis deals in detail with military themes.  My research confirms some key recent 
findings and approaches in studies of the Japanese military.  In particular, the thesis 
reinforces an emphasis to be found in several recent studies, namely, the complex 
interplay between the military and political worlds in Japan before the Second World 
War, both in policy terms and in the careers of particular individuals.    In a sense this is 
a very old theme, but new approaches have revitalized and refined it.    Earlier works, as 
noted below, often concentrated on fairly narrow histories of single institutions, while 
the first analyses of the connections between the military and politics tended, 
understandably perhaps, to emphasise expansionist military dominance over ‘normal’ 
civilian politics.  The more recent works have provided much more subtle analysis of 
this topic.  The interplay among institutions that they describe was clearly evident in 
Japanese activities in Mongolia as it was elsewhere.     
The common perception of the Japanese Army among foreign observers, both 
prior to and after the Second World War, was that it either acted alone, or conspired 
with sinister intent with other arms of the state from the early 1930s onwards to 
dominate the political system.
77  Early corrections to this view were provided by 
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Malcolm Kennedy, the military attaché at the British Embassy in Tokyo in the early 
1920s, and Hillis Lory, who both noted the army’s long-standing and fairly orthodox 
connections with other elite institutions and the wider Japanese society.
78  Later  works, 
including those of Saburo Hayashi, Alvin D. Coox, Meirion and Susie Harries, and 
Leonard Humphreys, support the earlier conclusions of Kennedy and Lory, recognising 
that the army played an important part in the political process of determining Japan’s 
continental policy, and not just by ‘standover’ tactics.
79  Humphreys further notes that 
the Japanese military itself was a complex organisation riven by an array of different 
factions, all seeking their own direction with respect to policy.  The eventual 
consequence of these internal struggles was inconsistent military policy.
80  Coox  deals 
specifically with the ambitions of the Kwantung Army in Mongolia, showing that the 
pursuit of Japan’s supposed claims to the region had far-reaching consequences, among 
them ‘enhanced Chinese nationalism and confidence’.
81   
A number of recent studies have examined the relationship between the Japanese 
military and the bureaucracy, especially the Foreign Ministry, as well as the various 
political parties that existed in Japan from the latter part of the nineteenth century 
onwards.    They include the works of Barbara Brooks, Stewart Lone, Ryoichi Tobe and 
J. Charles Schencking.  Again, while none of these studies deals specifically with 
Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, each confirms the multiple connections between 
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the Japanese military and the civilian elites.  Such a perspective is reinforced and 
extended by my research on Mongolia.     
Brooks, for example, analyses the relationship between Japanese Foreign Ministry 
personnel stationed throughout China and their army counterparts, concluding that the 
consular officials on the spot were often fully aware of what the military was up to and 
kept the civilian authorities in Tokyo informed; the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo, on the 
other hand, was often unwilling to challenge the military.
82    The same was also true in 
the case of Mongolia, especially prior to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5 and at the 
time of the first Mongolian ‘independence’ movement in 1912.  Lone illustrates the 
manner in which prominent individuals, specifically General Katsura Tar, were able to 
move between the military and political spheres, playing an influential and 
complementary role in both.
83  Mongolia, too, provides instances of military officers 
who subsequently held political office and played an important role in both spheres.  
Tanaka Giichi and Araki Sadao are just two examples of army officers who were 
connected with military operations in Mongolia in the 1910s and 1920s, and who then 
moved into the political sphere where, no doubt, they continued to influence Japanese 
policy  on  Mongolia.   
Tobe focuses on the interplay between the military and political spheres that 
developed during the First Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, and on the 
importance of this connection not only for the military-political nexus, but also for the 
relationship between the Army Ministry and Army General Staff.
84  Relations  between 
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the Japanese military and political elites were just as significant in connection with 
Mongolia as in other ways.  In particular, the closeness between the military and 
political realms is displayed in the willingness of some members of both elites to 
overlook ‘patriotic’ insubordination by officers in the field in Mongolia during the 
1910s and 1920s.     
Schencking demonstrates the often complex nature of the relationship between the 
Imperial Japanese Navy and the political system in the late Meiji and Taish periods, 
showing that the navy exploited this connection to its own benefit, particularly in 
attempts to expand naval budgets.
85  The same complexity is also found in the 
relationship between the Imperial Japanese Army and the political system with respect 
to Mongolia.  When the two were in accord, the military was willing to co-operate 
with the political elite to enhance Japanese control of Mongolia.  It was also prepared 
to ignore the civilian government, however, when there was disagreement between the 
two and when the political elites sought to rein in the military.     
Taken as a whole, the works identified above provide a far better understanding of 
the way in which the military, political and bureaucratic elites in pre-war Japan 
interacted, especially with regard to Japan’s relations with China and Russia.  Thus 
they are particularly useful to a study of the relationship between Japan and Mongolia, 
in which so many individuals and agencies were active, often in concert with each 
other.  At the same time, analysis of Japanese projects in Mongolia complements and 
refines the insights of such earlier works.     
A major aim of this thesis is to explore the range of Japanese individuals and 
groups that were active in Mongolia and that often played a mediating role in Japanese 
imperialism there.  In particular, the thesis expands the range of conscious or 
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unconscious ‘partners’ of the Japanese military, well beyond the usual focus on 
politicians and bureaucrats, to include religious, academic and business figures among 
others.  In doing so, it builds on a theme evident in a number of recent studies that 
have recognised and explored the contributions of non-state actors, including writers, 
folklore specialists and doctors, to Japanese imperialism.  They include the works of 
Faye Yuan Kleeman, Timothy Tsu Yun Hui, Ming-Cheng M. Lo and Joshua Fogel.  
While studies of Japanese imperialism and colonialism are thus beginning to take 
account of a much wider range of actors than older works did,
86 the insights they 
provide are still very partial ones, and have hardly ever been applied to Mongolia.  
Nevertheless, though the majority of these works specifically consider Japan’s 
relationship with Taiwan, they do provide important examples through which to 
evaluate the actions of the people involved in the various Japanese schemes in 
Mongolia.   
Kleeman, for instance, analyses the Japanese colonial literature on Taiwan, 
providing a context through which writings on Mongolia can be assessed, particularly 
from the point of view of images of the local population.
87  For Kleeman, Japanese 
writing on Taiwan presented images that were far more complex than simply 
‘subjugated colonized populace and … dominating colonizer’.
88  This  observation  also 
applies to Mongolia, but in addition, the works of Japanese writers on Mongolia were 
often imbued with a sense of romance, something apparently less evident in the 
Japanese colonial literature on Taiwan.  Tsu demonstrates that pre-war Japanese 
academic research on folklore in China, particularly Taiwan, was a function of the 
emergent Japanese empire’s expansionist aspirations and colonising enterprises.   
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Moreover, he illustrates how the political elites used the work of Japanese academics to 
legitimise colonialism.
89  Such a finding is certainly relevant to Mongolia as well, as 
will be shown in my discussion of the anthropologist Torii Ryz especially.  Torii’s 
works, along with those of other Japanese academics, had considerable influence on 
pre-war Japanese images of Mongolia, yet have attracted little attention from scholars 
so far.
90    Though definitely scholarly in intent, Torii’s work also reflected the positions 
of the Japanese military and political elites, who also sponsored and supported his work 
in various ways.     
Lo examines the prominent role of doctors in Taiwanese politics and society, 
arguing that the activities of these doctors demonstrate the ‘unintended and 
unpredictable interactions’ that occurred between the processes of what she terms 
‘professionalization’ and ‘colonization’.
91  What Lo means is that by creating an ‘elite 
native class’, the Japanese encouraged the rise of a group who were then able to 
‘articulate and promote anti-colonial policies’.
92  A similar process occurred in 
Mongolia, where, for example, the Zenrin kykai’s provision of education to the local 
population led to an increase in dissatisfaction among Mongol nationalists, partly 
because the Japanese sought to make the Mongols feel they were part of the larger 
Japanese empire, contrary to the wishes of the great majority of Mongols.     
Finally, Fogel analyses the extensive range of Japanese travel writings about 
China from the Meiji Restoration through to 1945, also drawing attention to a number 
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of specific instances in which Japanese authors wrote about Mongolia.
93  He  notes  that 
the travel narratives of Japanese visitors to China are an ‘almost entirely unused 
source’,
94 even though they contain a wealth of firsthand information about a wide 
range of topics, something that also holds true for Japanese travel writings on Mongolia 
specifically.  This thesis demonstrates that such writings constitute a valuable source 
as to which groups and individuals across the Japanese elites exhibited an interest in 
Mongolia, pointing to a series of networks that has received little attention in previous 
scholarly examination of Japanese-Mongolian relations.    Moreover, such works reflect 
as well as help to construct dominant Japanese discourses on Mongolia in the period 
from the late nineteenth century onwards.     
 
Thesis Argument, Sources, Approach and Structure 
Overall, I argue in this thesis that Japan’s relationship with Mongolia was a crucial part 
of its interaction with the Chinese continent from the 1870s to 1945, and hence its 
foreign relations more broadly.  Though Mongolia was primarily coveted by Japanese 
leaders and ideologues for strategic reasons, the Japanese Army did not operate there as 
an isolated entity, but rather, cultivated ties with a variety of Japanese civilian actors, all 
of whom, with greater or lesser degrees of self-consciousness, helped to further the 
strategic goals of Japanese leaders while pursuing their own agendas as well.  
Mongolia, however, was more than just an arena of Japanese military activity.  It also 
offered unparalleled opportunities for the elaboration of all the major aspects of the 
discourses that made up Japan’s evolving claim to solidarity with and leadership of 
Asia.  In addition, it functioned as a showcase for Japan’s supposedly benevolent 
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intentions towards Asia.  In turn, the opportunities provided by Mongolia account for 
the wide range of groups and individuals in Japan that developed connections with 
Mongolia and for the often close relations between these groups and individuals on the 
one hand, and the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state on the other.     
The primary sources used in this thesis consist of a diverse range of contemporary 
materials.    In addition to these primary sources, I have drawn on a range of secondary 
texts, including some that use contemporary primary sources from languages other than 
Japanese and English, such as Mongolian, Chinese or Russian.  One important group 
of primary sources, held at Japan’s Beich shirykan (Self-Defence Force Archives), 
relates to Japanese military activities in Mongolia between the 1870s and 1945.    These 
materials include the Mitsu nikki (Secret Great Diaries), an unpublished collection of 
more than one hundred volumes containing the highest-level reports prepared by 
departments within the Army Ministry for the Army Minister, the Chief of the Army 
General Staff and the various departments that were directly subordinate to these 
positions, as well as the diaries of specific campaigns, including the Nishi ju mitsu 
nikki (Western Secret Great Diaries), which pertain specifically to the Siberian 
Intervention of 1918-22.
95  The Self-Defence Force Archives also contain opinion 
pieces by staff officers, intelligence reports from military officers in the field, and 
detailed reports regarding the strategic and economic potential of particular parts of 
Mongolia.   
Certain limitations of these sources must be borne in mind.  Aside from the fact 
that many of the early materials in the Secret Great Diaries are hand-written in an 
extremely cursive style that makes them difficult to read, there are also gaps in the 
records.  Such gaps may result from deliberate destruction, as in the disposal of 
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records that occurred shortly after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, or from 
losses incurred in other ways, including during the fire-bombing of Tokyo in the last 
months of the war.  Other lacunae also occur.  For example, the reports that mention 
Mongolia in the Secret Great Diaries between 1933 and 1935 are vague as to what the 
Kwantung Army was up to in the region, although other, more specific reports on 
Mongolia were certainly filed with the Kwantung Army General Staff by the Kwantung 
Army Special Intelligence Agency (Kantgun tokumu kikan) during this period; a 
number of them have been located from other sources, and will be examined in 
Chapters Four and Five.  Thus it seems that the Kwantung Army, for some reason, 
may have been keeping the Army General Staff in the dark about its activities in Inner 
Mongolia.  Moreover, the earliest reference to Japanese military goals in Mongolia in 
the Secret Great Diaries appears to occur in 1907, but other sources indicate a clear 
focus on Mongolia on the part of the army high command almost thirty years 
previously.  Despite such gaps, there are certainly more than enough entries in the 
Secret Great Diaries to demonstrate a high level of Japanese military attention to 
Mongolia from the late Meiji period through until the end of the Second World War.     
Materials held at Japan’s Gaik shirykan (Diplomatic Records Office of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), including consular reports and opinion pieces, provide 
strong evidence that Japanese diplomats pursued specific objectives in Mongolia.  
Such records also demonstrate the degree to which the Foreign Ministry and the Army 
Ministry co-operated with each other on matters relating to Mongolia as on other issues, 
as shown by the regular exchange of documents between the two.  The two ministries 
often agreed on policy for Mongolia, and the Foreign Ministry was, in all probability, 
generally aware of what the military intended.     
Three sets of published collections provide further valuable material.    The Senshi 
ssh (Military History Series), published by the Beich kenkyjo senshi shitsu (Self- 
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Defence Force Research Institute’s War History Section), is the official military history 
of the period between 1937 and 1945, and is based on records held in the Self-Defence 
Force Archives.
96  The series Gendaishi shiry (Source Materials on Contemporary 
History) reproduces a wide range of original documents.  Material in these volumes 
relevant to Mongolia is drawn not only from the Self-Defence Force Archives, but also, 
for example, from the South Manchurian Railway Company.
97  The  Foreign  Ministry’s 
official publication, Nihon gaik bunsho (Japanese Diplomatic Records), reproduces in 
one hundred volumes the telegraphic traffic between the Foreign Ministry and its 
embassies, consulates and legations from 1865 to 1935.
98   
Documents produced by the Japanese Army and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
give Japan’s official position with regard to Mongolia.  They are complemented by 
other contemporary sources, allowing us to build up a fuller picture of Japanese-
Mongolian relations and their importance at the time.  Such materials indicate that 
consciousness of Mongolia could be found throughout a much broader section of 
society than an examination relying solely on official records would suggest.  My 
research has uncovered at least seventeen books dealing exclusively or substantially 
with Mongolia that were published in Japan between 1878 and 1921, and more than 
forty published between 1922 and 1945, including travel accounts, guidebooks, 
government publications for the general public and works by highly respected 
academics.  Many of these sources have been overlooked in earlier examinations of 
Japan’s continental exploits.     
                                                 
96  B eich kenkyjo senshi shitsu, Senshi ssh, 86 vols, Tky:  Asagumo 
shinbunsha,  1968-75.   
97  Gendaishi shiry, 43 vols, Tky:  Misuzu  shob, 1962-70.     
98 Gaimush (ed.), Nihon gaik bunsho, 100 vols, Tky:  Nihon kokusai reng 
kykai, 1961-76.    Unfortunately, the documents contained in Nihon gaik bunsho only 
go up to 1935, so the Foreign Ministry’s official position on Mongolia after this date is 
not as fully documented.      
49
Such works also provide an insight into how Mongolia was presented to the wider 
Japanese reading audience.  They often describe the region that Mongolia was 
perceived to encompass, emphasising its size, as well as the customs and religions of 
the Mongols, giving the impression that Mongolia was in some respects different from 
Japan, particularly in its vast area, but in other respects similar, including in religion.  
Of particular interest in the case of these less formal sources is the question of who 
wrote the Forewords, as this is often an indication of the network of shared interest that 
existed at a specific time in relation to Mongolia.  For example, in three books on 
Mongolia published in Japan between 1909 and 1913,
99  the Forewords were written by 
kuma Shigenobu, one of the most important Meiji political figures, while two of the 
three also had Forewords by Fukushima Yasumasa, a prominent military figure with 
close ties to Mongolia.    While it is easy to explain the choice of Fukushima, given his 
connections with Mongolia, that of kuma is less obvious, as there appears to be 
nothing else in his career to suggest a strong involvement with Mongolia.  In one of 
the three examples, it may simply be that the author was kuma’s protégé,
100  but in the 
other two instances, this does not seem to be the case.  It may be that kuma had a 
connection to Mongolia that has escaped the attention of previous researchers.     
One caveat must be borne in mind when examining Japanese-language materials 
on Mongolia produced from the 1870s to 1945.  The intended audience and timing of 
publication are often important factors, as is acknowledged by the historian Nakami 
Tatsuo.
101  Some authors in the 1930s, for example, because of their association with 
right-wing organisations, glorified the role played by the tairiku rnin, the so-called 
‘continental adventurers’, more often than not right-wing, in Japan’s activities in 
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Mongolia.  In reality, their role was almost certainly less significant than that of the 
military.  On the other hand, the histories of right-wing associations are an important 
source of information on Japanese operations in Mongolia.  The three-volume history 
of the Kokurykai (Amur River/Black Dragon Society), for example, running to some 
eighteen hundred pages in total, constitutes one of the most important contemporary 
sources available on topics such as Japanese involvement in the Manchurian-Mongolian 
independence movements of 1912 and 1916.
102  To discount the information it 
provides would be extremely shortsighted.    A number of post-war works are also very 
useful, including the history of the semi-official Zenrin kykai.
103   
Several sets of official English-language primary sources are of particular value for 
this study.  The intelligence reports of the United States military attachés based in 
Peking between 1911 and 1941, for instance, give another perspective on the activities 
of the Japanese military in Outer Mongolia from the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in 
1912 through to Japanese military operations in Inner Mongolia during the 1930s.
104  
The reports from the various United States consulates in China between 1930 and 1939 
show how United States consular officials on the spot viewed Japanese activities in 
Mongolia.
105  A third major English-language source is the official record of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East, more often referred to as the Tokyo 
War Crimes Trials.
106  The object of the Trials was, in part, to determine legally if 
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Japan had pursued a concerted policy to gain control of the Chinese continent, 
beginning in 1928 with the assassination of the Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin, and 
continuing until 1945.  Accordingly, the materials presented to the tribunal by the 
prosecutors, at least, had been selected with a specific purpose in mind, that being to 
prove Japanese leaders guilty of waging a war of aggression, among other things.  
Naturally, therefore, such materials must be approached with caution.  Nevertheless, 
various documents presented to the tribunal do provide information on Japan’s activities 
in Mongolia, and thus supplement what is otherwise known from the various official 
and unofficial Japanese-language sources.     
Taken together, these three sets of official English-language sources contribute to 
an understanding of how Japanese ambitions in Mongolia impacted on Japan’s 
relationships with other countries, as well as providing both additional information and 
a different perspective on events as they unfolded.  The reports were written by 
experienced observers, who sought to provide their own governments with accurate 
information as to what was occurring in the region.  The use of such documents has 
allowed the construction of a far more detailed, and, in some ways, a more reliable 
picture of Japanese ambitions towards and activities in Mongolia than would have been 
possible by relying solely on Japanese-language sources.     
Less formal English-language materials also provide considerable insight into 
Japan’s relationship with Mongolia before 1945.  The researcher into events in Asia 
prior to the Second World War is blessed by the fact that so many Western visitors to 
the ‘Far East’ seem to have felt compelled to write about their journeys, either focusing 
on the weird and wonderful sights and smells that they encountered while touring the 
‘exotic Orient’ so that those back home could also appreciate them, or, particularly in 
the 1930s, pontificating on the events unfolding in China and Japan during this  
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tumultuous decade.
107  There was also a steady flow of works by long-term Western 
residents in Asia, including China, Outer Mongolia and Inner Mongolia, in which they 
sought to explain to those back home how things really were in the ‘exotic East’.
108   
Journalists, academics and other professionals who passed through the region 
produced other relevant works, including Thomas A. Bisson, Peter Fleming and 
Guenther Stein, all of whom wrote in the 1930s and at least touched upon Japan’s 
relationship with Mongolia.
109  Many of their books were constructed largely from the 
opinions of ‘leading Japanese’, voiced for Western consumption.  Such publications, 
especially those dating from the 1930s and 1940s, thus give an insight into how 
prominent Japanese at the time wanted the rest of the world to view the Japanese 
relationship with the Mongols, even if the Western writers recording their opinions did 
not always convey the view that their Japanese informants intended them to.  All of 
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these works must be approached with caution, as such writers were often also in the 
employ of one or other of the countries whose causes they championed, and many were 
partisan in their views.  Nevertheless, they are a valuable source of information.  
Western writers on the region also produced some serious academic works during the 
1930s, one example being the three volumes by C. Walter Young that examined Japan’s 
position in Manchuria in terms of international law.
110   
The thesis proceeds chronologically, moving from the earliest contacts between 
modern Japan and Mongolia that I have identified, that is, from shortly after the Meiji 
Restoration of 1868, to the end of the Second World War in 1945.    Within the specific 
chapters, the various dimensions of Japanese-Mongolian relations are analysed both 
thematically and chronologically.    Chapter One deals with the period from 1873, when 
Meiji Japan’s first encounter with Mongolia appears to have occurred, through to the 
abdication of the young Manchu emperor Pu-yi in February 1912 and the end of the 
Ch’ing dynasty, examining the diverse range of groups and individuals in Japan who 
worked to further specific objectives in Mongolia during this first phase.    Chapter Two 
then examines the three Japanese-sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian movements that 
sought independence from China after the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty.    The chapter 
covers the period from March 1912 until the death of the Japanese-backed White 
Russian military leader Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg in 
September 1921, and focuses almost exclusively on a re-examination of Japanese 
military ambitions in the region at that time.  In particular, this chapter discusses the 
role that covert military operations in Mongolia played in the development of gekokuj 
as a means of implementing policy on the continent, together with the apparent 
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willingness of the army high command to turn a blind eye to such behaviour when it 
fitted with its own objectives.     
Chapter Three analyses the period from the Japanese withdrawal from Siberia in 
November 1922, following the failure of the Siberian Intervention to halt the Bolshevik 
advance, until just prior to the creation of Manchukuo by the Kwantung Army in March 
1932.  The chapter considers first the re-emergence of connections with Mongolia 
among Japanese business and religious groups, then the re-appearance of overt Japanese 
military attention to the region, particularly in relation to its potential to supply horses 
to the Japanese Army.     
Chapter Four deals with the period from the Manchurian Incident in September 
1931 to the Suiyuan Incident in November 1936, examining the various military and 
intelligence-gathering operations undertaken by the Kwantung Army in an attempt to 
gain control of Inner Mongolia, as well as the activities of the Japanese-sponsored 
Mengchiang government between its foundation in September 1937 and the defeat of 
the Japanese Army in August 1945.    In addition, it discusses the cultural promotion of 
Japan’s claim to a special position in Mongolia through an examination of Japanese- 
and English-language books published between 1932 and 1945.   Finally, Chapter Five 
discusses the operations of the Zenrin kykai from its inception in 1933 until August 
1945, investigating the humanitarian activities that it undertook in Inner Mongolia 
through the provision of medical facilities and educational opportunities, as well as its 
increasing interest in the Muslims of Mongolia and its promotion of Mongolia in Japan.     
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
 
SOLDIERS, ADVENTURERS AND EDUCATORS: 
MEIJI ENCOUNTERS WITH MONGOLIA, 1873-1912 
 
 
‘When Lieutenant-Colonel Fukushima crossed Siberia … the Japanese nation 
went wild with enthusiasm and feted him everywhere as a hero’.
1   
 
 
 
Information about the early stages of Japan’s relationship with Mongolia in the modern 
period is sketchy.  The evidence that exists, however, indicates that representatives of 
a number of different groups, including military, diplomatic, political and religious 
elites, sought to cultivate ties with Mongolia from an early stage, and that first contact 
between the two countries in the modern period probably occurred in 1873, only five 
years after the start of the Meiji era.     
This chapter analyses relations between Japan and Mongolia in the Meiji period 
from Japan’s point of view.  Sources are patchy, as noted above, but one way to 
investigate Mongolia’s significance for Japanese leaders in this period is to examine the 
activities of specific individuals who had both a strong connection to Mongolia and 
close contacts with the Japanese elites.  The first part of the chapter focuses on the 
careers of three very different people connected with the Meiji military, political and 
academic worlds who sought to develop links with Mongolia in this period, namely 
Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima Naniwa and Kawahara Misako.  All three were 
deeply connected with events in Mongolia after 1879 but are now largely forgotten 
figures.  The chapter next examines the cultural connection between Japan and 
Mongolia, as seen through the romantic musings of political and academic figures, and  
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the promotion of ties with Mongolia by Buddhist leaders.  Lastly, the chapter details 
Japanese activities in Mongolia in the first part of the twentieth century, up to 1912 and 
the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty, an event that precipitated a distinct change in 
dominant Japanese perceptions of Mongolia, especially in its relation to China.     
Certain common themes are evident throughout this formative period in relations 
between Japan and Mongolia, themes that embedded themselves in Japanese discourse 
about the region and remained persistent for decades afterwards.  Some Meiji-period 
observers believed that Japan and Mongolia shared a common racial heritage; along 
with this the idea developed that there was something inherently romantic about 
Mongolia.    Such an attitude is markedly different from the Japanese view of Korea; as 
Peter Duus notes, Japanese writers may have exoticised Koreans, but they never 
romanticised them.
2    The intertwined themes of a common heritage and of Mongolia as 
a place of romance were continually revisited throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, until they became more or less fixed aspects of the dominant image 
of Mongolia in Japan.  Moreover, as the notion of a supposedly shared racial heritage 
developed, it was in turn woven into the emerging discourse that proclaimed Japan’s 
solidarity with and leadership of Asia.  Underlying the romantic perception, however, 
was the far more important fact that Mongolia occupied a vital geo-strategic position, 
lying as it did between Russia and China.    This was the overriding concern for those in 
the Japanese elites who cast their eyes towards Mongolia, though they couched their 
views partly in culturally romantic terms.  Alongside geo-strategic considerations, 
another significant feature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship that was established 
in this early period was the interdependence of military and civilian elements in the 
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quest for greater Japanese control over Mongolia, an interdependence that continued 
until  1945.   
Fukushima Yasumasa was one of the outstanding Japanese military men of his 
time.  Though no longer much remembered, he was once a household name 
throughout Japan because of a dramatic and well-publicised lone horseback ride he 
undertook from Berlin to Vladivostok in 1892-3.    He subsequently had a distinguished 
military career, which included serving as the commander of the Japanese expeditionary 
force to Peking during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and as governor of the Kwantung 
Leased Territories.  If Kawashima Naniwa is now remembered, it is as the adoptive 
father of Japan’s infamous female spy, the Manchurian-born Kawashima Yoshiko, the 
‘Far Eastern Mata Hari’.
3  Kawashima Naniwa himself, however, was one of the 
principal political activists in Japanese attempts to establish an ‘independent’ Mongolia 
from 1912 onwards.  To understand the role he played after 1912, it is important to 
examine his career during this earlier period.  Thus in this chapter, the discussion of 
Kawashima centres on his initial activities in China and the links he forged in Peking 
with two Manchu princes.  These connections were crucial to his later activities in 
Mongolia, which will be discussed in Chapter Two.  Kawahara Misako is in some 
ways the most fascinating of the three, for her career illuminates the interplay of 
different Japanese ambitions in Mongolia in the late Meiji period and beyond, as well as 
contributing to the entrenchment of some important attitudes that influenced ongoing 
Japanese activities in the region.  She was primarily a teacher who worked in 
                                      
3 For details regarding Kawashima Yoshiko’s life see Muramatsu Shf,  Dans no 
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Mongolia for several years, but she also engaged in undercover work for the Japanese 
military during the Russo-Japanese War.     
All three of these people were born in the town of Matsumoto in Nagano 
Prefecture, in central Japan, and in some way they were connected with one another.  
Post-war studies in English that consider Japan’s continental expansion during the Meiji 
period have paid little attention to their careers.    Yet, as I will show in this chapter, the 
lives and careers of the soldier, Fukushima, the adventurer, Kawashima, and the teacher, 
Kawahara, foreshadowed much about the tone and pattern of Japan’s later forays into 
Mongolia, and also contributed to the forging of an influential and popular Japanese 
image of Mongolia as a wild and romantic region.  This image, in turn, arguably 
provided an important underpinning for Japanese activities in Mongolia in later decades.    
The chapter then examines the other cultural connections that existed between 
Japan and Mongolia during this period, before finally analysing Mongolia’s position in 
military, diplomatic and political thinking following Japan’s victory over Russia in 
1905.   
 
Fukushima Yasumasa and the Military Dimension of Japanese-Mongolian 
Relations 
Fukushima Yasumasa was born in Matsumoto in 1852, and joined the military at an 
early age.  Clearly his superiors saw something in him, as he was transferred to the 
Army General Staff in 1875, at the age of just twenty-three.  Fukushima was destined 
for a colourful career, during which he would visit places as diverse as India, the United 
States and the countries of the Balkans, as well as serving as military attaché in China, 
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Korea and Germany.
4    His first contact with Mongolia came in 1879 when Lieutenant-
General Yamagata Aritomo, then chief of the Japanese Army General Staff, dispatched 
him to Inner Mongolia to spend three months undercover, gathering intelligence on the 
region.  Exactly why Yamagata chose to send Fukushima to Inner Mongolia is 
unknown.  Fukushima, however, was not the only officer Yamagata sent around this 
time to study conditions in the countries that were Japan’s near neighbours.  In 
December 1878 Yamagata had already dispatched Lieutenant-Colonel, later General 
and Prime Minister, Katsura Tar, in this case to study and report on conditions in 
North China and Korea, and in the same year that Fukushima was dispatched to Inner 
Mongolia, Yamagata also sent ten officer-students to survey various other parts of 
China.
5    It should be noted, though, that while Katsura and the officer-students sent to 
China appear to have travelled in uniform, Fukushima, as mentioned above, was 
ordered to travel incognito.    The reason remains unclear, but the dispatch of officers in 
disguise, especially to the borderlands between China and Russia, continued after this 
point as well.     
Yamagata’s specific orders to Fukushima provide some indication of the nature of 
the Japanese Army General Staff’s goals in Mongolia at this time.
6  Principally, the 
army’s focus on Mongolia stemmed from a general desire on the part of Japanese 
military leaders to establish control of North China, and an appreciation that the greatest 
threat to such ambitions was Russia.    The Russians already had an established military 
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presence in Outer Mongolia by the late nineteenth century,
7 and it was always likely 
that they would continue their advance until they reached the Pacific coast of the 
Chinese continent, placing them within striking distance of the Japanese archipelago.  
There were two possible routes for the Russians to take.  The first was south from 
Outer Mongolia into North China, followed by a turn east, directly into Manchuria.  
The alternative was for the Russians to enter Manchuria over its northern border, the 
one abutting Siberia, then move south down through Manchuria, and then turn west to 
head directly into North China.
8    With either of these manoeuvres, the Russians might 
gain control of a large area of the northern region of the Ch’ing empire.     
If Japanese forces, on the other hand, were to be active in the region, they would 
be most likely to operate from North China, and they therefore needed to evaluate 
which route the Russians might take if they chose to advance into the region.  
Amongst other things, Fukushima was required to assess the likelihood of the Russians 
moving south from Outer Mongolia, as well as the likelihood that they might either use 
the western route from Kupeikou, lying to the north of Peking or, as an alternative, 
advance from Manchuria into North China via Shankaikwan; to assess the political 
situation in Inner Mongolia and determine whether the Mongols were pro-Japanese; and 
to locate Han Chinese in Inner Mongolia who were willing to work with the Japanese.
9  
On his return to Japan, in December 1879, Fukushima prepared a report for Yamagata 
detailing his five-month mission to North China and Mongolia, entitled Rinb heibi 
ryaku (The Military Preparedness of Our Neighbour), and the following year this report 
was presented to Emperor Meiji.
10  Two years later, Fukushima was given an official 
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posting to China, on this occasion serving as military attaché in Peking from 1882 to 
1884.  While there is no record of him visiting Inner Mongolia during this period, 
given that the Great Wall, which was regarded as the boundary between China proper 
and Mongolia, lay only one hundred kilometres north of the Chinese capital, the 
possibility that Fukushima made additional intelligence-gathering sorties into the region 
cannot be discounted.
11   
Between 1880 and 1885 the Japanese Army General Staff sent a number of other 
officers to carry out operations similar to Fukushima’s, with two in particular focusing 
on Mongolia.    In 1881, when Major Yamamoto Kiyokatsu was returning to Japan after 
a period of service as military attaché in St Petersburg, he travelled via Irkutsk, Urga 
(Ulan Bator, the capital of Mongolia), Kalgan and Peking.  He thus became the first 
Japanese Army officer to have visited Outer Mongolia, as far as I can ascertain.
12  Four 
years later, in 1885, Lieutenant Hagino Suekichi was dispatched on an intelligence-
gathering operation to Vladivostok, Siberia and Mongolia.
13    Unfortunately, there is no 
record of how long either Yamamoto or Hagino spent in Mongolia, nor what their 
specific instructions were while there.  Overall, however, the dispatch of several 
military officers to gather intelligence about Mongolia suggests that the Japanese Army 
General Staff regarded the area as at least potentially important in strategic terms.     
In 1887, the Army General Staff’s intelligence-gathering in relation to China as a 
whole resulted in the production of a six-volume work entitled Shina chishi staibu (A 
Complete Topography of China).
14  Volume Six covered Manchuria, Mongolia and 
Tsinghai, the last being the province adjacent to Tibet, as well as the peoples on the 
                                      
11 Richard Deacon, Kempeitai:  The Japanese Secret Service Then and Now, Tokyo:  
Charles E. Tuttle, 1990, p. 67.     
12 Shimanuki,  Fukushima, vol. 1, p. 74.     
13 Nishihara Yukio, Zenkiroku Harubin tokumu kikan:  Kantgun jhbu no kiseki, 
Tky:    Mainichi shinbunsha, 1980, p. 13.      
62
peripheries of these regions, who were termed ‘outlying nomads’ (naizoku ybokubu).  
Fukushima was directly involved in the production of this series, being listed on the title 
page as one of those responsible for proofreading and corrections.  A second work, 
again part of a multi-volume series, was published six years later, in 1893.  Shina 
chishi kan jgo ge:   Mko bu (A Topography of China, volume 15, part 2:    Mongolia) 
ran to 215 pages, beginning with the location of Mongolia in terms of longitude and 
latitude, as well as geographical features such as rivers, before moving to cover, in 
some detail, such topics as manners (fzoku), Buddhism, education, trade, roads and 
population.
15  The production of such substantial and detailed works indicates the 
degree of attention that the military paid to Mongolia, among other parts of China, in 
the 1880s and 1890s.     
Fukushima Yasumasa, in the meantime, had returned to Mongolia in the most 
dramatic way, in the process bringing both himself and Mongolia to the attention of the 
broader public in Japan.    In 1887, he had been dispatched to Berlin as military attaché, 
a post that he held for over five years.    During his time in Berlin, someone supposedly 
offered him a wager that it was impossible for a man to ride solo on horseback from 
Berlin to Vladivostok.    Fukushima accepted the wager.
16    As unlikely as it may sound, 
this was not the first instance of a lone ride by a military officer through territory 
controlled by another power.  In 1875, a British officer, Captain Frederick Gustavus 
Burnaby, had embarked on a ride through Russia into Afghanistan, a journey that 
allowed him to gather information for Britain on Russia’s military strength along the 
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way.
17  Presumably, the Japanese Army General Staff was thinking along the same 
lines when it agreed to Fukushima’s ride, although Fukushima both sought and received 
permission from the Russian and Chinese governments for his trip,
18 indicating, 
perhaps, that those governments were not overly worried about what he might learn.     
 
  
Figure 9:    Fukushima Yasumasa, c. 1895, 
reproduced from ta Ayama (ed.), Ch Ajia yori Arabia e (Fukushima 
shgun iseki tsuzuku), Tky:  T-A kykai, 1943, reprinted Tky:  
zorasha, 1997.     
 
Having taken the bet, and having received approval to undertake the attempt from 
the Japanese Army General Staff and from the Russian and Chinese governments, 
Fukushima departed from Berlin on his epic journey on 20 January 1892.  While the 
ostensible objective of his journey was to prove that the lone ride to Vladivostok was 
possible, and to win the wager, there can be little doubt, given the approval of the Army 
General Staff, that it was also an intelligence-gathering exercise of the first order.  
Fukushima travelled from Berlin through the Russian empire, spending almost a month 
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and a half in Mongolia, before finally reaching Vladivostok on 9 June 1893, some 
seventeen months after setting out.
19  His lone ride, as Jason Karlin has noted, 
coincided with an upsurge of romanticism towards Asia among certain groups of 
Japanese youth.    This romanticism centred on tales of the horseback bandits of the late 
Ch’ing period who had apparently ‘protected’ the peasants who lived along the great 
plains of Northeast China, the region that encompasses Mongolia and Manchuria,
20 
though it is unclear exactly what the bandits were protecting the peasants from.     
The Japanese press covered Fukushima’s journey extensively; there was obviously 
no secrecy surrounding his ride.
21  When Fukushima arrived in Vladivostok there was 
even a Japanese journalist on hand to interview him, and according to James Huffman, 
this one interview provided copy to the Tky asahi newspaper for an incredible 120 
successive stories that ran through until November 1893, nearly six months after the 
completion of the journey.
22  The extensive reporting of Fukushima’s adventure made 
him, as Karlin has noted, ‘an overnight hero and a symbol of the new adventurous 
Japanese male’.
23  T h e  saka asahi newspaper proclaimed in June 1893:  ‘in one fell 
swoop, this stalwart fellow of five lands and two seas has astonished us all and elevated 
the good name of Japanese men.  What’s more, he has made our nation’s pride shine 
among the Great Powers’.
24  In fact, Fukushima’s exploits were still being written 
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about more than twenty years after his death, as will be discussed in Chapter Four, and 
recently his lone ride has been presented to a new audience through manga.
25   
According to Karlin, one contemporary outcome of Fukushima’s ride was that, 
encouraged by the stories about Fukushima, ‘would-be Japanese adventurers, many 
former  sshi [the so-called “patriotic adventurers”], journeyed to the continent, 
apparently aiming to define their manhood through imperialistic labours and idealistic 
dreams’.
26  One of those ‘patriotic adventurers’ was Kawashima Naniwa, who was 
subsequently closely connected with Japanese schemes to bring Mongolia and 
Manchuria under Japanese control.     
 
Kawashima Naniwa:    Man of Action 
Kawashima was born in Matsumoto in 1865.    He was apparently fascinated with China 
from an early age, and in 1882, at the age of seventeen, entered a foreign language 
school in order to learn the Chinese language.  In 1886 he made his first visit to the 
Asian mainland, travelling to Shanghai.  With him, Kawashima carried a letter of 
introduction to Fukushima Yasumasa, who was at this time stationed in Tientsin.
27  
Exactly why Kawashima needed an introduction is a little unclear, as according to a 
number of sources, it was Fukushima who had provided the funds for Kawashima to 
make the journey in the first place.
28   
Kawashima remained in China for a number of years, and according to more than 
one source, it was during this first period of residence there that he began to think about 
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the desirability of establishing a new country in the region of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ to 
protect Japan against invasion by Russia.
29  His stay in China, however, was cut short 
in 1889 by illness, and he was forced to return to Japan.  Undaunted, Kawashima 
travelled back to China to serve as an interpreter for the Japanese Army during the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, and then again during the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, this 
time at the specific request of Fukushima Yasumasa, then the commanding officer of 
the Japanese Expeditionary Force.
30  In the course of his second term of duty as an 
interpreter, Kawashima came into contact with Prince Ch’ing, one of the two Manchu 
princes with whom he was to be closely connected during the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, the other being Prince Su (see Figure 10).
31   
Exactly when or where Kawashima first met Prince Ch’ing is a matter of 
conjecture, but it is likely that it was following the 1900 Boxer siege of the Peking 
legations.    In any case, the relationship between the two was such that in October 1900, 
only two months after the lifting of the siege, Kawashima was asked by Prince Ch’ing 
to coordinate an intensive training program in police work for the then fledgling 
Chinese police force in Peking.  There is no obvious reason for the selection of a 
Japanese for this position, except perhaps for a general recognition throughout Asia of 
Japan’s success in modernisation, and how and why Kawashima came to be chosen is 
not clear.    There is nothing in his background to suggest why he was suitable.    It may 
have been partly that, given his acquaintance with the commander of the Japanese 
Expeditionary Force, that is, Fukushima, Kawashima was deemed a politically suitable 
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appointee by Ch’ing, one who could act as an intermediary between the Ch’ing court 
and one of the nine powers occupying Peking following the end of the Boxer Rebellion.   
Kawashima’s appointment was to lead to even greater things, when in August 1901 
Prince Ch’ing awarded him a five-year contract to head the new Peking Police 
Academy.  The award of a contract of this length was unusual, as agreements were 
normally for three years, but in fact Kawashima single-handedly oversaw the academy 
for the next twelve years.
32   
 
  
Figure 10:    Kawashima Naniwa (left) and Prince Su (right), c. 1905, 
reproduced from Aida Tsutomu, Kawashima Naniwa-, Tky:   
Bunsuikaku, 1936, reprinted Tky:  zorasha, 1997, opp. p. 88.   
 
Kawashima’s time in Peking allowed him great opportunity for intrigue, especially 
in the field of intelligence-gathering.    His exact relationship with the Japanese military 
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at this point is not known, but there is evidence that he was involved in covert 
operations.  According to Reynolds, it was later reported that during the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904-5 Kawashima had begun to use the academy as a base for 
political propaganda against the Russians on behalf of the Japanese.  Reynolds adds 
that the academy was also reported to have become a gathering-place for Japanese 
adventurers with their eye on Mongolia.
33  This was not the only instance of 
Kawashima’s apparent connection with intelligence-gathering.  According to 
Kamisaka Fuyuko, Kawashima planted a Japanese teacher at a school in Peking run by 
the Manchu Prince Su, with the teacher reporting to Kawashima regularly on events 
within the Su household.
34    Kawashima’s connection with Prince Su grew even closer, 
when, in 1913, he adopted one of the prince’s daughters, Chin Pi-hui, renaming her 
Kawashima Yoshiko.
35   
In many respects, Kawashima Naniwa represents the archetypal ‘tairiku rnin’, or 
continental adventurer.  His early career is certainly a good example of the way in 
which individual Japanese who were drawn to the Chinese continent subsequently 
became involved in various schemes to further Japanese influence in the region.  
Through his association with Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima met and developed 
close ties with the Manchu Prince Su.  Together the two men went on to play an 
important part in the Japanese-sponsored attempts to detach portions of Mongolia and 
Manchuria from Han Chinese Republican control after 1912, as we will see later.     
Meanwhile, by the early 1900s, important changes had begun to occur in the ethnic 
composition of Inner Mongolia.    Until the start of the twentieth century, the regions of 
Mongolia and Manchuria had been officially off-limits to Han Chinese.    This is not to 
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say that there had been no immigration by Han Chinese into these regions, but rather 
that numbers were limited.  The situation changed in 1902, when, to raise money to 
pay the Boxer Indemnity required by the foreign powers as compensation for the losses 
they had suffered during the rebellion, the Ch’ing court abolished the earlier policy of 
immigration restraint and opened these lands to cultivation.
36  The land was thus sold 
to Han Chinese who wished to migrate to the region.  Then, around 1903, with the 
extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway as far as Dairen, there was an influx of Russian 
settlers into the northern Mongolian hinterlands, a region that had long been isolated 
from the rest of the world.     
The increased contacts between Mongols and outsiders led some Mongol nobles to 
reassess how they viewed their existing relationship with the Manchu and the Han 
Chinese.  Indeed, some nobles gradually became pro-Japanese, in part because they 
believed that with Japanese help they could achieve greater independence from the Han 
Chinese, who now controlled them more closely.
37  While the desire to achieve 
independence was muted prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the seeds that grew 
into greater Japanese-Mongol co-operation in later years were planted at this time.  
This was the situation in Mongolia when Kawahara Misako first travelled there.     
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Kawahara  Misako:  A  Forgotten  ‘Hero’ 
Kawahara is a significant figure in Japanese-Mongol relations, not least because she 
was a woman and she went to Mongolia as a teacher in 1903.
38  In previous academic 
commentary on Meiji expansion, where the role of Japanese women has been 
considered, the focus has most often been upon prostitutes.
39    It is clear, however, from 
the careers of Kawahara and a number of others like her, that there is a second group of 
women, namely teachers, who have been largely overlooked in the context of Meiji 
Japan’s continental expansion.    For this reason alone, Kawahara is an important figure, 
as she provides a different perspective on women’s role in the imperialist project.  In 
addition, Kawahara’s career points to the function of education itself as a means of 
strengthening the ties between Japan and Mongolia, an aspect of cultural exchange that 
has received comparatively little scholarly attention.    Teaching was in fact originally a 
male profession in Japan, and the influx of women into the profession did not begin 
until around 1916,
40  making Kawahara one of the pioneers among women teachers.     
It was not only in the cultural realm that she was active, however, and a further 
dimension of Kawahara’s importance is the part she played in intelligence-gathering 
operations prior to and during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, using her position as 
a teacher in Mongolia to serve the Japanese Army General Staff in its desire for 
accurate information on the region.  Finally, through her later activity as a writer, 
Kawashima contributed strongly to the introduction and consolidation of a romantic 
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view of Mongolia among the Japanese reading public in the early part of the twentieth 
century.    Such a view persisted in Japanese discourses for decades to come.     
Kawahara attracted a good deal of attention in Japan throughout her adult life, 
especially in the early twentieth century, and again in the 1930s.  The publicity that 
surrounded her raises the question of why her exploits have not received greater 
attention from historians.   The most probable explanation is that Kawahara, while both 
a woman and a teacher, was also blatantly an agent of Japan’s expansionist policies, and 
as such may have seemed an embarrassing figure after the Second World War.    This is 
unfortunate, as an examination of Kawahara’s career provides a good understanding of 
the relationship between official organisations and ‘unofficial’ individuals during 
Japan’s imperial phase, and of the role that at least one woman played in this 
relationship.   
Kawahara was born in Matsumoto in 1875, the eldest daughter of Kawahara Ch, a 
respected  kagakusha or Chinese literature scholar, and his wife Shinako, who died 
while Kawahara was still a child.  Her family was acquainted with the family of 
Fukushima Yasumasa.
41  Kawahara graduated from high school, and then went on to 
attend the Women’s Higher Normal School in Tokyo, later known as Ochanomizu 
Women’s University, although ill-health forced her to return home without graduating.  
Despite this, Kawahara continued her studies, presumably at home, and began teaching 
at Nagano Girls’ High School.    It was while she was there that she met the noted Meiji 
educator Shimoda Utako,
42 whose influence on her was considerable.  The extent to 
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which Kawahara modelled herself on Shimoda apparently led to Kawahara being 
nicknamed ‘little Shimoda’ (koShimoda).
43   
Shimoda herself is an important figure not only in the history of education in Japan, 
but also in her promotion of Pan-Asian ideals.    She was very influential in both official 
and non-official circles concerned with educational reform for girls in China and Japan 
from the late nineteenth century onwards.    She worked closely with both Japanese and 
Chinese politicians during this period to create educational institutions that instilled in 
women what she regarded as East Asian values, including the practice of ‘feminine 
virtues’ and the desire to serve the nation by reorienting these virtues from a simple 
focus on local issues towards patriotism of a national kind.  Her objective was to 
‘strengthen Asia’ by extending education to all women while at the same time 
preserving the Confucian concept of female virtue.  Prasenjit Duara has called 
Shimoda the single most significant figure of the early twentieth century in East Asia in 
the development of orthodox role models for women, particularly in her insistence that 
women should be self-sacrificing and frugal.
44  In many ways, Shimoda’s views on 
education for women were actually not that different from those of other leading 
educational figures in Japan, but what is distinctive is her combination of these views 
with Pan-Asianism.     
It was apparently on Shimoda’s recommendation that Kawahara was employed 
from 1902 onwards by the famed Wupen Women’s College in Shanghai, as the lone 
female among the school’s nine teachers.    Shimoda probably recommended Kawahara 
because the two women shared not only broadly similar ideas about education in 
general, but also more specific ideas about education for women.    Kawahara remained 
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in contact with Shimoda, in all likelihood for the rest of Shimoda’s life.  At one point 
Kawahara asked Shimoda to pen a Foreword for the book she wrote about her time in 
China proper and Mongolia, as well as entrusting to Shimoda the education of three 
young Mongol women who had been placed in her care,
45  as we will see below.     
Kawahara’s appointment to the Shanghai college may also have been the result of 
efforts by another person who was in favour of women’s education, namely 
Güngsangnorbu (Gung), prince of the Kharachin Right Banner, an administrative 
district in the eastern part of Inner Mongolia, who was related by marriage to Prince Su, 
the Peking sponsor of Kawashima Naniwa.  Prince Gung founded one of Mongolia’s 
earliest modern schools in 1902, and has been referred to by Almaz Khan as the pioneer 
of modern Mongol education.
46  In 1903 Prince Gung was invited by Major-General 
Fukushima Yasumasa, who knew the prince as one of the progressive leaders of Inner 
Mongolia, to visit the Fifth Domestic Industrial Exposition (Daigokai naikoku kangy 
hakurankai) in Osaka, which was formally opened by the Emperor Meiji on 20 April 
1903.    In her own writings, Kawahara suggested that in going to Osaka the prince was 
not only responding to Fukushima’s invitation, but was also motivated by concern about 
the growing Russian sphere of influence near the Kharachin Right Banner.  He 
apparently wanted to learn more at the Osaka Exposition about Japan’s industrial 
progress, ultimately with a view, perhaps, to strengthening Mongolia by imitating 
Japan’s success.  It was while he was there, according to Kawahara, that the prince 
realised that education, for women as well as for men, had been an important factor in 
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Japan’s rise to become an industrial and military power.
47  Nakami  Tatsuo  also  stresses 
that Gung’s visit to Osaka was his first experience of another country, and that Gung 
was struck by the way in which Japan had modernized, especially in respect of the 
military and education.
48   
While he was in Osaka, it was reported that Prince Gung discussed with 
Fukushima the changes that had occurred in Japan as a result of the Meiji Restoration.  
As one way of facilitating similar changes in Mongolia, the prince apparently requested 
Japanese aid in regard to education for women.
49  In any event, on his return to his 
banner, Prince Gung set about establishing a number of schools, including a school for 
women and a military school, then inviting teaching staff from Japan in an attempt to 
implement reforms within his banner.  The prince also organized for selected 
Mongolian students to study in either Japan or Peking.    Among the students dispatched 
were a future leader of the Inner Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party and a future 
cabinet member in the influential Mongol leader Prince Teh’s Mongolian Allied 
Autonomous Government of the 1930s.    It must be stressed, however, that the number 
of Mongols sent to Japan in this period was very small.
50   
In September 1902, Kawahara arrived in Shanghai to begin work as a teacher at 
Wupen Women’s College.    While she was employed there, a series of meetings on the 
subject of Mongolia took place at the Japanese Legation in Peking, attended by Colonel 
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Aoki Nobuzumi, the military attaché; Uchida Yasuya (Ksai), the Japanese consul-
general; and Kawashima Naniwa, then superintendent of the Peking Police Academy.  
These meetings had been arranged by the Japanese Army General Staff, which had 
become increasingly concerned about Russia’s economic and strategic ambitions in 
Mongolia, especially in view of the ever-increasing likelihood of war between Japan 
and Russia.
51  K u z  Yoshihisa states that Shimagawa Takezabur, presumably another 
‘patriotic adventurer’, also joined Aoki and Uchida.
52  The outcome of the meetings 
was a decision to gather intelligence throughout Manchuria and Mongolia, making use 
of those ‘tairiku rnin’ who were then in Peking.  The ‘tairiku rnin’ subsequently 
dispatched included shima Yokichi, who was sent to Urga, and Yokogawa Shz, 
who, over a period of eighteen months, was ordered to traverse Manchuria a total of 
three times.    On his final journey he travelled throughout Inner Mongolia as well.    In 
addition to these missions, Colonel Aoki also undertook to appoint an army captain, It 
Rytar, as a military instructor at the Kharachin Right Banner administration of Prince 
Gung.
53   
Other developments relating to the region were also occurring in Japan at this time.   
In late May 1903 a group of seven university professors, six of whom were from Tokyo 
Imperial University’s prestigious Faculty of Law, began to lobby the government to 
adopt a strong foreign policy in regard to Russia.  These scholars, whose ideas were 
published in June 1903, had long been working to get the Japanese government to 
accept not only the necessity of pushing Russia out of Manchuria, as far back as Lake 
Baikal as some of them urged, but also the inevitability of war as a means of doing 
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that.
54  Despite being censured by Tokyo Imperial University authorities for their 
outspokenness, the seven professors continued to call for war, and there is little doubt, 
in view of their high positions, that their views were influential.
55  While  the  professors 
made no specific reference to Mongolia, a glance at a map would have made clear that 
much of Mongolia would most likely have fallen under Japanese control if the 
professors’ demands had been met, as it lay just to the south of the region in question, 
and thus would be traversed by Japanese troops.     
In November 1903, Kawahara Misako left Wupen Women’s College to take up an 
appointment as governess in Prince Gung’s household.  According to the official 
history of the Kokurykai, the person who arranged her appointment was the politician 
Sasaki Yasugor, known, because of a visit he had made to Mongolia in the summer of 
1903, as the ‘king of Mongolia’.  During his 1903 visit, Sasaki met with Prince Gung 
at the Kharachin Right Banner administration, where the prince’s wife, according to this 
version of the story, asked him to find a Japanese governess for her children.  Sasaki, 
no doubt eager to oblige, consulted the Japanese consul-general and military attaché in 
Peking, who both agreed that this was a golden opportunity to place an observer in a 
banner administration at the centre of a region in which the Russians were active.    The 
woman they selected was Kawahara.
56  Sasaki himself continued to be involved in 
Japanese-Mongol relations in the years following the 1911 Chinese Revolution, while 
also serving as an independent member in the Diet.
57   
Kawahara Misako first travelled, in November 1903, from Shanghai to Peking, 
where she met with the Japanese Consul-General, Uchida Yasuya.  Presumably, she 
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had already accepted the position of teacher at the banner of Prince Gung, because she 
was briefed in Peking as to what her new position would involve.  It was clear, 
however, that Kawahara was to be more than a teacher.  According to one source, for 
example, it had been Fukushima Yasumasa, rather than Sasaki Yasugor, who had 
engineered her appointment, as Fukushima wanted someone to gather intelligence in 
Kharachin, given its strategic position in Inner Mongolia.
58   
 
  
Figure 11:    Kawahara Misako, Prince Gung and consort, c. 1904,   
reproduced from Kawahara Misako, Karachin hi to watashi:   Mongoru 
minzoku no kokoro ni ikita josei kyshi, Tky:  Fuy shob, 1969, 
frontispiece.   
 
In this version, Kawahara’s mission was to cultivate Prince Gung, who had earlier 
visited Japan and shown himself to be sympathetic to the Japanese, and also to ascertain 
what Russia’s military and political intentions were.  Both the Japanese and the 
Russian military recognised the importance of the Kharachin Right Banner, which lay 
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on the road to Hailar and Tsitsihar in Northern Manchuria.  Control of the banner 
could prove vital in the event of war between the two countries.  Indeed, because of 
the geographic position of the Kharachin Right Banner, the Russians were also wooing 
Prince Gung.
59  Thus, part of Kawahara’s purpose in cultivating the prince was 
presumably to discern what Russia’s intentions were.     
After three weeks of preparation in Peking, Kawahara left for her new assignment, 
arriving at the Kharachin Right Banner administration on 21 December 1903.  On 28 
December, together with the prince’s consort, she presided over the opening of the 
Ikusei Women’s College, a school for approximately sixty young women aged between 
fourteen and seventeen
60 (see Figure 11). Having taken up her teaching position, 
Kawahara was now well placed to begin gathering intelligence.  She appears to have 
fully recognised the danger in which she was placing herself by providing the Japanese 
military with intelligence regarding Russian troop movements.  In the diary that she 
kept while at the Kharachin Right Banner she wrote, ‘In case of capture by the Russians, 
I am resolved to commit suicide with the pistol that I received from my father for self-
protection when I left my country, and always have near me’.
61  Her diary entry 
suggests that Kawahara’s father, too, might have been aware of the dangers that his 
daughter could face on the continent, although one wonders if he knew in advance that 
she might be called upon by her country to be more than a teacher.     
Kawahara was not the only intelligence operative dispatched around this time by 
Major-General Fukushima.    At some point in 1904, on orders from Fukushima, Narita 
Yasuteru, a ‘patriotic adventurer’, was ordered to undertake a reconnaissance trip into 
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Mongolia from Peking, crossing the Gobi Desert, and then entering Urga to ascertain 
Russian troop strengths there.
62  This trip may have taken place either prior to the 
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February of that year, or after hostilities were 
underway, as the Japanese Army General Staff still needed to know Russian troop 
strengths even after the war had begun.     
On 10 February 1904, Japanese forces launched a naval attack against the Russian 
fleet at Port Arthur, and military operations on land were soon underway as well.   The 
Japanese Army General Staff was keenly aware of the need to maintain its strategic 
advantage in relation to the battlefront, and to deprive Russia of the opportunity to 
diminish this advantage.  Accordingly, special operations teams (tokubetsu ninmuha) 
were dispatched to carry out a series of attacks against Russia’s principal line of 
reinforcement, the Trans-Siberian Railway.
63  Forty-six operatives in total were 
dispatched by the Army General Staff to gather intelligence, as well as to carry out acts 
of sabotage on railway and telegraph lines.  To enable the special operations teams to 
penetrate Russian-occupied areas, the members were disguised as Mongols.
64  A t  t h e  
end of February 1904, a five-man team arrived at the Kharachin Right Banner 
administration.  Included in the team were Captain It Rytar, who had previously 
served as a military instructor at the banner administration, and Yokogawa Shz, one 
of the tairiku rnin who had undertaken several intelligence-gathering missions in 
Manchuria and Inner Mongolia prior to the outbreak of the war.    The team remained at 
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the banner administration for three days to receive information about the region from 
Kawahara.
65   
Overall, the special operations failed to destroy any of the designated targets, with 
one two-man team being caught and executed by the Russians as it attempted to plant 
explosive charges in the railway tunnel at Hailar.  Nevertheless, the operation should 
not be judged a complete failure from the Japanese point of view.  The hunt by the 
Russians for the remaining teams no doubt tied down troops who could have been better 
utilised, so, in all probability, the Japanese Army General Staff would have considered 
the operation a partial success.  It should be noted, to support this conjecture, that 
following the Russo-Japanese War, Kawahara was decorated with the sixth grade of the 
Order of the Sacred Crown, an award bestowed only on women and considered to rank 
as equal to the Order of the Rising Sun, presumably for her role in these operations.
66  
Moreover, by the late 1920s, the two members of the special operations team who had 
been executed by the Russians, Yokogawa Shz and Oki Teisuke, were being lauded 
as heroes along with other much more famous figures, including General Nogi 
Maresuke.
67   
Kawahara remained at the Kharachin Right Banner administration for the 
remainder of 1904 and then, at the end of the year, accompanied Prince Gung and his 
retinue to Peking to deliver the traditional New Year’s greeting to the Manchu emperor.   
                                      
65 Kuz, T-A senkaku, vol. 1, p. 766.     
66 Fukushima, Kawahara Misako, pp. 166-8; hama, Shomin no mita Nisshin · Nichiro 
sens, p. 120; United States War Department, Handbook on Japanese Military Forces, 
Washington, DC, 1944, reprinted Baton Rouge, La:  Louisiana State University Press, 
1991, p. 353; James W. Peterson, Orders and Medals of Japan and Associated States, 
3
rd edn, San Ramon, Calif.:  Orders and Medals Society of America, 2000, pp. 28-33.  
According to Kleeman, Kawahara was the first woman to receive the award for 
‘contributions to the military effort’.  See Faye Yuan Kleeman, ‘Russo-Japanese War 
and Literary Expression:  Voice, Gender and Colonialism’, in John Chapman and 
Inaba Chiharu (eds), Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5:  The Nichiman 
Papers, Folkestone, Kent:    Global Oriental, 2007, p. 252.      
81
It is unclear whether she returned to the banner administration afterwards, but it seems 
likely that she did, as it is known that at some point she arranged for three daughters of 
the chief retainer of the Kharachin Right Banner to study in Japan.  The three young 
women, Ho Hsün-cheng, Yü Pao-cheng and Chin Shu-sheng, accompanied Kawahara 
when she eventually returned to Japan in January 1906.    She entrusted them to the care 
of Shimoda Utako, who had by that time also returned to Japan.
68  The three young 
women subsequently returned to the Kharachin Right Banner where they worked as 
teachers.
69   
Kawahara’s activities on the continent, even prior to her move to Inner Mongolia 
in November 1903, were not unknown in Japan, and her work as a teacher received 
special attention in the progressive weekly women’s magazine Fujo shinbun (Women’s 
and Girls’ Newspaper), a periodical with a particular focus on women’s education.
70  
The magazine ran a series of articles between January 1903 and February 1904 entitled 
‘Mko kik’ (An Account of My Travels in Mongolia), detailing Kawahara’s 
adventures while travelling, as well as her experiences as a teacher at the Kharachin 
Right Banner.  In May 1904 another article appeared entitled ‘Zaigai no futari joshi’ 
(Two Teachers Overseas), concerning the careers of Kawahara in Mongolia and Yasui 
Tetsu
71  in Siam.    Shortly after this, one of Kawahara’s own articles appeared, in which 
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she wrote specifically about teaching in Mongolia, giving details of the curriculum, the 
number of students, and other matters.
72  The coverage of Kawahara’s activities in 
Fujo shinbun, a magazine with impeccably respectable credentials, including a 
connection to the imperial household,
73 indicates that she was considered to be a very 
suitable subject for the educated female reading public in Meiji Japan.  The recent 
assertion by Faye Yuan Kleeman that the Japanese press focused primarily on 
Kawahara’s espionage work, and that the press paid attention to her only after her return 
to Japan, ignores the stories that appeared in Fujo shinbun about Kawahara’s work as a 
teacher, both prior to and after the war.
74   
Following her return to Japan, Fujo shinbun did publish a number of pieces either 
about Kawahara or written by her.    The first of these, appearing in February 1906, was 
entitled ‘Kawahara joshi o mukau’ (Welcome to Miss Kawahara), while the second was 
entitled ‘Mko miyage’ (Mongolian Souvenir).
75  They were followed in April 1906 
by an article by Kawahara entitled ‘Mko kyiku no gaiky’ (The General Condition of 
Education in Mongolia).  Finally, in July 1906, Fujo shinbun published two articles, 
one entitled ‘In’ (Retirement), and a second, far longer piece which ran for three 
consecutive issues, entitled ‘Setch ume’ (Plums Amid the Snow), an extract from the 
diary that Kawahara had kept while she was in Mongolia, which told of her 
intelligence-gathering work for the military espionage team.
76  Publication of such an 
article in Fujo shinbun again suggests that Kawahara’s military activities in Mongolia 
were not regarded as something to be hidden, and probably were not even considered a 
failure in broad terms.  Clearly, Kawahara was a role model to be admired, or at least 
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someone whose activities were judged to be significant.  At the same time, the focus 
on Kawahara inevitably brought an additional focus on Mongolia itself, and on Japan’s 
relationship with the region.     
Kawahara’s memoir, Mko miyage (Mongolian Souvenir), covering her time in 
both China proper and Mongolia, was published in 1909 under her married name, 
Ichinomiya Misako.
77    The book provides considerable insight into how Mongolia was 
portrayed in Meiji Japan, and also constitutes a significant work in the promotion of 
closer ties between Japan and Mongolia.  Further, it confirms Kawahara’s own high 
profile:  Fukushima Yasumasa contributed some calligraphy to the book, as did the 
retired statesman kuma Shigenobu, while Shimoda Utako and Shinoda Toshihide,
78 
another important figure in Meiji education, each wrote one of the Forewords.     
One point to note is the use of the word ‘miyage’, or ‘souvenir’, in the title of the 
book.  The word has a romantic or nostalgic flavour, conjuring up the idea of 
something special brought home to give to others or as a memory to treasure.  The 
theme of romance was in fact a major aspect of the book as a whole, not just the title.  
Within its pages, Mongolia is portrayed as an alluring and mysterious place.   
Kawahara’s introduction begins:       
 
The heart beats as the wind blows across the foreign sands, and the 
Mongolian moon looks down upon more than two thousand li of 
sorrow exhausted.
79   
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The romantic image is heightened by chapter titles such as ‘Yume?’ (A Dream?) and 
‘Setch ume’ (Plums Amid the Snow).  One passage presaged the image of friendship 
and harmony between Japan and Mongolia that was more consciously propagated 
during the 1930s.  Kawahara’s students are described gathered at a garden party, 
attended by Prince Gung, his consort and several hundred others, at which the students 
entertained the assembled guests by singing Japanese and Mongol songs.
80   
The first part of Kawahara’s book dealt with China proper.  Interestingly, this 
book followed others in distinguishing between the northern region and the rest of 
China, using terms like ‘Shina honto’ and ‘Shina honbu’ to refer to China proper.    For 
example, when talking about roads in Mongolia, Kawahara began, ‘To reach Mongolia 
from China proper, …’ (Mko yori Shina honbu ni itaru ni wa …).
81  In  making  such  a 
distinction, Kawahara followed the convention, found in military and political works of 
the period, that separated Manchuria, or ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’, from the rest of 
China.
82    This was an important step in the development in Japan of the idea that China 
and ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’, or China, Manchuria and Mongolia, were actually separate 
countries, a notion that came to have greater importance as time went on.  It was a 
view articulated with increasing frequency by those in Japan who championed the 
concept of an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia in the years following the fall of the 
Manchu dynasty in 1912.  Two subsequent chapters of Kawahara’s book were then 
devoted to her time at the Kharachin Right Banner, with another specifically about the 
Ikusei Women’s College where she had taught.    Another chapter covered a wide range 
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of topics related to Mongolia, including the weather, animal life, customs, education, 
and Buddhism.     
Despite the deft romantic touches accompanying the description of her experiences 
in Mongolia, Kawahara the analytical intelligence operative is also very much in 
evidence in this book.  The author provides much information as to Mongolia’s 
geographical location, as well as a detailed list of the leagues and banners of both Inner 
and Outer Mongolia.  With respect to boundaries, for example, Kawahara was very 
precise, noting that:     
 
Excluding Tsinghai, Mongolia’s northern boundary is the Altai 
Mountains and adjoins Russian Siberia, while the Great Wall, 
which marks the limits of China proper, marks the southern 
boundary.  The basin of the Nunkiang River in Manchuria marks 
the eastern boundary, while the western boundary adjoins Kansu 
and Ili provinces.  In area, Mongolia covers 248,040 square li
83 
[approximately 3,830,952 square kilometres], but has a population 
equivalent to that of the combined population of Tokyo and 
Osaka.
84   
 
In this short passage, Kawahara captures for her readers both the vast size of Mongolia 
and its sparse population, a combination that became a stock theme to be echoed by 
later Japanese visitors to Mongolia.
85  The information regarding the leagues and 
banners of Inner and Outer Mongolia then runs to three pages, including a complete list 
of the names of the banners within each of the leagues.
86  The inclusion of this highly 
specialised information is puzzling, given that it is unlikely to have had much practical 
value for a general readership.  It may have reflected a kind of pseudo-scientific 
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approach, echoing the work of anthropologists including Torii Ryz, who, as noted 
earlier, travelled to the region on a number of occasions, the first time shortly after the 
Russo-Japanese War, and wrote extensively about his journeys.
87   
Shortly after her return to Japan in 1906, Kawahara had married Ichinomiya 
Reitar,
88 the assistant manager of the Yokohama Specie Bank’s New York Branch.  
She then accompanied her husband to New York, remaining there until 1921.  She 
stayed in the public eye in Japan, however, writing two articles about life in the United 
States for Fujo shinbun not long after arriving in New York, and following these with 
several others.
89    We know little about her life after her return to Japan, but what we do 
know indicates that, once again, she did not disappear entirely from public view.  In 
the 1930s, especially, Kawahara’s earlier activities received renewed attention.  In 
1935, as part of the commemoration of the magazine’s thirty-fifth anniversary, Fujo 
shinbun published a book about Kawahara’s exploits during the Russo-Japanese War, 
written by Fukushima Sadako, the wife of Fukushima Shir, editor of Fujo shinbun.
90  
This book will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four.    Then, the following year, 
Torii Ryz, in his memoir of his early visits to Mongolia, wrote of Kawahara and her 
role as a teacher at the Kharachin Right Banner.
91  Kawahara’s own book, Mko 
miyage, was reprinted in 1943, two years before her death in 1945.
92  More recently, 
Kawahara’s activities at the Kharachin Right Banner have attracted the attention of 
Japanese historical revisionists, who laud Kawahara as an example of Japan’s 
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supposedly benign pre-Second World War relationship with Asia.
93  Kawahara’s book 
has also been introduced to a new Japanese reading audience in a paperback edition, 
part of a series devoted to literary works from Japan’s ‘school of modern romantic 
writing’,
94 suggesting that the romantic appeal of Mongolia continues for some 
Japanese.   
While Kawahara Misako was not one of the prime movers of Japanese policy on 
Mongolia, she did play an important personal part in forging the links between Japan 
and Mongolia in the first part of the twentieth century, on both the military and the 
cultural level.  The military operations for which she provided intelligence as a spy in 
1904-5 were ultimately unsuccessful, but her information must have been considered 
valuable, given that the government later decorated her.  Her more enduring legacy, 
however, was probably cultural rather than military.  Kawahara helped to strengthen 
ties between Japan and Mongolia through education, presumably also doing her part to 
spread Shimoda Utako’s Pan-Asian ideals.  In the longer run, she contributed to the 
development of enduring themes in Japanese attitudes to Mongolia:  firstly the idea 
that Mongolia should be regarded as separate from China proper; and secondly, the 
view of Mongolia as a romantic region worthy of the best endeavours of Japanese 
adventurers and pioneers.  Both these ideas provided important groundwork for later 
Japanese activities and ambitions in Mongolia.     
Kawahara’s career also has wider implications for our understanding of the overall 
relationship between Japan and Mongolia in the late Meiji period.    While the accepted 
view is probably of a predatory Japan taking every opportunity to expand its military 
control of the region, Kawahara’s case provides much more nuance.  The relationship 
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between Japan and Mongolia was evidently not solely military, but also had a 
significant cultural dimension, as shown by the teaching activities of Kawahara and 
others.  At the same time, however, there was no clear division between the cultural 
and the military:  after all, Kawahara was both teacher and spy.  The Japanese Army 
had its hand in everything, so that again, the cultural and the military were not separate 
realms, and the distinction should not be exaggerated.  Moreover, Kawahara’s career 
also provides evidence that the connection between Japan and Mongolia was by no 
means one-way.    The relationship was not equal — it was Japan that was the source of 
knowledge and aid, and members of the Mongol elite went to Japan to learn and to 
acquire financial support.  Nor, however, was it a case of Japanese action versus 
Mongol passivity, as we can see from Prince Gung’s approaches to Japan to further his 
own agenda.     
Rather than a picture of Japanese imperialism acting upon a passive and powerless 
Mongolia, the cases of Kawahara and others point to a shifting, dynamic relationship 
very much influenced by larger historical events, and seeking to take advantage of new 
opportunities as well as meet new challenges.  This pattern was repeated in the events 
of the next decade or so.  By the early twentieth century, Japanese schemes for 
Mongolia had extended beyond a few pioneering figures — partly, presumably, thanks 
to the efforts of those pioneers.  Mongolia may not have been of primary concern in 
Japan’s foreign policy objectives in this period, but nevertheless, military, diplomatic, 
political and religious considerations combined to produce a significant focus on the 
region and its potential from Japan’s point of view.     
 
Other Cultural Connections between Japan and Mongolia 
In addition to Fukushima, Kawashima and Kawahara, there were a number of other 
groups and individuals who promoted the perceived cultural connections between Japan  
89
and Mongolia.  Among them were prominent Meiji political figures, leading 
academics and important religious leaders.  In some instances, the work they 
undertook was based on a rational premise.  This is evident, for example, in the 
research done by leading academics to show that the Japanese and Mongols were 
racially alike, or in the attempts by Japanese Buddhist leaders to forge a Japanese-
Mongol Buddhist alliance.  In other instances, the claims were much more fanciful.  
The common thread is a clear determination among all of these groups and individuals 
to draw attention to apparent cultural connections between Japan and Mongolia.     
The most fanciful example of this effort to find cultural connections must have 
been the promotion of the supposed Japanese origins of the great Mongol leader 
Genghis Khan.  As farfetched as it might sound, the legend that Genghis Khan was 
actually Japanese dates back at least to the early Edo period (1600-1868).    The legend 
holds that Genghis Khan was actually Minamoto no Yoshitsune, one of the greatest of 
Japan’s medieval heroes.  According to the story, Yoshitsune was not in fact killed in 
1189 at the Battle of Koromogawa, but rather escaped via Hokkaid and Sakhalin to 
Mongolia, where he became Genghis Khan.  Yoshitsune, as Genghis, then unified the 
Mongol tribes and went on to forge the largest empire the world has ever known, while 
his grandson, Kublai Khan, subsequently sought revenge on his former enemies by 
staging the attempted Mongol invasions of Japan in 1274 and 1281.
95  An early 
example of the propagation of this myth is the Chinese-language work Chin-shih pieh-
pen (A Separate History of the Jin), by Sawada Gennai, dating from the mid-
seventeenth century.
96  The tale re-emerged periodically throughout the Edo period, 
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suggesting that it retained a certain appeal.  It was in the early Meiji period, however, 
that it was presented to a far larger audience, both inside and outside Japan.
97   
In July 1885 a Japanese translation appeared of a book by the journalist and writer 
Suematsu Kench, originally entitled Identity of Great Conqueror Genghis Khan with 
the Japanese Hero Yoshitsune:  An Historical Thesis and first published in English in 
1879.
98    The Japanese version fast became a best-seller.
99    Indeed, by November 1886, 
only seventeen months after the translation had been published in Japan, it was in its 
sixth printing,
100  suggesting it had struck a chord with Japanese readers.    It is not clear 
why Suematsu first wrote in English, but the book was completed while he was resident 
in England.  According to Miyawaki Junko, it was while studying at Cambridge that 
Suematsu noticed that the on reading (onyomi) of Minamoto’s name, or ‘Gengikei’, was 
similar in sound to that of Genghis Khan, ‘Jingiskan’, and concluded that the founder of 
the Mongol empire had in fact been Japanese,
101  although as noted above, the myth pre-
dated Suematsu by at least two centuries.     
What is important here is Suematsu’s high profile, and hence the prominence of 
this theory in the 1880s and beyond.  He was well connected, well educated and well 
placed.  Ten years before his book appeared in Japanese, Suematsu, then a journalist 
working for the newspaper Tky nichinichi (Tokyo Daily), had been taken under the 
wing of It Hirobumi, one of the most important figures of the Meiji political world.  
With It’s assistance, Suematsu had gone to England, serving from 1878 on the staff of 
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the Japanese Legation in London, before moving to Cambridge University to study law. 
Suematsu remained at Cambridge until 1886.
102  By the 1880s, Suematsu was an 
influential member of Japanese ruling circles, becoming not only It’s son-in-law in 
1889 but also a prominent politician who sat in the Diet for many years and who also 
served in different capacities in several of It’s cabinets.    He became a member of the 
Privy Council in 1906.
103    Suematsu’s case, while idiosyncratic, shows that at least one 
member of Japan’s ruling elite in the late Meiji period had a distinct perception of 
Mongolia, and indeed harboured very particular ideas as to the historical relationship 
between Japan and Mongolia.     
Nor was Suematsu the only person to popularise the long-standing ‘Yoshitsune is 
Genghis Khan’ myth in the modern period.  The tale re-appeared in 1924, with the 
publication of a study by Oyabe Zen’ichir,
104 a Yale-educated Christian minister and 
teacher, and again just prior to the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, in a short 
story by noted author Sakaguchi Ango, who went on to become a well-known writer 
after World War Two.
105  The myth was even propagated in the early 1940s to a 
Western audience in English-language works by Japanese authors.
106  These examples 
suggest that the myth of Yoshitsune and Genghis Khan had a certain appeal for the 
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Japanese reading public and that certain Japanese were happy to propagate the myth to a 
larger audience.     
There was also, of course, more serious academic research undertaken by 
Japanese scholars into the relationship between Japan and Mongolia.  While much of 
the early Meiji focus on Mongolia had been military and strategic, in the period 
following the Russo-Japanese War, academics began to develop and disseminate the 
idea that the Japanese and the Mongols were in some way directly related.    Moreover, 
several prominent Japanese academics, among them Shiratori Kurakichi and Torii 
Ryz, began to focus specifically on Mongolia.     
By the late nineteenth century, Social Darwinism, and the notion that the maxim 
‘survival of the fittest’ could also be applied to race, were prominent in academic circles 
throughout the world, prompting considerable activity in the measuring, photographing, 
and even collecting of indigenous peoples.
107  At the same time, while the proto-
anthropologists were measuring and comparing the races of the world, the proto-
linguists were endeavouring to unravel the links among the various tongues, hoping to 
show which groups were related.    In 1857 the Austrian scholar Anton Boller published 
a work aimed at proving that Japanese was a language within the Ural-Altaic category 
of languages — that is, the Uralic group, comprising Samoyed and Finno-Urgic, and the 
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Altaic group, comprising Turkic, Mongolian and Manchu-Tungus.
108  By the late 
nineteenth century, this idea had reached Japan, where it was developed primarily by 
the eminent Sinologist Shiratori Kurakichi, who used Boller’s thesis to argue that 
Japan’s roots were in Northeast Asia, even while emphasising Japan’s supposed 
superiority over other members of this ‘family’ of nations.
109  Using methods from 
linguistics and ethnology, Shiratori did groundbreaking research on the various peoples 
of Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia and Inner Asia, giving the Mongols great prominence 
in his writings as a driving force of history.
110   
Nor was Shiratori alone in thinking that Mongolia had played a special role in 
history from Japan’s point of view, and indeed the world’s.  From the spring of 1906 
through until December 1908, Torii Ryz, the so-called ‘father of modern Japanese 
anthropology’, served as both advisor and teacher to Prince Gung in Inner Mongolia, 
while Torii’s wife replaced Kawahara Misako as a teacher at Ikusei Women’s 
College.
111    After his return to Japan, Torii produced the first Japanese anthropological 
study of ‘Eastern Mongolia’.  The book had two Forewords, one by Fukushima 
Yasumasa and the other by kuma Shigenobu.  Of the two, kuma’s is the more 
significant, beginning:    ‘Except for Korea, Japan’s deepest relationship is with Eastern 
Mongolia …’.
112  kuma’s comment provides further evidence that politicians as well 
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as academics were conscious of Japan’s supposed special historical relationship with 
Mongolia.   
Ultimately, Torii himself hoped to develop an integrated conception of Asia with 
Japan at the centre.  He subscribed to the view that Northeast Asia was the ancient 
meeting-ground of all the ‘Far Eastern’ races, and he also believed that the indigenous 
inhabitants of the Siberian-Manchurian region had remained basically unchanged since 
‘prehistoric times’.    Torii suggested that shamanism had provided a common feature of 
and source for all the indigenous religions of Northeast Asia, including those of Korea 
and Japan.
113  Kuwabara Jitsuz, the legendary late-Meiji Sinologist, followed Torii’s 
lead in studying Mongolia, spending one and a half months in ‘Eastern Mongolia’ from 
July 1908.  Kuwabara was obviously enthralled by his trip to Mongolia, and in his 
later writings he took pains to distinguish Han Chinese from Mongol culture.
114   
The belief in the importance of the Mongolian plateau in the development of 
civilization was not confined to Japanese scholars.    In October 1909, an expedition by 
the Russian Academy of Science and Geological Research in the Amur District returned 
from Mongolia.    M. Wittenburg, the expedition leader, apparently believed that he had 
collected evidence to support the theory first advanced by the explorer Pyotr 
Alexeyevich Kropotkin some forty years earlier, that the first humans had lived on the 
banks of the lakes of the Gobi plains, and thus, Mongolia was the cradle of the human 
race.
115   
In turn, Shiratori Kurakichi, having already employed the Ural-Altaic theory to 
construct a new paradigm of history, further developed Torii’s proposition that the 
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Mongolian plateau had been a meeting-place for various different peoples.    According 
to Duara, Shiratori believed the Altaic peoples of Asia, especially the Mongols, were 
the ‘key to the unfolding of world history’.
116  By the beginning of the twentieth 
century, Shiratori, now a professor at Tokyo Imperial University, had produced a body 
of work that covered mythology, ethnology, and comparative linguistics among 
Koreans, the Hsiung-nu (a people on China’s northern border during the Han dynasty, 
206 B.C.-220 A.D.), the Manchus, and the Mongols.  The culmination of all of his 
scholarship was the idea that the Mongols had been a major force affecting the history 
of both the Orient and Europe.  To sustain this point of view he had to reclassify a 
number of peoples as members of a Mongol subgroup, thereby creating a genealogy that 
considerably elevated the Mongol influence in Eurasian history.
117  The idea that the 
Japanese and the Mongols were related, in terms of both race and language, was one 
that Japanese academics also advanced to foreign audiences in the early part of the 
twentieth century.
118  In the years that followed, Mongolia continued to receive more 
than its fair share of attention from Japanese academics.     
Religion provided further links between Japan and Mongolia from an early point.  
Japanese religious groups cultivated ties with Mongolia, largely because Buddhism was 
the dominant religion in both Japan and Mongolia.  In fact, in 1873, six years prior to 
Fukushima’s first visit to the region and three years before Japanese Buddhist missions 
to China proper started,
119 a group from the Kyoto tani school’s Honganji temple, 
home of a famous and powerful Japanese Buddhist sect, journeyed to Mongolia.
120  
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This is the earliest modern contact between Japan and Mongolia that I have discovered 
in the course of my research.  After overcoming various hardships, the travellers first 
entered Inner Mongolia, to conduct research on Buddhist practices there, and then 
proceeded on to Outer Mongolia.  The ultimate aim of the mission was apparently to 
establish an East Asian Buddhist Federation.
121  According to Brian Victoria, the 
Japanese government lent its support to Buddhist activities in China as a whole because, 
as a Pan-Asian religion, Buddhism was seen as a useful tool in promoting the unity of 
East Asian people under Japanese hegemony.
122  Certainly, Honganji’s activities in 
Mongolia were part of a broader interest in the region, including North China.    This is 
shown by the temple’s dispatch of a party to help wounded Japanese soldiers during the 
Boxer Rebellion, and to ascertain how the welfare of the troops could be improved.  
One prominent member of the party was Okumura Ioko, who returned to Japan to found 
the Aikoku fujinkai (Patriotic Women’s Association) in 1901.
123   
Buddhism was also useful as a cover for other activities.  For example, prior to 
the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1894, an agreement was reached between 
Japanese Army vice-chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Kawakami Sroku, and tani 
Kzui of Kyoto’s Honganji sect, that all Honganji missions dispatched to China proper, 
Siberia and Mongolia would assist the military in intelligence-gathering activities.
124  
Co-operation between the Japanese Army and the Honganji sect continued after the 
victory over China in 1895.  Two years later, Shimizu Shgetsu, supposedly a priest 
from Nishi Honganji temple in Kyoto, arrived in Vladivostok to serve as a priest at the 
sect’s temple there.  In the winter of 1899 he travelled throughout Eastern Siberia, 
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going as far west as Irkutsk before passing through Mongolia to Kirin, Changchun, 
Manchouli and Maimaicheng in Manchuria.  In actuality, however, ‘Shimizu’ was the 
pseudonym of Captain Hanada Nakanosuke, who had been sent secretly to Siberia on 
the orders of Lieutenant-General Kawakami, Vice-Chief of the Japanese Army General 
Staff.
125  The use of the role of Buddhist monk as cover for military intelligence-
gathering operations continued until almost the end of World War Two.     
There were also more concrete ties between the Japanese Army and the Honganji 
sect, in relation to activities in China proper and Mongolia.  One link was a language 
school established in Kobe by tani around the turn of the century, which included 
army officers among its students.  Little is known about the school, but it was 
definitely operating prior to the Chinese Revolution of 1911.  The school employed a 
Mongol lama as the teacher of Mongolian, and it is reported that at least nine army 
officers studied the language there for a period of three years.
126  Unfortunately,  direct 
evidence is scanty:  the only officer actually on record as having studied at the tani 
school is Hayashi Daihachi, who later served in Harbin and Taonan in Manchuria in 
1914, and the Russian Far East during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention.
127   
tani and Japanese military intelligence were linked in other ways as well.    In the 
first decade of the twentieth century, tani dispatched a number of young acolytes to 
Mongolia, the most famous being Tachibana Zuich.    Tachibana travelled first through 
Mongolia and then throughout much of Central Asia, crisscrossing the region, 
supposedly in search of Buddhist relics, but more likely gathering intelligence for the 
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Japanese military.
128  His travels were reported in both the English-language press in 
Japan and the Western press.
129  According to Peter Hopkirk, Tachibana’s travels also 
attracted the attention of British military intelligence, which suspected him of being a 
Japanese naval officer and lodged an official complaint with the Japanese government 
when Tachibana approached the border between Kashgar and British India.
130   
An important event in Japanese-Mongolian relations occurred in the summer of 
1901, and once again there was a connection with the Honganji temple.  Teramoto 
Enga, a Zen Buddhist monk and one of the first Japanese to go to Tibet in the modern 
period, led a delegation of thirteen prominent Tibetan and Mongol holy men or ‘living 
Buddhas’
131 and Lamaist dignitaries to Japan, where they met representatives of 
Higashi Honganji temple in Kyoto, as well as leading political figures in Tokyo.  The 
group was also granted an audience with Emperor Meiji.  Teramoto, who had studied 
at the Yunghogung temple in Peking in 1898, had emerged as a hero to Tibetan and 
Mongol lamas of that temple in the period after the Boxer Rebellion, for his efforts in 
getting Russian troops evicted from the temple grounds where they had been 
quartered.
132  In the aftermath of the siege of the legations, food had been scarce in 
Peking, but Teramoto had also succeeded in obtaining some tons of rice to sustain the 
starving lamas, a move that apparently led Buddhists from Mongolia to Tibet to regard 
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Japan as the defender of the faith.
133  The idea that Japan was the protector of the 
Buddhist faith in Mongolia was exploited again and again from the Japanese side in 
subsequent years, and the religious ties between Japan and Mongolia continued through 
the next half-century.     
 
Mongolia in Japanese Military, Diplomatic and Political Thinking after 1905 
The Japanese Army General Staff continued to regard Mongolia as a region of geo-
strategic importance for Japan after the Russo-Japanese War.  Several pieces of 
evidence support this conclusion.  In 1906, for example, two officers, Majors Uehara 
Taichi and Hino Tsuyoshi, were ordered to undertake a journey through China and 
Central Asia, including Mongolia.  Uehara spent as long as four years investigating 
Mongolia and Sinkiang, living for part of this time in Ili in Sinkiang while learning 
Mongolian and Russian.  In March 1908, moreover, the Chief of Staff of the 
Kwantung Government-General, Major-General Hoshino King, forwarded a copy of a 
report by a Colonel Morita to Foreign Ministry undersecretary Chinda Sutemi, 
following a visit to Mongolia by Morita.  This report, which ran to more than three 
hundred pages, constituted a very thorough examination of Inner Mongolia.  It clearly 
detailed the borders between Inner and Outer Mongolia, in particular the borders of the 
six leagues of Inner Mongolia, as well as those within Heilungkiang and Kirin 
provinces in Manchuria.
134  Evidently, the army was still intent on collecting 
information  about  Mongolia.   
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In addition to intelligence-gathering, the Japanese Army General Staff also 
undertook to win hearts and minds in Mongolia.  In 1907, Major Moriyama Toshit 
was assigned as military attaché at Changchun, in Manchuria, but was charged 
specifically with improving Japanese-Mongol relations.    To do this, Moriyama brought 
together a number of the Mongol leaders in the region and implemented a program 
under which the Japanese language was taught to Mongols, while Mongolian was 
taught to Japanese, presumably to army officers assigned to the region.    His long-term 
objective was apparently to combat Russian designs on Mongolia and to foster 
Japanese-Mongol friendship among the ten banners of ‘Eastern Mongolia’, as well as 
the forty-nine banners of Outer Mongolia.
135   
From this point onwards, the relationship between officers within the Japanese 
military and members of the right wing who wanted to bring Mongolia more directly 
under Japanese control became closer.    Adachi Takanari, for example, a member of the 
Japanese Army General Staff’s survey department, undertook a trip to Manchuria and 
Mongolia in 1909.
136  In the years to follow, Adachi was part of a group that included 
Tyama Mitsuru, founder of the right-wing Genysha (Dark Ocean Society); 
Kawashima Naniwa; Uchida Ryhei, one of the co-founders of the Kokurykai; and 
others who were concerned with issues relating to Manchuria-Mongolia.
137  Together 
with Kawashima, Adachi subsequently took part in the second Manchurian-Mongolian 
independence movement of 1916.
138   
Japanese diplomats also focused on Japan’s relationship with Mongolia in the late 
Meiji period.  Mongolia was an important consideration in all four of the ententes by 
which Russia and Japan sought to resolve their differences in the aftermath of the war 
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of 1904-5.  Under the first of these, signed in 1907, the two countries divided the 
region of Mongolia and Manchuria into separate spheres of influence.  Although 
Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria was nominally affirmed, Russia recognized 
Japan’s pre-eminent position in the south, and in Inner Mongolia to the east.    In return, 
Japan recognized Russian influence as paramount in Northern Manchuria, Outer 
Mongolia, and Sinkiang.
139  According to the Mongolian historian Baabar, however, 
several years later, Japan coerced an admission from Russia that Outer Mongolia 
actually lay within Japan’s sphere of interest.
140   
Those in the political world who paid attention to Mongolia were not limited 
merely to members of the government or to the bureaucracy, but were also found on the 
fringes.  One organisation that focused on Mongolia was the Rninkai (literally, 
masterless samurai society), a small society established in 1908 by Tyama Mitsuru, 
who, as previously noted, was the founder of the Genysha and was also godfather to 
the Kokurykai, established seven years earlier in February 1901.  The new group 
seems to have been a subsidiary of the Kokurykai.    Its exact purpose is not clear, but 
it appears to have concentrated initially on strengthening Japanese influence over 
Mongolia, by seeking intelligence there, as well as creating a cell of activists, 
presumably made up of suitable Japanese individuals in Mongolia.
141  Members of the 
society included Nakano Seig, an important political figure who served in the Diet 
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from 1920, and Kazami Akira, a longtime associate of Nakano’s.
142  The Kokurykai 
itself had already incorporated a focus on Mongolia and its neighbours in its manifesto, 
where it declared that Japan must fight Russia and expel it from the East, then ‘lay the 
foundation for a grand continental enterprise taking Manchuria, Mongolia and Siberia 
as one region’.
143   
 
Conclusion 
The first period of modern Japanese-Mongolian relations established many of the 
characteristics that remained constant in the following decades.  The most significant 
of these was a perception of the geo-strategic importance of Mongolia to Japan, with 
Mongolia lying as it did between Tsarist Russia and Imperial China, both potential 
rivals of Japan’s.  Accompanying the emphasis on Mongolia’s geo-strategic position 
was a sense of romance about the region and a belief that Japan and Mongolia had a 
shared ancestry in ethnic terms.  These themes could be found in the exploits of 
Fukushima, the writings of Kawahara and Suematsu, and the academic theories of Torii 
and Shiratori.  Moreover, it was during this early period that the networks of groups 
and individuals that sought to establish Japanese control of Mongolia first emerged — 
some within the most powerful institutions of the Japanese state and others on the 
fringes of Japanese society — networks that remained active until 1945.     
The next chapter will examine the two unsuccessful attempts, in 1912 and 1916, 
by factions within the Japanese military, aided by members of the right wing and 
business groups, to support the establishment of an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia.   
It will also consider the shift in strategic thinking within the Japanese military 
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concerning Japanese-Mongol relations that followed the Russian Revolution of October 
1917, and subsequent Japanese involvement in the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention.     
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
 
CARPE  DIEM?:  THE  MANCHURIAN-MONGOLIAN 
INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENTS, 1912-22 
 
 
It is Manchuria and … Mongolia that offer her [Japan] the easiest field [for 
expansion]; and therefore he who wishes to understand the essence of 
Japanese policy must carefully watch every development in this zone.
1   
 
 
 
With the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 and the subsequent power 
vacuum in Northeast Asia, Japan seemed poised to take a much greater role in Asia.  
Manchuria and Mongolia were prime areas for increased Japanese activity, and between 
1912 and 1922, members of the various Japanese elites made numerous attempts to 
delineate a sphere of influence there for Japan, and to increase Japanese control.  
These disparate efforts were by no means coordinated, but together they do reveal a 
marked overlapping of goals among several powerful institutions and groups, even 
while opinions differed on how Japanese control could be increased.     
The resolve of the Japanese military to increase its power in Mongolia is 
particularly evident, and circumstances were conducive to this project in the fluid 
conditions surrounding the end of both the Ch’ing and Tsarist empires, as well as the 
events of the First World War.  One major result of the opportunities presented by 
these developments was Japanese military involvement in three separate movements to 
wrest Mongolia from Han Chinese control, in 1912, 1916 and 1918-22.   Though these 
movements were abortive, Japanese participation in them indicates the lengths to which 
some military officers were prepared to go in an attempt to facilitate Japanese 
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domination of the region.    The Japanese Army officers involved were for the most part 
field officers and not especially senior, but considerable evidence suggests that their 
attempts were supported from above.   Moreover, Robert Valliant noted in 1972 that in 
all three movements between 1912 and 1922 there was a consistency of purpose on the 
part of elements of the Japanese military and the right wing, as well as continuity in 
Japanese personnel, both military and civilian.
2  Valliant, however, overlooks several 
points of conflict over Mongolia among the Japanese elites, which will be discussed 
below.   
An important feature of Japanese military activity in this period was the apparent 
willingness of the Army’s high command to turn a blind eye to the incidences of 
insubordination that occurred in connection with all three military operations in 
Mongolia.  In each operation, as noted earlier, there appears to have been high-level 
tolerance, approval or support of military action in the field that was designed to 
increase Japanese control of Mongolia, even when these field actions constituted clear 
instances of insubordination.  Arguably, this high-level approval or tolerance of 
independent action set a pattern that was later exploited by the Kwantung Army in the 
assassination of Chang Tso-lin in 1928 and the Manchurian Incident of 1931.     
From the numerous attempts to delineate Japan’s sphere of military influence or to 
increase direct Japanese control of the region in this period, it is clear that the supposed 
strategic importance of Mongolia to Japan was uppermost in the relationship, and had a 
distinct impact on Japanese-Mongolians ties.  Not surprisingly, therefore, elements of 
the Japanese military and the right wing were in the ascendancy in the relationship 
between 1912 and 1922.  Religious, academic and business groups did continue to 
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seek closer ties with Mongolia, but their activities were largely overshadowed by the 
operations of the military and of right-wing activists.     
Nevertheless, as in earlier periods, the relationship between Japan and Mongolia 
was a two-way affair in these years.  Especially in the diplomatic arena, several 
overtures to Japan were made from the Mongolian side, suggesting, once more, that 
circumstances were fairly favourable to an increase in Japanese influence in the region.   
The various approaches during the period made by Mongolian individuals and groups 
seeking either diplomatic recognition or concrete aid from Japan no doubt further 
reinforced the perception among the Japanese elites of the validity of Japan’s claims to 
leadership within the region.     
This chapter will first consider the geopolitical context of the three Japanese-
backed ‘independence’ movements between 1912 and 1922.    Then it will examine the 
ongoing promotion within Japan of Japanese ambitions in Mongolia between the 1912 
and 1916 movements.    In particular, I will consider the efforts of members of the press, 
political figures and academics to draw attention to these ambitions.  Next I will re-
examine the role of the Japanese Army high command in all three operations, paying 
particular attention to the willingness of high-ranking army officers to overlook 
insubordination when it suited their purposes.  Finally, I will consider the various 
overtures made by Mongolian leaders to their counterparts in Japan in their quest for 
either diplomatic recognition or concrete aid.     
 
The Geopolitical Context of the ‘Independence’ Movements 
Throughout this period, Japanese-Mongolian relations were again strongly coloured by 
changes in Japan’s relations with both China and Russia.    Sino-Japanese relations were 
profoundly affected by the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 and the 
establishment of the Han Chinese republic, a development that cannot have been   107
completely unexpected by the Japanese authorities.    Prior to the downfall of the Ch’ing 
dynasty, some in the Japanese government and military had supported its overthrow by 
providing arms and financial assistance to anti-Ch’ing groups, as well as political 
asylum for their members in Japan.
3    The general aim of this assistance seems to have 
been to ensure a weakened China, one that could be more easily influenced by Japan.     
With the outbreak of the Wuchang uprising in October 1911, the Ch’ing dynasty, 
in decline ever since its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5, was wracked by 
fresh upheaval, which eventually culminated in the abdication of the emperor in 
February 1912.   The demise of the Ch’ing dynasty and the arrival of its replacement, a 
comparatively weak Republican government, have been described by Yoshihisa Tak 
Matsusaka as ‘a once-in-a-century chance to strengthen Japan’s influence both north 
and south of the Wall dramatically’.
4    Even the creation of the Republican government, 
however, was met with opposition from some of those who had supported the 
overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty, presumably because they were opposed in principle to 
a republican form of government.    Japanese aid, therefore, was subsequently funnelled 
to Mongol and Manchu leaders who favoured an imperial restoration,
5 albeit one 
controlled by the Japanese.     
The fluidity of the situation on the Chinese continent affected both the Japanese 
and the Mongols.  In December 1911, eighty Mongol princes had gathered in Peking 
for consultations about the possible future of the Manchu dynasty.  Some of the 
princes went so far as to suggest that China should be divided in two, with the southern 
part becoming a republic and the northern part remaining a Manchu monarchy, though 
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it is not clear why they suggested such a move.  Others opted to join the so-called 
‘royalist party’, headed by a Manchu prince who was supported to a limited extent by 
the Japanese military and Japanese right-wing groups.  As a part the plan it was 
proposed that an independent country called ‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ be established 
under Japanese and Russian protection.
6   
Prince Gung of the Inner Mongolian Kharachin Right Banner, who was probably a 
member of the ‘royalist party’, then requested Japanese support for a Mongolian 
independence movement.    Japanese leaders were quick to exploit this opportunity, and 
in the same month as the princes met in Peking, the Japanese Foreign Ministry 
approved a loan of 200,000 taels (approximately US$148,000) to Prince Gung through 
the Yokohama Specie Bank.  Other princes followed suit and applied to Japan for 
loans.  The Japanese Army General Staff negotiated with the Mongols through Major 
Taga Muneyuki and kura Kihachir, head of kura-gumi, one of the largest Japanese 
industrial-financial combines.  A total of ¥110,000 (approximately US$55,840) was 
loaned, with the security being mining rights in the five banners of the Chao-uda 
League.  Nor was Japanese aid restricted to loans.  In an effort to ensure the success 
of the independence movement, Prince Gung also requested arms and ammunition.  
Accordingly, in December 1911, the Army General Staff dispatched three army officers, 
Major Taga, Captain Matsui Shinsuke and Captain Kimura Naoto, to liaise with Prince 
Gung.  All three subsequently figured prominently in operations in Mongolia.  
Japan’s dealings with the Mongol princes in the region did not go unnoticed.  Chao 
Erh-sun, the Han Chinese Governor-General of the three Northeastern Provinces, that is, 
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Manchuria, complained to Peking about the subsequent smuggling of arms by Japanese 
to the Mongols.
7   
Events, however, were moving faster than the Ch’ing dynasty could control.  
While the princes in Southern Mongolia were approaching the Japanese for assistance, 
the princes in Northern Mongolia had already taken the initiative.   In November 1911, 
Outer Mongolians opposed to Chinese rule rose against the Han Chinese officials 
stationed in Urga, the capital of Outer Mongolia, and imprisoned the Chinese Resident, 
that is, the most senior official representing the Ch’ing government.  They then 
declared the Bogd Khan, the supreme Buddhist leader of Outer Mongolia, to be the 
head of a ‘Mongolian Confederacy’.
8  On 3 November 1911 the Outer Mongolian 
princes formally declared their independence from China, claiming that all along their 
allegiance had been to the Manchu throne, and not to the political entity known as 
‘China’.  A message proclaiming the independence of Northern Mongolia was sent to 
France, Britain, Germany, the United States, Belgium, Japan, Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Austro-Hungary.
9  As Matsusaka has noted, however, while China’s relationship 
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with Outer Mongolia may have been under challenge and poorly defined, by 1912 the 
Han Chinese Republic’s formal sovereignty over Manchuria and Inner Mongolia was 
recognised by international treaties,
10 making Japan’s subsequent attempts to assert its 
control over this region tentative at best.     
Japan’s relations with Tsarist Russia were also changing rapidly.  In the years 
following the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, the Japanese government made a 
concerted effort to resolve territorial differences with its former enemy through a series 
of diplomatic agreements.  As discussed in the previous chapter, the first of these 
agreements, signed in May 1907, divided the contested region of Manchuria and 
Mongolia between Russia and Japan:  Russia recognised Japan’s pre-eminent position 
in South Manchuria and in Inner Mongolia to the east, while Japan recognised Russian 
influence as paramount in Northern Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang.
11  T h i s  
first Russo-Japanese agreement was followed, in July 1910, by a second that more 
precisely delineated the respective Japanese and Russian spheres of influence in 
Northeast Asia.
12  Russo-Japanese relations, however, were complicated by Outer 
Mongolia’s declaration of independence, a development that neither Tsarist Russia nor 
imperial Japan could ignore.  When the Outer Mongolian forces ousted the Chinese 
officials in Urga in November 1911, the Russians reacted swiftly to replace the Chinese, 
sending troops to Urga ‘for the protection of Russian residents and also for maintenance 
of peace in Mongolia’.
13   
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Following these Russian troop movements, the Japanese press raised the question 
of how Japan’s own position on the continent might change.
14  For its part, the 
Japanese government clearly viewed Russia’s actions with alarm, and political 
negotiations between Russia and Japan recommenced, culminating in the third Russo-
Japanese agreement, signed in July 1912.  This agreement not only reconfirmed 
Russia’s pre-eminence in Outer Mongolia, but also fixed the line of demarcation 
between the respective spheres of influence of Russia and Japan at the meridian of 
Peking, meaning that Outer Mongolia, the Barga region of northwestern Manchuria, and 
the portion of Inner Mongolia found in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces were placed 
under Russian influence, while Jehol and the three Manchurian provinces were placed 
under Japanese influence.
15   
Tsarist Russia and Japan signed a fourth and final agreement in 1916, in which the 
two countries agreed to work together to prevent China falling under the control of a 
third power,
16  the most likely contender being the United States.    All four agreements, 
however, were overturned in November 1917, in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution.   
Russo-Japanese relations were further affected by the Russian civil war from 1918 to 
1922, and by Japanese involvement in this war through the provision of support for the 
White Russian forces.    In the Russian Far East, a series of actions ensued that became 
known in Japan as the Siberian Intervention, during which elements of the Japanese 
military once again sought to seize control of Outer Mongolia, as will be discussed later 
in this chapter.     
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The 1912 ‘Independence’ Movement 
At the beginning of 1912, the most senior military figures among Japan’s top leaders, 
Yamagata Aritomo, Katsura Tar and Terauchi Masatake, had all come to the 
conclusion that Japan should send reinforcements to the Kwantung Province, in the 
southern part of Manchuria, where Japanese troops had been stationed since 1905, to 
defend Japan’s territorial interests from the consequences of the Chinese revolution.  
Desiring to avoid arousing international suspicion, however, the cabinet in fact decided 
on 12 January 1912 not to move troops, but rather to initiate talks with Russia about 
Japanese and Russian spheres of interest.    This rejection of the military advice resulted 
in dissatisfaction among certain Japanese Army officers, who saw the ongoing Chinese 
revolution as an opportunity for action.  In this context, a plan was formulated by 
Major-General Utsunomiya Tar, a section head in the Japanese Army General Staff, 
and Kawashima Naniwa, then attached to the Peking Legation, to encourage the 
separation of both Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China.
17  Accordingly, 
throughout January and February of 1912, Japanese Army officers were assigned to 
different parts of Mongolia, and ordered to gather intelligence, especially on the attitude 
to Japan of the Mongol nobles, as well as to conduct topographical surveys.
18   
The decision to assign these officers was probably taken as a way of circumventing 
the cabinet’s decision not to move troops to Kwantung Province, and in order to allow 
for a degree of ‘independent’ action by officers on the scene.  This supposition is 
supported by what followed.  As we have seen, several Mongolian princes were 
applying to Japan for financial aid around this time.  On 22 January 1912 Kawashima 
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Naniwa dispatched a telegram to the Army General Staff that read, ‘the Mongol princes 
have asked for Japanese aid as they long to escape from the tiger’s mouth’.
19   A  
second telegram followed, announcing that on 2 February, Prince Su, under the alias of 
Chin An-tai, had left Peking, where, with the collapse of the Manchu dynasty, there was 
growing unrest, for the safety of  Dairen.  A  third  telegram read, ‘It is estimated that we 
require approximately ¥50,000 (approximately US$25,400) to get Prince Su to join 
us’.
20  At the same time that he was organising for the Japanese to support Prince Su 
financially, Kawashima was also concluding an agreement with Prince Gung to provide 
Japanese aid in other ways as well, with the aim of bringing about the independence of 
Mongolia.  This agreement comprised ten points and aimed to establish a region in 
Inner Mongolia from which, presumably, Japan would oppose Russia.  According to 
Kawashima, only weeks before the collapse of the Ch’ing dynasty, Prince Gung had 
said:   
 
Mongolia is not a part of China.    More than ever, at the present 
time, with the collapse of the Manchus, it is only right that 
Mongolia should be independent of China.  Further, Mongolia 
should not be unhappy.  On this occasion, with Japanese aid, 
we should strive for independence.
21   
 
Nor was he alone in this belief.  As the noted Mongolist Owen Lattimore wrote in 
1935:   
 
Mongolia having been artificially linked with China under the 
Manchu dynasty, the fall of the dynasty ought to have broken 
the connection.  The idea that a Chinese republic could claim 
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to inherit the Manchu overlordship in Mongolia was historically 
a non-sequitur.    Mongol independence of China was something 
that had always existed.
22   
 
As mentioned above, one part of the plan to detach Mongolia from Chinese control 
involved the placement of Japanese Army officers at a number of the leagues and 
banners throughout Inner Mongolia.  This, however, was not a new development.  
The large numbers of surveys that the Japanese military had ordered conducted by 
military officers and right-wing adventurers in the decade before the revolution had 
already furnished intelligence to facilitate both the detachment of Mongolia and 
Manchuria from China, and the control of the region by Japanese forces.
23  Kawashima 
Naniwa’s ongoing relationship with Prince Su, who was to be one of the principal 
leaders of the first independence movement, also suggests that the 1912 movement did 
not occur spontaneously.  For the better part of a decade, both the Japanese military 
and the right wing had cultivated Su and others like him in China who had been 
strongly opposed to a republican government and to Han Chinese control of the region 
north of the Great Wall.     
The immediate foundations of the 1912 movement were certainly laid in the wake 
of the Wuchang uprising of October, with the placement of Japanese Army liaison 
officers in a number of the Eastern Inner Mongolian leagues and banners.    While these 
officers had presumably been placed there in an attempt to counteract Russian influence 
in the region, in the aftermath of the overthrow of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912, 
they now worked closely with those Mongol and Manchu princes who sought 
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independence from the new Han Chinese Republic.  As we have seen, the princes 
called amongst other things for the establishment of an independent country called 
‘Manchuria-Mongolia’ which would be protected by Japan and Russia.
24  Among the 
princes concerned was Prince Su, who argued that the Emperor and the court should 
withdraw north of the Great Wall, preferably to Jehol, and from there, if the worst came 
to the worst, consolidate what remained of the Manchu dominions after the secession 
from China.
25   
While it was the Japanese military that figured prominently in the scheme to 
separate Mongolia from China, Japanese Foreign Ministry documents show that 
diplomats were certainly aware of what was occurring.  As noted above, the Foreign 
Ministry had been the conduit through which funds, under the guise of loans, were 
transferred to the Mongol princes who sought independence from China.
26  Moreover, 
numerous references in the diary of Ijin Hikokichi, Japan’s principal diplomatic 
representative in Peking in 1912, indicate that he was well informed as to the plans of 
the Mongolian-Japanese coalition working for the ‘independence’ of Inner Mongolia.  
Both before the independence movement got underway and during its initial stages, 
Ijin was kept informed about the activities in Inner Mongolia of Kawashima Naniwa 
and the Japanese Army officers involved.
27  Presumably  Ijin then kept Tokyo abreast 
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of what the Japanese Army officers were up to on the continent, as both the Foreign 
Ministry and the Army General Staff are reported to have opposed the assistance being 
provided to the Inner Mongolian princes.
28   
In February 1912, Japanese Army officers and members of the right wing on the 
Chinese continent set about assembling arms and ammunition to transport to Mongolia.   
In early March 1912, however, the authorities in Tokyo acted to rein in all of the 
Japanese, both military personnel and civilian activists, connected with the scheme.  
Furthermore, to ensure that right-wing civilian participants toed the line, the Japanese 
Army high command summoned Kawashima Naniwa to Tokyo, where both Vice-Chief 
of Staff Lieutenant-General Fukushima Yasumasa and Foreign Minister Uchida Yasuya 
bluntly informed him that all material assistance to the Inner Mongolians must cease.
29   
This apparent official opposition to the first ‘independence’ movement seems to 
be at odds with the impression that leading figures in Japan desired to bring as much of 
the Ch’ing empire north of the Great Wall as possible under Japanese sway.    No doubt 
the larger context of the fall of the Ch’ing dynasty in February 1912 had impacted on 
the political decision-making process in Japan, with the need to avoid antagonising 
Japan’s former adversary, Russia.  There is evidence, however, that the Japanese 
military itself had proposed the dispatch of two divisions to South Manchuria following 
the October 1911 Wuchang uprising, in part to give protection to the Manchu court, and 
also to ensure equality with Russia which was moving to secure its position in Outer 
Mongolia.
30  As noted earlier, however, in January 1912 the Japanese cabinet decided 
that any troop movement into Manchuria might arouse international suspicion, 
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especially among the Russians.
31    Accordingly, while some in Japan may have desired 
control of Inner Mongolia, this ambition had to be tempered by caution, and a 
distancing of the army high command from what was unfolding.  On the other hand, 
some in the high command wanted to extend Japanese control over Inner Mongolia, by 
force if necessary, and were presumably willing to turn a ‘blind eye’ to the support 
provided by officers in the field to Inner Mongols seeking independence from China.     
At any rate, despite the recall of Kawashima and the clear directive that the 
scheme to supply the Inner Mongols with arms and ammunition should cease, Japanese 
Army officers stationed in South Manchuria proceeded to ship the arms and munitions 
to the Inner Mongolian princes.  It was no small operation, with records showing that 
at least thirty Japanese were involved, a number them serving army officers.
32  I n  
addition to the Japanese participants, there were also around one hundred Han Chinese, 
who probably supported the idea of an independent Manchuria-Mongolia, as we will 
see below.  The party of Japanese and Han Chinese transported fifty wagonloads of 
arms and ammunition from Japanese-controlled Southern Manchuria to the Inner 
Mongolian princes in Jehol province.
33  While the arms shipments began secretly, the 
Han Chinese general at Mukden, Chao Erh-sun, soon exposed the clandestine 
arrangement to the Peking government.  In response, units from the Han Chinese 
Republican Army were dispatched to intercept and destroy the shipments.  This 
resulted in a clash between the Japanese-led smugglers and the Chinese military in early 
June 1912 in which the arms shipment was destroyed and more than fifty people were 
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killed, including thirteen of the Japanese involved, with one of the Japanese Army 
officers, Matsui, being seriously injured.
34   
The high death toll among the Japanese-led smugglers suggests a number of 
things.  First, it indicates that both the Japanese and the Han Chinese involved were 
fairly strongly committed to the operation to supply the Inner Mongols with arms and 
ammunition.    If the Han Chinese participants had simply been mercenaries they would 
surely have fled at the first sign of danger.  Second, the fact that one of the Japanese 
Army officers, Matsui, was seriously injured tends to confirm a high degree of Japanese 
commitment to the operation.  Third, army authorities do not usually look kindly on 
military personnel getting themselves killed or wounded in operations that are not 
officially sanctioned; accordingly, Matsui’s evident commitment to the venture suggests 
that either the army officers involved expected the high command to turn a blind eye to 
what they were doing, or that they had a ‘devil-may-care’ attitude with regard to 
authority and simply did not care about the official consequences of their actions.  In 
any event, the first independence movement had effectively come to an end.     
The Japanese press reported what had occurred on the continent, suggesting that 
the reading public in Japan was expected to have an interest in Mongolia and the 
question of Japan’s sphere of influence there, and that the operation was by no means 
secret.    Press reports clearly portrayed the events of 1912 as an attempt by a ‘Manchu-
Mongol coalition’ to achieve independence, with significant Japanese assistance, from 
the new Chinese Republic.  Reports also noted some degree of official Japanese 
approval of the idea of Mongolian independence.  In January 1913, six months after 
the collapse of the independence movement, a relatively long article appeared in the 
Japanese press that dealt extensively with the relationship between Kawashima Naniwa 
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and Prince Su, and their plan to bring about the independence of Manchuria and 
Mongolia from China.
35  Three days later, the Japan Chronicle, a Kobe English-
language newspaper, also ran the story, with substantially more information.  The 
paper claimed that approval for Japanese support of the attempt to achieve 
independence had been given by Chief of the Army General Staff General Hasegawa 
Yoshimichi, Governor-General of Korea Terauchi Masatake, Field Marshal Yamagata 
Aritomo, and the T-A Dbunkai (East Asia Common Culture Society).
36   
The assertion of such high-level approval deserves comment.  If the Japan 
Chronicle had not been sure of the accuracy of its information, it is hardly likely to have 
listed such prominent individuals as being connected with the scheme.  The 
willingness of the paper to devote two pages to the story implies that the editors were 
prepared to stand by the assertions, and there is no evidence of any later retraction with 
respect to those named as either involved in or supporting the operation.  The 
comparative length of the story in a highly-regarded newspaper aimed at an overseas 
audience
37 also suggests that the story was fairly widely known in Japan, and that the 
paper wanted to make its overseas audience aware of this Japanese attempt to achieve 
control of parts of the Chinese continent.     
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Ongoing Japanese Ambitions in Mongolia, 1912-16 
Despite the failure of the first ‘independence’ movement, some within the Japanese 
press, the military, the political world and academia continued to draw attention to 
Mongolia and Japanese activities there after 1912.  Japanese observers and writers 
covered a broad range of topics on Mongolia.  Meanwhile, definitions of what 
constituted ‘Mongolia’ continued to be fluid.     
Newspapers and periodicals produced a steady trickle of articles on Mongolia, 
often with the implication that the region was or should be part of Japan’s sphere of 
influence.  In November 1912, for instance, the press speculated on what impact the 
newly-signed Russo-Mongolian agreement might have on Japan’s relations with 
Mongolia.
38  The following November, a Russo-Chinese agreement was concluded, 
under which Russia recognised, among other things, Republican China’s suzerainty 
over Outer Mongolia and agreed to limit Russian troops there to those needed for guard 
duties, while China agreed not to interfere in Outer Mongolia’s internal affairs and to 
refrain from colonising the region.
39    Again the Japanese press examined the impact of 
the agreement on both Mongolia’s relationships with Russia and China, and Japan’s 
relations with Mongolia.
40  There was even an interview with Fukushima Yasumasa, 
still famed for his lone horseback ride from Berlin to Vladivostok some twenty years 
earlier, in which he voiced his opinions on Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, 
remarking that ‘in Inner Mongolia the climate was mild, and any crops grown in Japan 
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could be raised there’,
41  an observation perhaps designed to promote Inner Mongolia to 
potential Japanese settlers.    Reports on military and trade matters relating to Mongolia 
also appeared.
42   
While the press could only speculate as to the impact of the November 1913 
Russo-Chinese agreement on Japan’s position in the region, some in the Japanese 
Foreign Ministry were certainly alarmed.  The Japanese consul in Harbin, Honda 
Kumatar, for example, dispatched a long telegram in December 1913 to the Foreign 
Minister, Makino Nobuaki, addressing the probable impact of the agreement on Japan’s 
position.  Honda analysed such matters as the effect of the agreement on political 
developments in Outer Mongolia and how Russia’s new position might affect ‘our 
sphere of influence’ (waga seiryoku han-i) in Inner Mongolia (Uchimko).  Honda  was 
vague, however, about what this sphere of influence encompassed and what it should be 
called, referring to it as either ‘southeast Mongolia’ (tnan-Mko) or ‘Inner Mongolia’s 
southeastern region’ (Uchimko tnanbu).
43    What is highly significant, though, is that 
the consul here referred plainly to the region as Japan’s sphere of influence, and that he 
considered it to be more than just ‘eastern Inner Mongolia’ (tbu Uchimko), a 
comparatively smaller area geographically.     
The next significant development came in January 1915, with the presentation by 
the Japanese Minister to Peking, Hioki Eki, to the president of the Chinese Republic, 
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Yuan Shih-k’ai, of the ‘Twenty-One Demands’ for greater Japanese powers in China.
44  
Through these demands, the Japanese government attempted, amongst other goals, to 
achieve the same concessions in Southern Manchuria and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ that 
China had granted Tsarist Russia in relation to Outer Mongolia.  In effect, ‘Eastern 
Inner Mongolia’ in this case encompassed Jehol province.
45  After considerable 
Chinese protest and some revisions, the Chinese side finally accepted the demands in 
late April 1915, thus granting Japan the concessions it had sought in Southern 
Manchuria and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’.  The Japanese press trumpeted the advance 
in ‘Japan’s historic political and economic relations with Mongolia’.
46  Press articles 
also discussed how the economic development of the region could benefit Japan.
47  A s  
Daniel Weissich has noted, Chinese acceptance of the demands relating to Mongolia 
meant the Japanese were now in a position to ‘infiltrate the region’:  that is, Inner 
Mongolia.
48  Actually, following the signing of the treaty that was based on the 
Twenty-One Demands, various figures in Japan publicly denied that Japan did in fact 
have any plans to annexe Manchuria and Mongolia.  A member of the House of 
Representatives and a representative of the Oriental Development Company, for 
example, both publicly denied that Japan was considering annexation.  Both added, 
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however, that if China were serious about developing the region then Japan was the best 
placed to help it to do so.
49  
Questions raised in the Imperial Diet shortly after this confirm, firstly, that a range 
of public figures perceived in Mongolia some potential benefit for Japan, and secondly, 
that Japanese ambitions in Inner Mongolia nevertheless remained very vague.  In late 
May and early June 1915, the subject of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ was raised in the Diet on 
several occasions, with opposition spokesman Ogawa Heikichi calling on the 
government to clarify exactly what constituted Japan’s sphere of influence in China, 
and especially the position of Mongolia within this sphere.
50  The following week, 
leading opposition politician Inukai Tsuyoshi commented on the geopolitical terms 
applied to the region, in the course of complaining that the gains from the recently 
signed Sino-Japanese Treaty were not as great as the government claimed.  Inukai 
asserted:   
 
the Japanese Minister in Peking, in setting forth Japan’s 
demands on China regarding Mongolia [in the May 1915 Sino-
Japanese Treaty], carefully refrained from clearly specifying the 
limits of the districts concerned, all that he stated in this respect 
being ‘part of South Manchuria’ and ‘parts of Jehol district’, 
which the Minister of Foreign Affairs described as Eastern Inner 
Mongolia .… Jehol lies in Chili Province; so what the 
authorities give out as rights obtained in Mongolia are not really 
in Mongolia, but in Manchuria, masquerading under the new 
name Eastern Inner Mongolia .… the public must ascertain the 
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delimitation of the so-called Eastern Inner Mongolia before 
congratulating themselves upon the acquirement of rights.
51   
 
Thus, according to Inukai, ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ was merely being used as another 
term for part of Manchuria.  His statement underlines yet again the flexibility of the 
terms used for the region at this point.     
The Diet discussions show that the confusion as to what ‘Mongolia’ constituted 
were openly acknowledged in this period, at least by those politicians who concerned 
themselves with the region.    Debate as to the meaning of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, as 
well as ‘Man-M’ and other terms, continued over the next decade, both inside and 
outside of the Diet.    As we have seen, at the very time that questions were being raised 
in the Diet in June 1915 about the extent of Japan’s sphere of influence in Inner 
Mongolia, Torii Ryz was separately promoting a different version of the same sphere 
of influence, one that included significant portions of Chahar province, the province 
adjoining Jehol
52  (see Figure 4).   
Diet members did more than pontificate about Mongolia.  For instance, two 
months after Inukai had proclaimed that ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ was merely another 
name for Manchuria, a party of twenty Diet members undertook a tour through North 
China, visiting, among other places, Changchiakow, the capital city of Chahar 
province,
53 one of the four provinces that comprised Inner Mongolia.  It is not clear 
why a party of Diet members chose to visit that area at this point.  Japanese military 
ambitions in the region, however, were then on the increase and it is likely that some 
politicians shared the military’s strategic and probably predatory objectives there.     
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While politicians debated, the Japanese Army continued to investigate one part of 
the region in question, which it called ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, in this instance 
meaning all of Jehol and a substantial part of Chahar province.  At the beginning of 
August 1915, the Japanese Army General Staff’s Secret Great Diary carried a report 
delineating the boundaries of ‘Southern Manchuria’ and ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’.
54  
This report, from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Government-General, Major-
General Nishikawa Torajir, to Vice-Minister of the Army, Lieutenant-General shima 
Ken’ichi, concluded that ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ comprised the four eastern leagues 
(tyonmei) and the four banners of the left wing of Chahar (Chaharubu no sayoku yon 
hata).
55    This was approximately the same region that was held by Torii Ryz in 1915 
to be Japan’s sphere of influence
56  (see Figure 4).     
In the same month that Nishikawa submitted his report, the Army General Staff 
also dispatched a seven-man survey team, commanded by Major Koiso Kuniaki, to 
gather data on ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’.  The team, divided into three sub-teams, 
surveyed the northern, central and southern areas of ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’, which 
for the purposes of the survey included the Uchumuchin banners of Northern Chahar 
and the area around Dolonnor, a town located near the border of Chahar and Jehol.  
For the Japanese Army, then, ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ evidently encompassed a far 
larger area than Inukai Tsuyoshi had suggested in the Diet a few months earlier.  The 
table of contents of the subsequent report ran to forty-one pages, while the actual report 
exceeded 1,000 pages.  The report included information about a wide range of topics, 
including the agriculture, climate, and nature of the soil of each sub-region.  More 
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general information about the Mongol population — for example, about physical 
characteristics and health — was also included.
57  The broad range of topics covered 
suggests that the army’s goal was more than merely strategic.     
The Army General Staff also prepared three additional reports, each entitled T-
M jij (The Situation in Eastern Mongolia), between December 1915 and March 1916.   
These reports were comparatively short, around 150 pages each, and covered topics 
relating to politics, education, geography, diplomacy and other matters.  Amongst 
other things, they show that for the Japanese military, Suiyuan province, lying 
northwest of Peking, was considered to be within the boundaries of ‘Eastern Mongolia’ 
as early as 1915.
58  The army’s inclusion of Suiyuan in ‘Eastern Mongolia’, a region 
that cannot conceivably be included in definitions of ‘Manchuria’, appears to contradict 
Matsusaka’s assertion that the terms ‘Mansh’ and ‘Man-M’ were interchangeable at 
this point.
59   
In less than one year, then, the Japanese Army produced four reports on 
Mongolia.  The sheer number of reports in such a short time is evidence of an 
extremely high level of military attention to the region.  Furthermore, the army’s 
attention to Mongolia in itself attracted the notice of the press in Japan.    A speech by a 
Major Tomomori at the Osaka Military Officers’ Club regarding his recent tour of Inner 
Mongolia, for example, was deemed newsworthy enough to be reported.
60  While 
much of the army’s information on the region remained confidential, the reporting of 
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Tomomori’s speech suggests that the army was not averse to its activities in the region 
being reported to a wider audience within Japan and abroad.     
Nor was examination of the military importance of Mongolia to Japan confined to 
the army.  In September 1913, the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff (Kaigun 
gunreibu) produced a translation of a Russian report on a trade mission dispatched from 
Moscow to Outer Mongolia in the summer of 1910.  The Japanese version, entitled 
Seihoku Mko jij (Conditions in Northwest Mongolia), contained a map clearly 
showing that ‘Northwest Mongolia’ was essentially what both Russia and Japan termed 
‘Outer Mongolia’, although the map extended as far south as the Great Wall, suggesting 
that the location of the border dividing Outer Mongolia from Inner Mongolia was still 
as vague for the Japanese Navy as it was for the army.
61  Given that Mongolia is 
landlocked, its appeal to the Navy General Staff is difficult to explain.  One could 
speculate, however, that the navy’s interest stemmed either from inter-service rivalry — 
the need for the navy to be fully cognisant of what the army was up to — or from the 
fact that the report had originated in Russia, still a potential foe, and one whose 
priorities the navy needed to appreciate.  The most significant point, however, is that 
several powerful institutions in the Japanese establishment were paying careful attention 
to the region.     
The civilian bureaucracy was also conducting its own investigations into 
Mongolia during this period.  Once again, however, it was not always clear what 
actually constituted the region, in the eyes of the bureaucrats.  In March 1914, for 
instance, the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture’s Commerce and Industry Bureau 
(Nshmush shkkyoku) published Gendai Mko (Present-Day Mongolia), again a 
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translation of a book by a Russian who had spent two years in Mongolia.
62  While the 
title implied that the book dealt exclusively with Mongolia, it actually covered three 
areas:  Outer Mongolia and two adjoining regions, Sinkiang and Kansu.  Two years 
later, in March 1916, the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture collated and published a 
report entitled Tbu Uchimko sangy chsa (A Survey of Eastern Inner Mongolian 
Industry), which comprised a series of smaller reports.  This publication identified 
‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ as the Cherim, Chao-Uda, Chosotu, and Silingol leagues, as 
well as the region of Eastern Chahar,
63 a definition very similar to that offered by 
anthropologist Torii Ryz some nine months before, in July 1915, as discussed earlier.   
In all likelihood the Ministry of Trade and Agriculture was following Torii’s lead.     
Russian-authored books on Mongolia attracted attention outside official circles as 
well.  For example, March 1914 saw the publication of the Japanese translation of a 
book by Aleksiei M. Kuropatkin, the commander of the Russian Army during the 
Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, entitled Man-M shobunron (Concerning the 
Disposition of Manchuria and Mongolia).
64    The publisher was Minysha, a publishing 
house closely associated with the nationalist journalist Tokutomi Soh.  The book, 
which discussed such topics as the Yellow Peril, Russia’s eastern expansion, and the 
European encroachment on China, was very successful, being reprinted three times 
before the end of April the same year.  While the actual number of copies sold is 
unknown, at one yen, the book was not particularly expensive for the time,
65 so the 
number sold may have been considerable.  In his conclusion, Kuropatkin listed the 
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areas of the Far East to which Russia apparently laid claim, including Northern 
Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, arguing that Russia must be prepared to use all 
necessary force to achieve its aims in those regions.
66  The burgeoning strategic 
importance of Mongolia, coupled with the spectre of further conflict with Russia over 
respective spheres of influence on the continent, probably struck a chord with Japanese 
readers.   
Meanwhile, press coverage of Mongolia continued, and in the wake of the Sino-
Japanese treaty of May 1915 included some discussion of the potential for Japanese 
emigration.  An article in Ch k ron (Central Review) speculated that ‘East 
Mongolia would prove to Japan what Canada or Australia is to England’, going on to 
suggest that ‘the best means of exploiting the province would be to undertake stock-
breeding or mining and suchlike projects that would utilize the labour of the native 
people’.
67  In fact, however, Japanese emigration to Mongolia during this period was 
minimal and appears to have been largely limited to prostitutes for Chinese and 
Mongolian men.
68   
 
The 1916 ‘Independence’ Movement 
At the beginning of 1916, plans to implement direct Japanese control over Mongolia re-
emerged among factions of the Japanese military and the right wing, setting the stage 
for the second Manchurian-Mongolian ‘independence’ movement.   The lead-up to and 
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subsequent collapse of the movement have been well documented elsewhere;
69 here I 
will briefly review the events, with particular focus on how the military chain of 
command operated.     
 
  
Figure 12:    Babujab, 
reproduced from Aida Tsutomu, Kawashima Naniwa-, Tky:  
Bunsuikaku, 1936, reprinted Tky:  zorasha, 1997, opp. p. 256.     
 
At the start of 1916 several different military and right-wing groups within Japan 
actively supported two different coalitions on the continent that apparently had the same 
aim — separating Manchuria-Mongolia from Republican China.  In late March 1916 
the Japanese Army General Staff dispatched three officers, including Major Koiso 
Kuniaki, to the continent to oversee the merging of these two existing indigenous 
political groups, one of which was led by the Manchu Prince Su, the other by the Inner 
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Mongolian leader Babujab (see Figure 12), whose ties to the Japanese military dated 
back to the Russo-Japanese War.
70    Presumably, a merged organisation was considered 
likely to be more effective than two separate ones.  The army’s promotion of such a 
merger seemingly indicates that the General Staff favoured the idea of Manchurian-
Mongolian independence from China at this point.    Koiso was undoubtedly chosen for 
the 1916 mission because he had commanded the seven-man army survey team 
dispatched to ‘Eastern Inner Mongolia’ the previous year.     
Around the time that Major Koiso and the others were dispatched, however, the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry raised objections to the army’s evident support of plans to 
separate Manchuria and Mongolia from Han Chinese control.  These objections had 
little to do with actual opposition to detaching the region from China.  Rather, the 
complaint centred on how the separation was to be achieved.  Japan’s consul-general 
at Mukden, Yada Shichitar,
71   for example, favoured the promotion of an 
‘independent’ Manchuria and Mongolia, but felt that Japanese ambitions would be 
better served by backing Chang Tso-lin, the former Han Chinese bandit who now 
controlled much of Manchuria, rather than Prince Su or Babujab.
72    In response to this 
objection, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Giichi, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff, 
telegraphed Major-General Nishikawa Torajir, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung 
Government-General, and advised that no further action should be taken in connection 
with the planned army support for either Prince Su or Babujab, or with the idea of an 
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independent Manchuria-Mongolia.
73  What this meant, presumably, was that Tanaka 
agreed with Yada, preferring that support should instead be given to Chang Tso-lin.     
Then, in late April 1916, Tanaka went further, ordering Koiso’s immediate 
superior, Colonel Doi Ichinoshin,
74 to stop all preparations for the launch of the 
Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement.  Finally, in early May 1916, Major 
Koiso was recalled to Tokyo, where he met with Tanaka and Lieutenant-General 
Fukuda Masatar, also of the Army General Staff.  Despite being effectively ordered 
to end any support for a second Japanese-sponsored attempt to wrest Manchuria and 
Mongolia from China, Major Koiso, according to Valliant, chose to ignore orders, and 
following his meeting with Lieutenant-Generals Tanaka and Fukuda, informed both 
Colonel Doi and Major-General Nishikawa that it was necessary to continue 
preparations.
75   
If the first Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement can be dismissed as a 
gun-running operation that went wrong, the second was a far more grandiose affair, 
involving a conglomeration of Mongolian irregulars; Japanese Army officers, both 
regular and reserve; and the ubiquitous tairiku rnin, drawn from the right-wing 
patriotic societies.  One of those involved was the political activist Maekawa 
Tsuneyoshi,
76 who was later closely associated with the Zenrin kykai and whose 
career will be examined in more detail in Chapter Five.  In addition to this volatile 
mix, elements of the Japanese business world were drawn into the scheme, with the 
kura Trading Company providing funds for the operation while Mitsui undertook to 
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smuggle the ammunition.
77    As noted above, planning for the independence movement 
got underway in March 1916.  The actual operation ran from late June until early 
October.  In mid-August there was a series of clashes between the Japanese-backed 
Inner Mongols and the Han Chinese forces, in which the Mongols required the 
assistance of the Japanese military to survive.  At its height the independence 
movement involved a force of almost 3,000 men that exerted a degree of control over 
more than 5,000 kilometres of territory.
78   
The movement, however, was doomed from the outset.  Following the death of 
Chinese President Yuan Shih-k’ai in June 1916, the Japanese cabinet opted to back 
Yuan’s successor, Li Yüan-hung, and ordered that all support for the Manchuria-
Mongolia independence movement be withdrawn.
79  The decision to support Yuan’s 
successor was presumably based on a belief that backing Li as the appointed president 
of the Han Chinese Republic would be more likely to benefit Japan than would support 
of Babujab and Su.  With planning for the ‘independence’ movement in the final 
stages at the time of Yuan’s death, however, it was impossible to simply bring the 
operation to a stop.    Officers in the field continued to direct operations, and it was not 
until the death of Babujab, the Inner Mongolian leader, following a clash between the 
Japanese-backed Mongols and the Han Chinese Republican Army in early October 
1916, that hostilities finally ended and the Mongolian irregulars and Japanese personnel 
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dispersed.
80  As will be discussed later in the chapter, this train of events was very 
important in consolidating the pattern of high-level tolerance that grew up around 
independent army actions in Mongolia.     
With the cessation of Japanese support for the independence movement, the death 
of Babujab and the subsequent collapse of the second Manchuria-Mongolia 
independence movement, plans for an ‘independent’ Manchuria-Mongolia again came 
to an abrupt end.  The third and final attempt in 1918-22, however, would be a far 
larger affair.     
 
The 1918-22 Siberian Intervention and the Pan-Mongol Movement 
In 1918, following the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the success of the Bolsheviks, 
Japan joined the Allied expedition to the Russian Far East, more commonly known in 
Japan as the Siberian Intervention.  While the principal objective of Japanese 
involvement in the Siberian Intervention was to block the spread of Communism, some 
army personnel also viewed support for the anti-Bolshevik White Russians as a way to 
revive the failed Manchuria-Mongolia independence plan.
81  Moreover, some officers 
who had seen action in the second independence movement actively participated in the 
Siberian Intervention.
82  The third Mongolian ‘independence’ movement, also known 
as the Pan-Mongol movement, was connected with the Siberian Intervention.    It began 
in late 1918, and built on an earlier idea that had been promoted by two of the White 
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Russian figures supported by the Japanese army in the Russian Far East, namely 
Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov (Figure 13) and Baron Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich 
von Ungern-Sternberg
83 (Figure  14).   
 
  
Figure 13:    Grigorii Mikhailovich Semenov, 
reproduced from Canfield F. Smith, Vladivostok under Red and White Rule:   
Revolution and Counterrevolution in the Russian Far East, 1920-1922, 
Seattle and London:    University of Washington Press, 1975, opp. p. 23.     
 
The Cossack leader Ataman (‘headman’ or ‘leader’) Semenov was born in Siberia 
in 1890 of Buriyat-Mongol parentage.  Semenov first encountered the Japanese in 
early 1918, after being dispatched to the Russian Far East by Aleksandar Fedorovich 
Kerenskii, leader of the Russian Provisional Government that was formed following the 
abdication of Tsar Nicolas II in 1917, to raise a regiment of Mongol cavalry for use 
against the Germans on the Eastern front during World War One.  Shortly after 
arriving in the Russian Far East, Semenov is reported to have met with Lieutenant-
Colonel Araki Sadao, then Harbin Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) chief, and 
subsequently agreed to work with the Japanese in the fight against the Bolsheviks.  
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The details of the meeting are sketchy, but Semenov appears to have first outlined the 
idea of an independent Transbaikal, presumably an area from which the Bolsheviks 
could be fought, and later expanded this to include Mongolia.
84   
The nucleus of the Mongol cavalry unit that Semenov raised on Kerenskii’s 
orders
85  happened to come from a unit of Japanese-sponsored Mongolian irregulars that 
had been involved in the failed 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence 
movement.
86  How the Mongolian irregulars came to be part of the cavalry unit raised 
by Semenov is not known, but the likelihood that Japanese Army officers previously 
involved in the 1916 movement may have arranged it cannot be discounted.  An 
assessment by the Japanese Army, prepared in April 1918, not long after Semenov had 
begun to work with the Japanese, indicated that Semenov commanded a comparatively 
powerful force.    In addition to some 1,800 men, divided into infantry and cavalry units, 
he also possessed twenty artillery pieces and almost fifty machine guns as support 
weapons.
87  Almost a third of the cavalry unit that Semenov eventually raised were 
Mongols, most likely those who had earlier served under Babujab,
88 the remainder 
being made up, presumably, of White Russians.     
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Figure 14:    Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von Ungern-Sternberg, 
reproduced from Ferdinand Ossendowski, Tiere, Menschen und Götter,  
Frankfurt am Main:    Abteilung Buchverlag, 1924, opp. p. 280.     
 
Semenov’s compatriot, Ungern-Sternberg, was a Russian-Hungarian nobleman, 
rumoured to have been married to a Manchurian princess, who is reported to have 
encountered Semenov, evidently a kindred spirit, while serving in the Russian Far East 
either just prior to or during World War One.
89  Both Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg 
believed themselves to be ‘Buddhists’ and supported the idea of a ‘Buddhist-Mongol’ 
empire that included Mongolia and Tibet.
90  This proposal expanded to become the 
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Pan-Mongol movement, which in late 1918 aspired to a unified greater Mongolia.
91  
Semenov acted as the driving force of the movement, while other figures involved 
included an Inner Mongolian religious leader, appointed to lead the provisional 
government formed in 1919; a Buriyat nationalist from the Transbaikal; and a former 
associate of Babujab, the Mongolian leader connected with the 1916 Japanese-
sponsored Manchurian-Mongolian ‘independence’ movement.
92 
From the outset, Japanese military intelligence personnel were actively involved in 
this movement, as they saw in it a chance to encourage Mongolian separatism from 
China, and eventually, Japanese dominance of the region.  A number of the personnel 
who served in the Japanese Army’s SIA in the Russian Far East were directly linked to 
Semenov.
93  Japanese Army officers were present at meetings attended by regional 
representatives of the Pan-Mongol movement from early 1919, then reporting on 
developments to Tokyo, and arranging financial and military assistance.  In addition, 
archival sources show that the Japanese Army provided Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg 
with instructors and headquarters staff, who sent written reports to both the Army and 
Foreign Ministers on the development of the movement.
94  The army’s desire to 
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physically survey the region also continued unabated.  In April 1919, for example, 
Lieutenant-General Yui Mitsue, Chief of Staff of the Vladivostok Expeditionary Army, 
requested funds, and presumably permission, to enable Major-General Takayanagi 
Yasutar to undertake a special survey of Outer Mongolia.
95   
While the Japanese military backed Semenov, the principal organizer of the Pan-
Mongol movement, it does not appear to have believed that he could be successful on 
his own.    There is evidence to suggest that the military may have planned for Semenov 
to co-operate with Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese-sponsored Manchurian warlord.  The 
plan was apparently that Semenov and Chang would eventually divide Mongolia in two, 
presumably with both regions then coming under Japanese guidance.  The Japanese 
consul in Harbin apprised Foreign Minister Uchida of this plan in mid-September 
1919.
96  
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A White Russian present in Chita in 1919, who later wrote of his experiences, 
quoted a colleague involved in the Pan-Mongol movement as follows about the 
movement’s plans for the region:       
 
We intend to organize a new empire; a new civilization.  It will be 
called the Middle Asiatic Buddhist Empire, carved out of Mongolia, 
Manchuria and Eastern Siberia.  Communication has already been 
established for that purpose with Djan-Zo-Lin [Chang Tso-lin], the 
warlord of Manchuria, and with Hutukhta, the Living Buddha of 
Mongolia [the religious ruler of Outer Mongolia].  Here in these 
historic plains we will organize an army as powerful as that of Genghis 
Khan.    Then we will move, as that great man did, and smash the whole 
of Europe.  The world must die so that a new and better world may 
come forth, reincarnated on a higher plane.
97   
 
Whether Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg, let alone their Japanese supporters, actually 
believed in such a plan is unknown, but as we have seen, parts of the Japanese military 
were certainly willing to provide substantial assistance to the Pan-Mongol movement, in 
terms of both finance and equipment.     
The Pan-Mongol movement proved to be far less successful than had been hoped.  
Although it had the grandiose aim of uniting all Mongols under the one banner, the 
movement was viewed by the Outer Mongolian government with a high degree of 
suspicion and as nothing more than a ‘Japanese-Semenov plot’.
98  Even without Outer 
Mongolia’s participation, however, the plan proceeded and a Provisional Mongolian 
Government was formed in March 1919, comprising representatives from Inner 
Mongolia, Barga and Buriatia.
99  An attempt was then made in April 1919 to send 
delegates to the Paris Peace Conference to argue for Mongolian self-determination.  
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This move, however, was unexpectedly blocked by Tokyo, leading to an increase in 
distrust among the various parties involved, most of whom blamed Semenov.
100  
Things finally got completely out of hand in the autumn of 1919, when one of the Inner 
Mongols involved organised an armed revolt against Semenov, a revolt that Semenov 
ruthlessly put down.
101  
While Japanese military support for Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg increased, 
other alternatives were also considered in the military’s quest to gain control of 
Mongolia.  This is evident in the provision of a military advisor to two of the Han 
Chinese warlords who had ambitions in Mongolia.  The advisor to both was Banzai 
Rihachir, an army officer who had had a long and varied career, including several 
terms of service in North China.
102    Banzai, as will be discussed in Chapter Three, was 
also connected with Morishima Kadofusa, an individual who figured prominently in 
Japan’s relationship with Mongolia from the 1920s onwards.  In early May 1920, 
Banzai was reported to be advising the Chinese General Hsü Shu-cheng, after Hsü 
returned to Urga from Peking and attempted to re-establish Han Chinese control over 
Outer Mongolia, Chinese rule having formally ended there some nine years earlier, in 
1911, when the Outer Mongolians had declared independence.  Banzai’s duties as 
advisor appear to have been more than simply military.  The Japanese press reported 
that his role, in part, was to see ‘the farms and ranches in Eastern Mongolia [developed] 
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as a training ground for Japanese experts’.
103  Evidently the military was considering 
the economic potential of the region.  It was also reported that Banzai had been 
assigned by Marshal Tuan Ch’i-jui to oversee the training of several Chinese Army 
divisions, including one to be headquartered at Urga.
104  Banzai’s appointment as an 
advisor to Hsü and Tuan was, presumably, part of ongoing Japanese military schemes to 
increase Japanese control of Mongolia.     
By 1920, the existence of a Japanese-backed government in the Maritime Province, 
that is, the region of the Russian Far East adjacent to the Sea of Japan, had stimulated 
the creation by the USSR of a new entity, the so-called Far Eastern Republic, which 
was to act as a buffer state between Soviet Russia and the Japanese and their allies in 
the Maritime Province.    The new state was thus designed to combat the threat posed by 
forces hostile to the Bolsheviks following the withdrawal of the Japanese from the 
Transbaikal in July 1920 and the establishment of de facto Bolshevik control of the 
region.
105  Such a threat became real in June 1921, when Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg 
and other White Russian leaders launched a three-pronged assault on the Far Eastern 
Republic.    The assault evidently had significant Japanese support.
106  Nishihara  Yukio 
states that in addition to half a million yen in financial support, the Japanese military 
also provided the White forces in Vladivostok with 12,000 rifles, six heavy field guns, 
fifty machine guns and more than 350,000 cartridges.
107   
The assault on the Far Eastern Republic was ultimately a failure, with the forces of 
Semenov and the other White Russian leaders failing to make any real progress against 
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the Red Army.  Ungern-Sternberg’s force was initially more successful, but his 
reportedly brutal and sadistic behaviour,
108 which earned him the soubriquet of the 
‘bloody baron’, undermined the support of the Outer Mongolians, leading to the 
betrayal of Ungern-Sternberg and his subsequent capture and execution by the Red 
Army in September 1921.
109    Though it was more than a year before Japanese troops in 
the Russian Far East withdrew, active Japanese support for the White Russians 
effectively ended at this point.
110  The suspension of Japanese support for the various 
White Russian forces in the Russian Far East also meant the end of any concrete 
support for the Pan-Mongol movement, as support for the movement had been 
channelled through these forces.     
 
The Japanese High Command and Mongolian Operations 
Japanese military operations in Mongolia in this period were punctuated by seemingly 
renegade actions.  The pattern of official complicity in them is of key importance, 
because it suggests that what appears to be independent military action in the field was 
not in fact isolated from a larger pattern of willingness on the part of the Japanese 
establishment to interfere in Mongolia for the purpose of extending Japanese control 
there.  ‘Renegade’ actions were probably not planned or approved of in advance by 
senior officers, but nevertheless, those officers were more than willing to grasp at any 
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favourable outcomes that might ensue, and to turn independent field actions to their 
own advantage.    Presumably, they would also have repudiated such actions if they had 
proved sufficiently embarrassing.  On another note, as will be discussed later in this 
chapter, these events in the field did not radically clash with what some leading 
Mongols appear to have wanted from Japan.     
Several instances of senior Japanese military officers turning a blind eye to the 
independent actions of officers in the field in Mongolia are to be found in the 
‘independence’ movements from 1912 onwards, and the number of such instances 
increased each time.  The willingness of elements of the high command to ignore and 
thus tacitly to encourage what was happening in the field, presumably because it served 
the aims of some of them, has, however, attracted little attention in earlier studies of the 
three independence movements.   
As we have seen, Kawashima Naniwa, one of the important figures in the first 
independence movement, was summoned to Tokyo in March or April 1912 and 
informed by both Vice-Chief of Staff Lieutenant-General Fukushima and Foreign 
Minister Uchida that the operation must cease.
111  According to Valliant, however, 
Fukushima was in fact intimately involved in the operation and at times ‘almost seemed 
to be Kawashima’s right-hand man’.
112  So, the Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff 
officially forbade a plan of action, while actually being one of the participants in it.    If 
Fukushima’s actions in supporting the first independence movement were known and 
had contravened army policy, some kind of censure should have followed, but there is 
no evidence of any censure.  Indeed, Fukushima was subsequently promoted to a 
higher rank.    Then, in April 1912, he was appointed governor of the Kwantung Leased 
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Territories, a position that brought him closer to the action, and one he held until 
September 1914, when he was promoted to full general, the second highest general 
officer rank.  Fukushima also became vice-chairman of the Imperial Military Reserve 
Association.
113  Similarly, Taga Muneyuki, a major at the time of the first Manchuria-
Mongolia independence movement and an active participant in supposedly unauthorised 
operations, later reached the rank of lieutenant-general, only one rank below that 
attained by Fukushima.
114    The only conclusion to draw is that the actions of these two 
officers were not considered insubordinate; otherwise they would not have been 
promoted.   
There is, of course, the theoretical possibility that the army authorities were 
unaware either of Fukushima’s association with Kawashima or of Taga’s activities.  
This, however, is unlikely.  Fukushima and Kawashima had been closely associated 
with one another for the better part of twenty-five years.  It had probably been 
Fukushima who had provided the funds for Kawashima to travel to China in 1886,
115 
and it was Fukushima who had engaged Kawashima as an army interpreter at the time 
of the 1900 Boxer Expedition.
116  Presumably, the army must have been aware of the 
relationship between the two men.  As for Taga, it had been the army that had 
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dispatched him to Inner Mongolia for the purpose of aiding Prince Gung, one of the 
leaders of the ‘independence’ movement of 1912.
117   
The high command again appears to have turned a blind eye to renegade 
operations in Mongolia in the next independence movement.    The actions of the senior 
officers involved in 1916, Vice-Chief of the Army General Staff Lieutenant-General 
Tanaka, and Lieutenant-General Fukuda, discussed earlier, support this conclusion.
118  
As for Major Koiso Kuniaki, he had been ordered to suspend operations in Inner 
Mongolia, but when the operation in fact proceeded, he was not held culpable.    At the 
time Koiso was a comparatively junior officer, and had only been attached to the Army 
General Staff since June 1915.  Yet, apparently, he deliberately disobeyed orders.  
Junior staff officers were not expected to think for themselves, and if Koiso’s actions 
had been deemed irregular it is highly probable that he would have been sidelined.
119  
If Koiso ignored a direct order from a superior, in this instance the Vice-Chief of the 
Army General Staff, and then directed a number of officers senior in rank to him to 
proceed with the planning of the second independence movement, it implies that he 
believed he had at least the tacit approval of Tanaka, Fukuda and other officers senior to 
him.   
Thus the evidence strongly suggests that high-level tacit approval, at least, was 
given to Japanese involvement in the second Manchurian-Mongolian independence 
movement.  Koiso went on to hold a number of important posts, both military and 
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political, including that of Prime Minister between July 1944 and April 1945,
120 
indicating that his apparent disobedience in 1916 was by no means a black mark against 
his career.    The conclusion must be that Koiso received verbal approval for his actions 
in 1916, thereby allowing him to act independently, but avoiding the paper trail that a 
written order would have left.    Neither does there seem to have been any other censure 
by the Army General Staff of the independent action by other officers in the field 
following the cabinet’s decision to terminate support for the Inner Mongols.     
More importantly, even following the death of Yuan Shih-k’ai in June 1916 and 
the Japanese cabinet’s decision to terminate any further operations against the new 
Chinese Republic, there were still officers who continued to support the second 
independence movement, providing further evidence that some within the military 
disagreed with the political decision and were prepared and allowed to act 
independently.  As we have seen, the result of this independent action, in which 
Japanese officers actually directed operations, was a series of armed clashes between 
the Mongol and Han Chinese forces in 1916.  These encounters received extensive 
press coverage in both the Japanese- and English-language press in Japan, and in the 
English-language press in China, with particular attention being given to the fact that 
Japanese officers commanded the Mongols.
121  American military intelligence also 
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reported on Japanese involvement in the clashes between the Mongols and Han 
Chinese.
122  Thus the Japanese military’s involvement in the 1916 ‘independence’ 
movement was widely known, to the general public and at the highest levels of 
government, both within Japan and abroad.     
The propensity of the Japanese high command in this period to ignore 
independent action in the field, as well as to ignore the wishes of the elected 
government, is borne out by archival evidence of the army’s actions during the Siberian 
Intervention, and especially of its support for Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg.    As we 
will see, the government officially decided to cease supporting Semenov and probably 
Ungern-Sternberg in May 1919.  Local Japanese military assistance to Semenov, 
Ungern-Sternberg and others continued after May 1919, however, and it is safe to 
conclude from the archives that such assistance had the tacit approval of elements of 
both the Japanese military at home and the government.
123  The Army General Staff 
knew that Semenov was receiving Japanese support in the field, and as the aims of 
Semenov and at least one part of the Japanese Army were in concert, a blind eye was 
turned.  Several of the Japanese Army officers involved in the Siberian Intervention 
later played prominent roles in the political world in Tokyo; and more importantly for 
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our purposes, some of those in Tokyo who favoured support for unofficial action during 
the Siberian Intervention also went on to hold positions of significant responsibility, 
suggesting that their superiors had not greatly disapproved of their actions.     
Until the end of the Siberian Intervention, Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg 
themselves clearly had at least the tacit approval of senior levels of the Japanese Army 
for their activities in the Transbaikal and Mongolia.    The question of whether they also 
had high-level Japanese government approval is more difficult to answer.    It is known 
that in November 1917, a full ten months prior to the government’s decision to dispatch 
Japanese personnel to the Russian Far East, the cabinet of Terauchi Masatake adopted a 
policy of assisting ‘moderate elements’ in Siberia that were to include Semenov.
124  
Later, in January 1919, during the early phase of the Pan-Mongol movement, the 
cabinet of Hara Kei decided that it was necessary to remove Russian influence in Outer 
Mongolia, as well as to ensure that no other power, such as the United States, gained a 
foothold in the region.
125  While it is unclear if this decision implied further aid to 
Semenov, Japanese Army officers in Urga did make clear to the Mongols Japan’s desire 
to exclude Western influence from Outer Mongolia and also pressed repeatedly for 
diplomatic representation between Japan and Outer Mongolia, as well as a variety of 
economic concessions.
126   
As a result of his often bloody and brutal reign over the Transbaikal, however, the 
attitude of the other Allies in the Siberian Intervention, especially the USA, turned 
against support for Semenov, and shortly after the beginning of the Pan-Mongol 
movement, the Hara Cabinet decided to restrain him.  In May 1919, the cabinet 
persuaded the Japanese Army to unite behind a decision to channel all arms and 
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economic assistance to Semenov through the overall White Russian leader in the 
Russian Far East, Admiral Aleksander Vasilevich Kolchak, thus officially ending the 
separate support given to Semenov by Japanese secret agents and field officers, with or 
without the knowledge of the Army General Staff.
127    There was another twist when, in 
early January 1920, the United States government decided to end its involvement in the 
Siberian Intervention, realising that support for the White Russians was unlikely to lead 
to the defeat of the Bolsheviks.  The Hara Cabinet, after learning of the intended 
American withdrawal from Siberia, agreed that Japan would follow suit, but ‘at an 
appropriate moment’.
128  What this meant in practice was that Japan continued to 
occupy Vladivostok and the former Tsarist Russian railway zone in Northern 
Manchuria, supposedly to protect Eastern Mongolia, Manchuria and Korea from 
Bolshevik subversion.     
In May 1919, when the Hara Cabinet convinced the Army General Staff to suspend 
aid to Semenov, and presumably also to Ungern-Sternberg, the suggestion was that the 
support given prior to 1919 had been from field officers and was accordingly 
unofficial.
129  Reports from 1918 and 1919 in the Army General Staff’s Nishi mitsu ju 
nikki (Western Secret Great Diary), however, clearly show that the ministers for both 
the Army and Foreign Affairs were kept fully appraised of the steps being taken to 
support Semenov, and were still being kept informed in September 1920, when a report 
was submitted to the Army Ministry regarding Japanese volunteers fighting with 
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Semenov.
130  Finally, in May 1921, two years after the decision had been made 
officially to end assistance, a report championing military support for the White 
Russians was prepared by Major-General Isomura Toshi, Chief of Staff of the 
Vladivostok Expeditionary Army, and submitted to the Army Vice Minister, 
Lieutenant-General Yamanashi Hanz.
  The report urged that substantial assistance be 
given to Ungern-Sternberg, in order to facilitate the collapse of the Far Eastern 
Republic,
131  even though such an outcome would have left Ungern-Sternberg’s force in 
control of Mongolia.    Evidently such Japanese aid was in fact provided; the failed June 
1921 assault on the Far Eastern Republic, discussed earlier in the chapter, was one part 
of a broader Japanese-backed White Russian campaign by Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg 
and other White Russian leaders to overthrow the new state.    Thus the evidence is that 
the Japanese military continued aid both to Semenov and to Ungern-Sternberg well after 
the May 1919 cabinet decision to end such aid.  It is also apparent that the high 
command was well aware of what was occurring.     
More than two years after the official decision to end support for Semenov and 
those associated with him, presumably also including Ungern-Sternberg, the Japanese 
government was still finding it necessary to give public assurances on the international 
stage that it really was no longer supporting White Russian forces in the Russian Far 
East.  In September 1921, at the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 
Washington DC, Japan’s representative, Shidehara Kijr, read out a statement 
explaining that Japan had been reluctant to abandon Semenov, given that the 
government had originally encouraged him, but that it had been found that assistance to 
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Semenov had complicated the international situation in Siberia, and Japan had therefore 
severed all relations with Semenov and had not renewed them.
132  While Shidehara 
was denying Japanese support for Semenov, other sources confirm, as noted earlier, not 
only continuing Japanese support for Ungern-Sternberg in his assault on Outer 
Mongolia, but also the subsequent assault on the Far Eastern Republic, an operation in 
which Semenov himself was also involved.     
Nor was the Japanese Foreign Ministry unaware of the support Ungern-Sternberg 
was receiving from the Japanese Army.  A November 1921 report, prepared for Ijin 
Hikokichi, then head of the Foreign Ministry’s Information Bureau, entitled ‘“Ungerun” 
gun ni y haretaru Nihonjin no kd shimatsu’ (After-Action Report Concerning the 
Proud Japanese Participation in Ungern’s Army), went into some detail regarding 
Japanese support for Ungern-Sternberg.    It is possible to infer from the report that one 
unit of Ungern-Sternberg’s army was commanded by a Japanese Army colonel.
133  
Two reports by the United States military attaché in Peking, submitted to the United 
States government in March 1921, further detailed Japanese involvement in Ungern-
Sternberg’s operations.
134   
High-level complicity in supposedly renegade military operations in Mongolia 
progressively increased between 1912 and 1922.  In 1912, it appears to have been 
limited to a small number of senior officers, among them Fukushima Yasumasa, 
according to Valliant.
135  By 1916, however, the evidence suggests that a significant 
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proportion of the Army General Staff was willing to ignore political decisions in pursuit 
of its own aims, and that in doing so it had the support of at least some elements of the 
Kwantung Army.  The situation was even more complex by the time of the Siberian 
Intervention.  Again the evidence suggests that elements of the military were more 
than willing to ignore cabinet decisions that they did not like.    Judging from the title of 
the Foreign Ministry’s November 1921 after-action report, which talked of ‘proud 
Japanese participation’ in Ungern-Sternberg’s operations, some in the Foreign Ministry 
may also have opted by this time to ignore cabinet decisions that did not suit their aims.     
 
Mongolian Overtures to Japan 
Japan’s relationship with Mongolia at this time undoubtedly was largely moulded by the 
Japanese elites.  As in the earlier period, however, it was not a one-way relationship, 
and there were ongoing, albeit sporadic, attempts throughout these years by leading 
Mongols to establish closer links with Japan.    As Narangoa and Cribb and others have 
noted, Japan’s early success in industrialising, together with its spectacular and 
unexpected victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, inspired many Asians, who 
saw in Japan both a model and a possible source of assistance for their own plans for 
modernisation and independence.
136  The Mongols were no exception.  Indeed, in 
some instances, it could be argued that the Mongols welcomed the opportunity to forge 
closer ties with Japan equally as much as the Japanese sought to cultivate the Mongols.     
The first recorded diplomatic overture from the new Outer Mongolian 
government, established in 1911, to another country was in early 1913, when a 
delegation visited St Petersburg in an attempt to establish a closer relationship with 
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Outer Mongolia’s larger northern neighbour, through a guarantee of Russian support 
against any possible Chinese Republican incursion.
137  The same delegation, however, 
also sought to limit the influence that Russia exerted in Outer Mongolia through the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations, in particular, Japan.    As a part 
of this attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan, the Outer Mongolian delegation 
in St Petersburg forwarded a letter to the Japanese emperor from the Bogd Khan, the 
supreme religious ruler of Outer Mongolia and head of the Mongolian government.  
The letter, however, was returned to the Mongols unopened.
138  The Japanese 
presumably rebuffed the Outer Mongolian overtures because, under the Russo-Japanese 
Agreement signed in July 1912, Outer Mongolia was deemed to fall within Russia’s 
sphere of influence.     
Despite the rebuff, in February 1913, the Outer Mongolian government made a 
second attempt to open diplomatic relations with Japan.  On this occasion, the Home 
Minister of the Bogd Khan’s government, Tserenchimed, sought to have Japan establish 
a protectorate over Inner Mongolia while simultaneously recognising the independence 
of Outer Mongolia and also the notional sovereignty of Outer Mongolia over Inner 
Mongolia.  One major object was to enable the Outer Mongolian government to 
achieve its aim of nominally uniting Inner and Outer Mongolia, in order to create the 
Greater Mongolia that some in Outer Mongolia dreamed of.  To achieve this aim a 
delegation was dispatched to Harbin to meet with the Japanese consul there, as the first 
step in a planned trip to Japan to petition the Japanese government.    Unfortunately for 
the Outer Mongolian delegation, the Japanese consul informed them that because 
Russia opposed the trip to Japan, he could only advise the Outer Mongolians to avoid 
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unpleasantness and return to Urga.
139    The Japanese go-between for this second attempt 
was Miyazato Yoshimaro, a ‘Mongolian adventurer’ (Mko rnin), later connected with 
Babujab, the Mongolian leader of the 1916 independence movement.  Miyazato 
supposedly succeeded in persuading both the Harbin consul-general, and the Japanese 
military staff in Changchun, to accept the Mongolian mission, but because of pressure 
from Russia, the Japanese government declined to allow the mission passage to 
Japan.
140   
In early 1914, the Outer Mongolian government may have made a third attempt to 
open diplomatic relations with Japan.    On this occasion, the Mongolian Special Envoy 
in St Petersburg granted an interview to the Japanese press in which he called on the 
Japanese government to promote closer ties with Inner Mongolia.   The envoy’s reason 
for doing this is unclear, but it may have constituted another attempt by Outer Mongolia 
to gain Japanese recognition of Outer Mongolia’s notional sovereignty over Inner 
Mongolia.  Moreover, from the tone of the interview, it appeared that the Outer 
Mongols were becoming frustrated with Russia.  The envoy made the following 
statement:   
 
The Koolon [Urga] Government is now tired of the cunning 
diplomacy of the Russian Government.  In view of the self-
government of Outer Mongolia established through Russian 
help, Inner Mongolia desires to secure similar rights by Japanese 
help.  It was in furtherance of this desire that the Living 
Buddha [Bogd Khan, or religious leader of Outer Mongolia] 
asked the Russian Foreign Department to convey his letter to the 
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Emperor of Japan.  If, therefore, Japan should give help to the 
present political movement of Inner Mongolia, she would secure 
privileges there equal to those secured by Russia in Outer 
Mongolia.
141   
 
Evidently, parts of the Outer Mongolian government were seeking to strengthen Japan’s 
position in Inner Mongolia, perhaps hoping in the future that Japan might counter 
Russia’s dominant position in Outer Mongolia as well.  The fact that this interview 
was published in Japan also suggests that elements of the Japanese media regarded the 
Outer Mongolian overture as an opportunity to secure for Japan a stronger position in 
Inner Mongolia, and were not shy of conveying this opinion, albeit indirectly.     
Despite the earlier rebuffs, in the middle of 1915 Miyazato Yoshimaro was again 
approached to act as a go-between in Mongolian attempts to secure Japanese military 
assistance.  On this occasion, Miyazato assisted two Mongols, one of them Babujab’s 
brother-in-law, to travel to Japan, where the pair came to the attention of Kawashima 
Naniwa, who had been involved in the first Manchurian-Mongolian independence 
movement, and others of like mind.    Following a meeting of the Mongols, Kawashima 
and others, the Japanese military decided to dispatch two reserve army officers to 
Mongolia to assess what aid Babujab’s army required.
142    The eventual outcome of this 
approach was the Japanese assistance given to the second independence movement, 
discussed earlier in the chapter.     
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Conclusion 
The attempts by members of various interest groups to increase Japanese control of 
Mongolia during the Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 
1916 and the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22 should not be examined in isolation.  
Rather, the three operations, and the ongoing diplomatic overtures by Japan to China 
and Russia, must be seen as part of a larger pattern.  The independence movement of 
1912 was not the first attempt by Japanese military officers to enlarge Japan’s sphere of 
influence into Mongolia, though earlier efforts had been less ambitious.    As outlined in 
Chapter One, the Japanese military had made several attempts prior to the collapse of 
the Ch’ing dynasty to strengthen Japan’s position in Inner Mongolia, including by such 
means as encouraging the activities of Kawahara Misako as teacher and intelligence 
officer in the months preceding the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5, and placing 
Japanese Army officers in parts of Inner Mongolia prior to the collapse of the Ch’ing 
dynasty.   
One thing that is distinctive about this period, however, and yet has been 
neglected in other works, is the high-level tolerance of apparently renegade army 
actions in Mongolia.  From the first independence movement of 1912 through to the 
end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922 the pattern of apparent insubordination, and 
tolerance of it, grows steadily larger.  In 1912 it was probably only a handful of 
officers out in the field who disobeyed official orders, although it is possible, as Valliant 
has suggested, that Fukushima Yasumasa, a senior officer in the high command, was 
quite deeply involved.
143  In 1916, apparent insubordination again seems to have been 
accepted in connection with operations in Mongolia, as seen by the evident lack of 
censure of Koiso by the Army General Staff, although the General Staff did appear to 
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follow the wishes of the civilian government in officially suspending assistance to the 
forces led by Babujab.    By the time of the Siberian Intervention even the semblance of 
willingness by the Army General Staff to kowtow to the civilian authorities had ceased, 
as can be seen in the call by high-ranking army officers for aid to White Russian leaders 
in May 1921, some two years after the civilian government had decided to suspend such 
aid.  Clearly, some in the high command were prepared to ignore the civilian 
authorities when it came to operations in Mongolia, especially if the decisions made by 
the civilian authorities interfered with attempts by the military to extend Japan’s control 
over the region.  Operations were conducted, however, in such a way that the high 
command could plead ignorance of what had occurred if the attempt failed.     
Despite the failure of the various Japanese-backed attempts to gain control of 
Mongolia during this period, the degree of attention shown by the Japanese military and 
other groups to Mongolia indicates the perceived strategic significance of the region to 
Japan.    Moreover, the overtures made by some in the Outer Mongolian government to 
Japan, in an attempt to gain diplomatic recognition for their independence from Han 
Chinese domination, to counter Russian interference, and to enhance their own claim to 
influence over Inner Mongolia, indicate that some Outer Mongolians favoured the idea 
of Japan playing an active role in their future.    These overtures no doubt also served to 
strengthen Japanese leaders’ belief that Japan was or could be the leader of Asia.    The 
next chapter will show that the withdrawal of the Japanese Army from the continent 
following the collapse of the Siberian Intervention brought a further shift in Japanese-
Mongolian ties, as business and religious figures re-emerged and again assumed a 
significant role in the relationship.     
  
159 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
 
MONGOLIA’S RICHES:     
JAPANESE EXPLORERS, ENTREPRENEURS AND 
MILITARY OPPORTUNISTS, 1922-31 
 
 
Even if my body lies in Mongolian fields 
As a Japanese man I will feel no shame.   
At this moment I ascend to heaven.   
I will protect Japan and the world.   
Far away from Japan,    
I am now about to become a god in the skies of 
Mongolia.
1   
 
 
 
Between 1922 and 1931, the dominant Japanese attitudes to Mongolia were woven from 
a number of disparate strands.    Direct military ambitions remained a crucial factor, but 
certain Japanese political, business and, more surprisingly, religious figures also 
apparently came to feel that Mongolia was a valuable, exploitable resource, and one that 
should accordingly be brought under Japanese control.  Of all of them, economic 
considerations were particularly prominent in this period.     
The shift in imperialist emphasis — from a reliance in the 1910s on military 
means to achieve Japanese hegemony, to greater emphasis on economic control — was 
not exclusive to Mongolia and in this sense, orthodox attitudes to Mongolia reflected 
the broader trend in Japanese policy towards China at this time.  As a number of 
writers have noted, from the 1922 Washington Conference to the 1931 Manchurian 
                                                 
1 Deguchi  Onisabur’s death poem, composed 16 June 1924.    Tokushige Takane et al. 
(eds), moto nanajnenshi, Kameoka, Kyto:  moto nanajnenshi hensankai, 1964, 
vol. 1, p. 749, quoted in Nancy Stalker, Prophet Motive:   Deguchi Onisabur, Oomoto, 
and the Rise of New Religions in Imperial Japan, Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2008, p. 151.      
160 
Incident, Japanese leaders favoured a policy of economic expansionism in China as a 
whole, rather than relying on force in the first instance.  By and large they sought to 
preserve existing rights and interests, expand export trade and cultivate new 
investments,
2 though there were occasions, as in the May 1928 Tsinan Incident, where 
force was considered necessary.    Economic expansionism dominated Japanese activity 
in Mongolia as well throughout the 1920s, as Japanese business and religious figures 
explored the potential of the region, while back in Japan, certain bureaucrats and 
politicians promoted Mongolia’s supposed wealth and importance to Japan.  At the 
same time, Japanese press reports on civilian visits to Mongolia and on various 
bureaucratic and political pronouncements about Mongolia ensured that the region 
continued to be brought to the attention of the reading public.     
Despite the apparent new emphasis on economics, the lines between military and 
civilian activities remained blurred.  Many of those in Japan who promoted 
Mongolia’s wealth in fact had ties to the military.  The extent to which the Japanese 
military actually supported their ventures is unclear, but the apparent geo-strategic 
importance of Mongolia to Japan was often an important underlying element in schemes 
to exploit Mongolia economically, and thus the military is quite likely to have 
encouraged such schemes in one way or another.     
This chapter illustrates the ways in which a range of the Japanese elites, chief 
among them the military, sought in the wake of the withdrawal from Siberia to further 
Japanese control of Mongolia.  I first review the geopolitical context of Japanese-
Mongolian relations between the end of the Siberian Intervention in 1922, when 
military operations directed at achieving Japan’s strategic ends on the continent were 
temporarily halted, and the Manchurian Incident of 1931, in which the use of military 
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force was again pre-eminent.  I then discuss the notion that Japan had ‘special 
interests’ in Mongolia, showing how such claims were promoted to the general public 
by individuals and groups from the military, political, academic and religious elites.  
Next I examine some major Japanese business ventures promoted in Mongolia during 
this period, noting their connections to the military and the manner in which these 
ventures were publicised within Japan, before considering attempts by Japanese 
religious figures, both mainstream and fringe, to forge closer ties between Japan and 
Mongolia, again noting their links to the military.  Finally, I discuss one particular 
aspect of Japanese military ambitions, the desire to use Mongolia as a source of horses 
for the army.     
I argue overall that while the various schemes, both military and civilian, pursued 
by Japanese groups and individuals in Mongolia during this period may appear 
unconnected, they in fact form part of the larger, ongoing picture of Japanese ambitions 
for the region.    Those in the elites who regarded Mongolia as part of Japan’s sphere of 
influence maintained and strengthened their ties with Mongolia during this period, and 
Mongolia also remained in the public eye in Japan.    Moreover, there was a high degree 
of continuity in the participants involved in these schemes, many of whom had 
connections with the earlier attempts to extend Japanese control in Mongolia discussed 
in the previous chapters.  The web of personal connections that had first appeared 
during the late nineteenth century among those Japanese with ambitions in Mongolia 
expanded during the 1920s, leading to the emergence of a broad synthesis of political, 
economic and cultural interests in the region.     
 
The Geopolitical Context 
The Red Army’s defeat of Ungern-Sternberg in July 1921, and the subsequent Soviet 
occupation of Outer Mongolia, effectively ended Japanese plans to install a puppet  
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regime there during the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention.  How the Japanese Army 
General Staff reacted to this setback is unknown.   Given, however, that sections of the 
Japanese military had been contemplating an increase in support to Ungern-Sternberg 
shortly prior to his defeat, as discussed in the previous chapter, the General Staff cannot 
have been happy with the turn of events.  As for the Siberian Intervention itself, the 
last Japanese troops were finally withdrawn in November 1922,
3  but the army’s dogged 
pursuit of its strategic aims on the continent had ramifications that lasted beyond the 
period in which it had been active in Siberia.  As Leonard Humphreys notes, the 
Siberian expedition had been hugely expensive, and partly for that reason, it alienated 
the Japanese public from the military and increased calls for a reduction in the size of 
the army.
4   
On the diplomatic front there were several important developments in Japan’s 
relations with its principal rivals for influence in Mongolia, that is, Russia and China.  
At Soviet instigation, the Mongolian People’s Republic was proclaimed in Outer 
Mongolia in November 1924, five months after the death of the Bogd Khan, the Outer 
Mongolian religious leader and head of the government.  The area remained under 
Soviet sway until 1990.
5  The Japanese military certainly remained alert to political 
developments in Outer Mongolia after 1924.  Given the fact of Soviet power there, 
however, from the early 1920s onwards, most Japanese military attention switched to 
the geo-strategic position of Inner Mongolia instead.     
For Inner Mongolia, the 1920s were turbulent years.    Technically, the region was 
part of the extremely unstable Han Chinese Republic.  Between 1916 and 1928 the 
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Chinese head of state changed nine times, there were twenty-four cabinet reshuffles 
with twenty-six different Prime Ministers, and corruption was endemic,
6 with much of 
the country under the control of warlords.  The political instability on the national 
level in China was reflected in the three provinces that comprised most of Inner 
Mongolia:  Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol.  Shifting alliances among the warlords who 
vied for control of this region resulted in a never-ending series of skirmishes in which 
this month’s ally became next month’s enemy, and control of the three provinces 
changed with each round of combat.
7   
In May 1922, for example, the Chihli faction defeated Chang Tso-lin’s Fengtien 
faction, which had controlled much of Inner Mongolia since 1920, and control of the 
provinces of Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol passed to the Chihli faction.
8  While Chang 
lost military power in the provinces, however, this did not stop him from declaring the 
Three Northeastern Provinces (Manchuria), plus Jehol and Chahar provinces and Inner 
and Outer Mongolia, independent from the Peking government on 12 May 1922.
9  T h i s  
was a confusing array of territory, given that Jehol and Chahar were part of Inner 
Mongolia and under the control of the Chihli faction, while Outer Mongolia was under 
Soviet sway.  For their part, the Soviets allegedly regarded the declaration of 
‘independence’ as Japanese-inspired, a ‘revival of the idea of a Japanese-Manchurian 
buffer’ and the ‘spearhead of Japanese imperialism’.
10   
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In late 1924, the Fengtien and Chihli armies again clashed, with the Japanese 
military backing Chang, while the Russians backed his rival, Feng Yü-hsiang.
11  A s  a  
result of the clash, Suiyuan, Chahar and Jehol provinces fell to Feng’s Kuominchun 
(People’s Army).
12  Not surprisingly, the Japanese military was unhappy with this 
outcome.  Major-General Hayashi Yasakichi, the Japanese military attaché at the 
Peking Legation, for example, noted that Feng’s defeat of Chang would have a negative 
impact on Japan’s relations with Manchuria, and with ‘Man-M’.
13  The Japanese 
government was sufficiently worried to deliver a note to the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
in Peking expressing its concern about Japan’s position in Manchuria and Mongolia.  
The response from the Chinese Foreign Ministry indicated that Japanese claims there 
were to be treated the same as other foreign claims,
14 presumably meaning that Japan 
could no longer demand preferential treatment from the Chinese government.     
In the wake of the warlord clashes in North China came a further threat to Japan’s 
position north of the Great Wall.  In June 1926, Chiang Kai-shek launched his 
Northern Expedition, aiming to unify China under the control of the Kuomintang 
(Nationalists).
15  By the middle of 1927, Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Giichi 
considered the threat to Japanese ambitions sufficiently serious to send Yamanashi 
Hanz, a retired army officer who later served as Governor-General of Korea, to Peking, 
in an attempt to persuade Japan’s protégé Chang Tso-lin to retreat north of the Great 
Wall, thereby avoiding a clash with Chiang.  The Japanese hoped to convince Chiang 
                                                 
11 James E. Sheridan, Chinese Warlord:  The Career of Feng Yü-hsiang, Stanford:  
Stanford University Press, 1966, pp. 177-9.     
12 Ch’i,  Warlord Politics, p. 216.     
13 Ikei Masaru, ‘Dai-niji H-Choku sens to Nihon’, in Kurihara Ken (ed.), Tai Man-
M seisakushi no ichimen:  Nichi-Ro sengo yori Taish ni itaru, Tky:  Hara shob, 
1966, p. 220.     
14 Arthur Waldron, From War to Nationalism:  China’s Turning Point, 1924-1925, 
Cambridge:    Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 167.     
15 See Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition:  China’s National Revolution of 
1926-1928, Honolulu:    University of Hawaii Press, 1976.      
165 
Kai-shek to accept the partition of China, leaving Manchuria and Mongolia in Chang 
Tso-lin’s hands.  Given the Japanese support of Chang, the area would then be under 
de facto Japanese control.  Chiang Kai-shek was initially unresponsive.
16  In October 
1927, however, Tanaka and Chiang met face-to-face in Tokyo, and attempted to reach 
an agreement under which Japan recognised Chinese Nationalist control of China 
proper, and Chiang recognised Japan’s special position in Manchuria and Mongolia.  
The eventual outcome of the talks, however, was obscure and apparently ambiguous.  
According to Takehiko Yoshihashi, there was an agreement; William Morton, on the 
other hand, states that Tanaka did not respond to Chiang’s overtures.
17   
Although Japan’s overall China policy was generally geared towards economic 
expansionism during the 1920s, there were, nevertheless, instances in which the 
government dispatched troops to the continent to defend Japan’s perceived ‘special 
interests’.    Nor were the troops used purely for defensive purposes.    In May 1928, for 
example, Japanese and Chinese troops clashed at Tsinan in Shantung province, when 
Nationalist troops entered the city as part of Chiang Kai-shek’s offensive against the 
northern warlords and encountered the Japanese troops stationed there, supposedly to 
protect Japanese businesses.
18  The Tsinan Incident was just one instance of the 
opportunism that continued to colour the Japanese government’s dealings with 
Republican China.     
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Mongolia in Japanese Bureaucratic, Political and Cultural Discourse 
Throughout the 1920s, a discourse continued in Japanese bureaucratic, political and 
cultural circles about ties with Mongolia.  Much of the discussion revolved around 
claims to a special relationship with the northeast region of the Chinese continent, the 
region commonly referred to as ‘Man-M’, and the nature of Japan’s strategic, 
economic and political rights in what Japanese leaders regarded as their country’s 
‘sphere of influence’.    Public pronouncements by various prominent figures, as well as 
certain administrative moves, bolstered Japan’s claims to the region.     
Bureaucratic developments and academic arguments reinforced discourses about 
special rights and interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.
19  At the 1922 Tokyo Peace 
Exposition, for example, as at the 1903 Osaka Domestic Industrial Exposition, a 
number of pavilions were devoted to regions that were already Japanese colonies or 
were apparently regarded as potential colonies.
20  Among the pavilions in the colonial 
section in 1922 was the ‘Manchuria and Mongolia Hall’.  The inclusion of this hall in 
the colonial section resulted in a formal complaint from the Chinese government, which 
objected to the suggestion that the region was or would be a Japanese colony.
21  T h i s  
was not the only claim that Mongolia fell under Japan’s colonial preserve.  In 1922, 
the same year as the Tokyo Exposition, there was agitation in bureaucratic circles for 
the establishment of a Colonial Department at ministerial level, presumably to 
administer those external areas not already directly governed, that is, Taiwan and Korea.   
The proposed department would oversee the South Sea Islands, over which Japan held a 
League of Nations’ mandate; but there were also calls for it to take into account the 
                                                 
19 See Sandra Wilson, The Manchurian Crisis and Japanese Society, 1931-1933, 
London:    Routledge, 2002, pp. 57-9.     
20 Yoshimi Shunya, Hakurankai no seijigaku:  Manazashi no kindai, Tky:  Ch 
kronsha, 1992, pp. 212-14.     
21  ‘Notes of the Week’, JCWE, 4 May 1922, p. 622.      
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‘changed conditions in North Manchuria, Mongolia, Siberia and Saghalien’.
22  
Evidently, some bureaucrats viewed Japan’s colonial ambitions as stretching across a 
large swathe of territory, including Mongolia.    Despite these calls for the establishment 
of a Colonial Department, nothing eventuated at this stage.     
The question of whether or not a formal bureaucratic organ was needed to further 
Japan’s colonial aspirations and to oversee its colonial dependencies, other than Taiwan 
and Korea, was still under discussion in 1926.  In June of that year, a Mr Kurogane, 
the Director of the Japanese Government’s Colonisation Bureau (Takushokukyoku) of 
the Home Ministry, called for the establishment of a ‘Colonisation Department’, 
presumably another name for the department that had been proposed in 1922.  The 
specific aim was now to put Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Manchuria and Mongolia on a 
firmer basis.
23  Kurogane had toured the region and had concluded that Japan’s 
ambitions there were endangered by the fact that the South Manchurian Railway 
Company, the Foreign Ministry and the army each pursued independent policies.  
Hence there was a need for a new co-ordinating body.  Among the places Kurogane 
had apparently visited were Harbin, Tsitsihar, Kirin and Chita.
24  While the first three 
towns lie in Northern Manchuria, Chita lies west of Lake Baikal, deep inside Russian 
territory.  Kurogane’s visit thus poses the question of how far Japan’s ‘special 
interests’ were perceived to extend on the continent.  Calls for the creation of a 
bureaucratic colonial department eventually resulted in the establishment of the 
Takumush (Colonisation Ministry) in 1929.
25   
                                                 
22 ‘Shokuminsh ansaizen’, Tky asahi shinbun, 22 April 1922.     
23  ‘Japan in Manchuria and Mongolia – Statement by Director of Colonization Bureau’, 
JCWE, 10 June 1926, p. 681.     
24 Ibid.   
25   For further information about the Takumush and its forerunner, the 
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Academic arguments were frequently used to bolster Japan’s claims to the region.   
In late December 1921, for example, Dr Yano Jin’ichi of the Faculty of Literature of the 
prestigious Kyoto Imperial University held forth in a newspaper article as to what 
constituted ‘China’ and how this definition affected Japan’s perceived ‘special interests’ 
north of the Great Wall.  Yano concluded that ‘history’ showed that Manchuria, 
Mongolia and Tibet were not part of China, and that China therefore had no claim on 
these regions.
26  Presumably, the point of Yano’s article was that if China had no 
legitimate claim to them, one or more of these regions could then be appropriated by 
Japan.    A version of Yano’s article was also published by the influential foreign policy 
journal Gaik jih (Revue Diplomatique) and from there was swiftly translated into 
English.
27  Yano’s thesis was hardly original.  Some people in Japanese government 
and academic circles had long regarded China’s territorial claims to Mongolia, as well 
as to Manchuria and Tibet, as spurious.  This position predated the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-5, and had been advanced in 1905, for example, by Suematsu Kench in a 
paper offered to the Central Asian Society in London.
28   Indeed, Suematsu’s 
presentation of this view to a distinguished foreign audience suggests that even at that 
early point, the Japanese government believed it could legitimately and openly 
challenge Chinese territorial claims to Manchuria and Mongolia.  Such opinions 
continued to be published, as part of an ongoing flow of writings that legitimised 
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Japan’s claims to areas of the Chinese continent.
29    Moreover, it was not only Japanese 
authors who advanced this thesis; some Western writers said similar things.
30   
The question of whether Mongolia was the place of origin of the Japanese as a 
people was also hotly debated among Japanese academics in the 1920s.
31  One  of  those 
involved in the debate was Japan’s premier Mongolist, Torii Ryz.
32  In 1925, Torii 
published Yshi izen no Nihon (Prehistoric Japan), in which he presented a theory of 
Japan’s ethnic origins which emphasised Japan’s racial diversity, and painted a picture 
of a prehistoric population drawn from all corners of Japan’s imperial territory and 
beyond,
33 including Mongolia.  The effect of Torii’s argument was to highlight the 
racial links between the ‘Japanese’ and their neighbours, presumably providing those 
who sought to expand Japan’s empire overseas with further justification for their actions.   
To collect further evidence for his theory, Torii conducted extensive fieldwork in 
Mongolia and adjacent regions.  It was on a visit to Mongolia in the autumn of 1927 
that he revised his own former opinion, as discussed in the Introduction, as to which of 
the leagues of Inner Mongolia fell, or ought to fall, within Japan’s sphere of interest.
34  
The following year, Torii again spent several months in Manchuria and Mongolia, 
publishing his findings for a wider audience on his return to Japan.
35   
                                                 
29 See  Wilson,  Manchurian Crisis, pp. 57-9.     
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Torii’s 1928 visit was undertaken partially at the request of the Foreign Ministry’s 
Chinese Cultural Section (Gaimush tai-Shi bunkabu),
36 showing once again that Torii 
had close ties to the Japanese establishment.  Indeed, Torii had consistently received 
material support for his research from the Japanese authorities.   For example, when he 
conducted fieldwork in Manchuria and Mongolia in 1905, shortly after the end of the 
Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese Army stationed there provided him with both guards 
and transportation.
37    Then, during the Siberian Intervention of 1918-22, Torii enlisted 
the help of the Japanese expeditionary forces to travel to Northern Sakhalin and Eastern 
Siberia.
38  The support Torii received from both the Japanese Army and the Foreign 
Ministry not only provides evidence of the longstanding links between the academic 
and bureaucratic realms in Japan, but also implies that Torii’s research, in particular, 
was regarded as important to Japan’s official position in the region.     
Emphasis by the government on Mongolia and its importance to Japan was 
particularly evident in the second half of the decade.  For example, in January 1926, 
Prime Minister Kat Takaaki included a reference to Japan’s rights, ‘both corporeal and 
non-corporeal’,
39 in Manchuria and Mongolia in his speech at the opening of the fifty-
first session of the Diet.  In light of the ceremony that surrounded the opening of the 
Diet, with the emperor overseeing proceedings, the specific mention of Japan’s 
supposed rights in Manchuria and Mongolia can be seen as a measure of how important 
these rights were considered to be in political circles.    Moreover, the very next month, 
Foreign Minister Shidehara Kijr reiterated to the Diet that Mongolia, specifically, 
ranked highly in government thinking.    Responding to a question from the opposition, 
                                                 
36  Ibid., p. 3 of Foreword, p. 2 of main text.     
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Shidehara stated that the government was ‘ready to afford help to such Japanese 
capitalists as might make investments in that region’.
40  The willingness of the Kat 
government to formally pledge assistance to any Japanese business concern considering 
investing in Mongolia suggests the perceived economic importance of the region to 
Japanese leaders.  Mongolia’s economic significance for Japan, as part of ‘Man-M’, 
was still under discussion in political circles some two years later, when Seiy, the 
monthly journal of the Seiykai political party, published two articles on the need to 
develop the region, the second of which was a comparatively lengthy piece.
41   
Outside of academic, bureaucratic and political circles, various other individual 
civilians also subscribed to the notion that Mongolia lay within Japan’s purview and 
made a number of endeavours to promote closer ties between the two regions.  Of the 
private individuals who are known to have journeyed to Mongolia in the 1920s, nearly 
all went with some degree of assistance from one or more of the Japanese elites that had 
specific goals in the region.  These people may not have been directly associated with 
the political, bureaucratic or academic groups discussed above, but they often had 
connections to individuals within those circles.  The ‘casual’ travellers, language 
students and nationalist thinkers who ventured to Mongolia on unofficial visits, then 
returned to Japan and wrote or lectured about their experiences, further propagated the 
idea that Mongolia had a special significance for Japan and fell, accordingly, under 
Japan’s purview.     
Among these private individuals, one of the more intriguing is Morishima 
Kadofusa, whose links to Mongolia date back to 1913.  In that year Morishima, then 
aged twenty-seven and having decided for some reason that Mongolia was where he 
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should live out his life, entered a lamasery in Inner Mongolia to hone his Mongolian 
language skills.
42    After three years in the lamasery, Morishima had seemingly tired of 
the monastic life; from 1917 until 1921 he was attached to the Japanese Army Special 
Intelligence Agency (SIA) office in Urga.
43    Then, in 1926, he appears to have become 
the first Japanese visitor to Outer Mongolia since the Soviet occupation of 1921.  His 
visit was made possible through the mediation of the Mainichi shinbun (Daily 
Newspaper) special correspondent in Peking, Fuse Tatsuji,
44  who arranged for 
Morishima to obtain a visa from the Russian Consul in Peking, Lev Mihailovich 
Karakhan.
45  Given that diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union had 
only been normalised the previous year, the granting of a visa to allow Morishima — a 
private individual with no apparent connection to official circles in Japan — to visit 
Outer Mongolia, a region that had previously been a point of potential conflict between 
Japan and the USSR, suggests that Karakhan saw some benefit in the move.  Exactly 
how Morishima was able to gain this privilege, and the nature of his connection with 
Fuse or the Mainichi shinbun, remain unknown.    In any event, Morishima travelled via 
Manchuli, Ulan Ude and Kiakhta, before arriving in Ulan Bator, as Urga had been re-
named.
46   
On Morishima’s return to Japan, Lieutenant-General Banzai Rihachir, a long-
time friend, arranged for him to present a report on his visit to Outer Mongolia to the 
president of the House of Peers, Tokugawa Iesato, and other members of the House.
47  
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Following his appearance before this august body, Morishima went on to give a series 
of public lectures on two topics, namely ‘Outer Mongolia’s Current Situation and 
Future’ and ‘The Relationship of Japan, Russia and China with Reference to Outer 
Mongolia’.
48  The lectures were apparently successful, as Morishima seems to have 
later published two books based on them.
49  It is clear that Morishima had links to the 
Japanese military, not least through his friendship with Banzai, whose own connection 
to Mongolia was examined in the previous chapter.    The fact that Morishima was also 
invited to present a report to the House of Peers further suggests that his visit to Outer 
Mongolia was regarded as significant by important establishment figures.  Moreover, 
Morishima’s connection to Mongolia continued subsequently, as will be seen in Chapter 
Five.   
Other Japanese visitors to Mongolia during the late 1920s included a group of 
students from the Chinese and Mongolian language departments of the Tokyo Foreign 
Language School, who spent almost a month in Inner Mongolia in mid-1927.  They 
later compiled a series of reports, including ‘Commercial Transactions in Mongolia’.
50  
The title of this report suggests the students were encouraged to consider the eventual 
practical application of their language studies and also highlights the focus on the 
economic potential of Mongolia that was promoted from various quarters during the 
1920s.   
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Overshadowing the public impact of all other visits by private individuals to the 
region, however, was the 1928 visit by Yosano Akiko,
51  the famed feminist poet.    For 
six weeks, in May and June 1928, Akiko and her husband, Yosano Tekkan, 
accompanied by officials of the South Manchurian Railway Company, travelled 
throughout Manchuria and Mongolia.  The two later published an account of the 
journey, divided into three distinct sections comprising Akiko’s travel diary, a selection 
of the poems Tekkan and Akiko had been inspired to write during their travels, and 
Tekkan’s commentary on the journey, written in Chinese.  A selection of photographs 
was also included.
52    Of the three sections, it is Akiko’s travel diary that has been most 
highly praised.  American historian Joshua Fogel has even described it as ‘one of the 
great events in the writing of literary travel narratives’.
53    The tour by the Yosanos was 
highly publicized.
54  The impact of the subsequent book, however, was probably even 
more significant.  In some respects the book resembled Kawahara Misako’s of twenty 
years before, for example in its careful definition of ‘Mongolia’, its emphasis on the 
huge size of Inner Mongolia compared to Japan, and its detailed breakdown of the 
leagues and banners of Inner Mongolia.
55    This last feature further echoed the work of 
Torii Ryz, to whom Akiko also made reference.
56  Clearly, a modest but more or 
less coherent body of Japanese literary and academic writing on Mongolia had emerged 
by this stage.     
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Japanese Business and Mongolia 
By the 1920s, the Japanese press was focusing increasing attention on economic 
activities in Mongolia.  Particular attention was paid to prominent figures such as the 
financier kura Kihachir and Grigorii Semenov, the former White Russian leader and 
Japanese military protégé, who also had significant commercial interests in the region.  
In press reports of both kura and Semenov’s activities during the mid-1920s, the 
emphasis was on Mongolia as a land of great expanse and even greater natural wealth.  
Some stories, moreover, blurred the boundaries as to the area that ‘Mongolia’ actually 
encompassed.  The dominant aim of all reports appears to have been to highlight for 
the Japanese public the lush, resource-rich prize that was supposedly there for the taking 
in  Mongolia.   
From late 1924, for example, the Japanese press reported on Semenov’s plan to 
establish a forest-cutting concession in Mongolia and then to trade camel hair, horsetails, 
wool, hides and skins among Mongolia, Manchuria and Japan.
57  The latter project 
appears to have involved valuable quantities of materials, with some reports estimating 
the worth of the trade at around one hundred thousand yen per shipment, while others 
suggested ten times this amount.
58  Either way, the size of the sums must have 
suggested to the Japanese reading public that Mongolia had enormous economic 
potential.  Moreover, the underlying implication of these stories was that it was to 
Japan’s advantage to promote such ventures.     
The emphasis on great natural wealth was repeated in the stories concerning a visit 
by kura to Mongolia in 1925, although in this instance it was the agricultural potential 
of the region that was highlighted.  The press first reported on the planned trip in 
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February 1925, noting that the baron had decided to visit the extensive paddy fields he 
owned in Mongolia and that he would then sojourn in the Mongolian desert.
59  L a t e r  
reports went into far greater detail as to the size of kura’s holdings.  One story 
claimed that his fields covered an area of some 200,000 chbu (around 200,000 hectares 
or nearly half a million acres),
60 while another declared that his holdings extended to 
‘millions of acres … converted into rice paddy fields’.
61  Exactly how large kura’s 
holdings were in 1925 is hard to determine.    According to Sunagawa Yukio, however, 
when kura established his agricultural concern in Inner Mongolia in 1923, the planned 
development had covered only some 6,000 chbu (around 6000 hectares or 15,000 
acres).
62  Clearly, if the newspaper report is correct, kura’s operation in Mongolia 
had grown considerably in a short time to more than thirty times its original size, at the 
least.   
On his departure from Japan in May 1925, much was made by the press of the fact 
that kura planned to spend nearly two months in Mongolia, and that, while he had 
visited China ten times, this was to be his first visit to Mongolia.
63  Moreover, while 
kura spent some three months in total travelling throughout North China and Inner 
Mongolia, including the Gobi Desert, he apparently spent more time in Inner Mongolia 
than anywhere else.
64    Why this was so was not explained in the press, but it suggested 
that even a powerful figure such as kura placed great importance on Mongolia.  
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Reports further noted that the baron planned to ‘produce rice in great quantity in 
Mongolia’,
65   presumably for the Japanese consumer back home.  kura was 
apparently to be assisted in this project by a number of Japanese agricultural experts 
who accompanied him on his trip to Mongolia.
66  Later reports claim that the baron’s 
Mongolian agricultural endeavours were proving successful.
67   
Press reports of kura’s journey continued the prevailing tendency to blur the 
region’s  geographical  boundaries.  Newspaper  articles confused what was in Mongolia 
with what was in Manchuria, thus reconfirming other contemporary evidence, discussed 
earlier, that political and geographical boundaries on the Chinese continent were quite 
fluid in Japanese perceptions.  Such fluidity, as we have seen, reflected the ongoing 
ambiguity in Japanese political, military and academic writings as to what exactly 
constituted ‘Man-M’, or Manchuria-Mongolia, and in turn, different views about an 
actual or desired Japanese sphere of interest on the continent.     
kura was not merely a businessman seeking to promote commerce in the region; 
he also had ties to the Japanese government and to the military.  He had been closely 
involved in financing the 1912 and 1916 ‘independence’ movements discussed in the 
previous chapter, and the possibility that kura was again acting as an intermediary for 
either the Japanese government or the military to promote Japan’s ambitions in the 
region cannot be discounted.    Indeed, from certain newspaper articles it is clear that his 
visit to the region had a political dimension.  For example, there were reports that he 
had arranged to meet Chang Tso-lin, with the express purpose of organising ‘a Sino-
Japan joint company for the exploitation of Mongolia on an elaborate scale’;
68 one 
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newspaper placed its account of this meeting prominently on its front page, 
accompanied by a photograph of the two men.
69  Nor was kura’s appointment with 
Chang his only meeting with an important Chinese political figure in the region.  
Shortly after he arrived in Inner Mongolia, kura met with Feng Yü-hsiang, Chang’s 
political rival.  According to James Sheridan, kura and Feng discussed the need for 
Sino-Japanese co-operation in ‘resisting the white race’.
70    The meeting with Feng had 
been arranged by one Matsumuro Takayoshi, a Japanese Army cavalry officer, who was 
attached to Feng’s army at the time as an advisor, and who subsequently served as the 
SIA chief at a number of locations in North China and Inner Mongolia.
71  In  this  latter 
capacity, Matsumuro submitted several reports to the Kwantung Army General Staff 
concerning Japan and Inner Mongolia, which will be discussed in Chapters Four and 
Five.  Matsumuro’s part in arranging kura and Feng’s meeting suggests that there 
was an ‘official’ purpose behind kura’s  visit  to  Mongolia.   
kura’s connection with Mongolia was again in the news in early 1927, when he 
announced his formal retirement from business.    The press reported that while much of 
his commercial empire was to be passed to his son, kura senior planned to retain 
control of his holdings in Inner Mongolia.
72  Perhaps, then, kura saw these as more 
important than all his other holdings, including those in Japan.  Great emphasis was 
again placed in press reports on the size of kura’s holdings in Inner Mongolia.  The 
effect of this emphasis was twofold.  First, it advertised the size of one individual’s 
financial investment in a region in which Japanese leaders claimed a ‘special interest’, 
and so helped to legitimise that claim.    Second, given that the average farm-holding in 
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Japan was no more than a few chbu, the enormous size of kura’s holdings, some 
200,000 chbu, underlined the opportunity that Inner Mongolia, at least, appeared to 
offer to Japanese settlers in terms of land.     
Apart from the ventures promoted by Semenov and kura, Japanese interests 
supported a number of other economic undertakings targetting Mongolia during the 
1920s.  In late 1924, for example, an expedition by the Japanese Asiatic Exploration 
Association (Ajia tanken kykai) to Inner and Outer Mongolia was announced.
73  T h i s  
expedition was no small affair, consisting of a party of some sixty explorers, with the 
object of assessing the natural resources of the region.  The party even included a 
camera crew, which was to document the journey.
74  The expedition was led by a son 
of Kiyoura Keigo, a former prime minister, which may indicate a degree of official 
connection with the venture.  Moreover, the party’s guide was Hatakeyama Ktar, 
who had assisted Ungern-Sternberg during the Siberian Intervention, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.
75  The involvement of persons with ties to the Japanese political 
world, and others with ties to the military, raises the possibility that this was not just an 
expedition to assess the natural resources of the region for general purposes.  Later 
analyses have certainly suggested other aims.  In Gerard Friters’ view, for example, 
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Transnational Film Culture in Imperial Japan, Honolulu:  University of Hawai’i 
Press, 2008, pp. 6-9.     
75 Gaik shirykan, Tokyo, ‘“Ungerun” gun ni y haretaru Nihonjin no kd shimatsu’, 
5 November 1921, in Foreign Ministry papers 1·6·3·24-13-28-1, ‘Rokoku kakumei 
ikken:  (bessatsu) Kyokut oyobi kagekiha katsud, (bessatsu) “Ungerun” no Kron 
kgeki’.  Hatakeyama’s service with Ungern-Sternberg during the Siberian 
Intervention was also specifically mentioned in ‘Unknown Mongolia – More Peaceful 
Penetration’.    
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while the expedition had gone to Mongolia ostensibly to conduct geological research, in 
reality its object was to ‘reconnoiter’ the political situation.
76   
A more direct attempt by the Japanese government to establish ties with Outer 
Mongolia, for economic purposes, was made in October 1927.  On this occasion, the 
Japanese government dispatched Kuhara Fusanosuke, president of the Seiykai political 
party, to the Soviet Union as its ‘Special Economic Survey Delegate’.
77  The  objective 
of Kuhara’s journey was to discuss the possibility of creating a demilitarized buffer 
zone between Russia and Japan, consisting of Manchuria, Korea, the Maritime Province 
of Siberia and, presumably, Outer Mongolia.    The ultimate purpose of this buffer zone 
from Japan’s point of view, according to Sadako Ogata, was to hinder Soviet economic 
penetration of the parts of Manchuria and Mongolia that Japanese leaders regarded as 
properly falling within Japan’s sphere of influence.
78  Although Stalin expressed 
interest in the idea, however, this grandiose scheme never came to fruition, probably 
due to opposition both from within Japan and from Chang Tso-lin.
79   
Two years later, in the spring of 1929, an even more direct attempt was apparently 
made to open trade between Outer Mongolia and Japan.  On this occasion, according 
to Joseph Geleta, a Hungarian who spent more than a decade in Outer Mongolia, the 
Japanese government sent a mission to Mongolia to ‘study the possibilities of the 
country’, with a view to granting Mongolia a ‘large measure of support’,
80 though 
details of the kind of support envisaged are not known.  The Japanese mission was 
permitted to travel through the Soviet Union, but was turned back at the Soviet-Outer 
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Mongolian frontier by the Outer Mongolians.    The Russians, Geleta claims, engineered 
the Mongolian rejection of Japan’s overture, rather than openly opposing the Japanese 
plans.
81  Presumably, Russia wished to maintain the monopoly it held with respect to 
trade with Outer Mongolia.     
 
Japanese Religious Aims in Mongolia:    The Mainstream and the Fringe 
Throughout the 1920s, Japanese religious organisations, both mainstream and fringe, 
were active in Mongolia.  It is also distinctly likely that religious missions were again 
used as cover for intelligence-gathering operations in the region, as they had been in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
82   
In late 1923, for example, the Kyoto-based Honganji sect of Buddhism announced 
that it planned to build a branch temple at Mukden in Manchuria, in part to support the 
sect’s operations in Mongolia.
83    This was a major undertaking, with the proposed cost 
of construction alone being 300,000 yen (approximately US$145,770),
84  a very sizeable 
sum at the time.  The land for the temple was to be provided free of charge by the 
South Manchurian Railway Company.  Given that the company was a quasi-
government organisation, this can be taken to mean that the sect’s activities in 
Manchuria had a degree of official approval.  tani Kzui, the former head of the 
Honganji sect, was reportedly involved in the enterprise.
85  As discussed in Chapter 
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One, tani had close ties to the Japanese military dating back to the late Meiji period, 
while the Honganji sect had been active in intelligence-gathering operations from the 
time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5.  One press article described tani as an 
‘ardent missionary and wireless amateur’.
86  Why were these two attributes linked 
together in connection with Mongolia?  The most likely answer, given tani’s earlier 
connection to the military, was that the proposed temple was considered to be a cover 
for intelligence-gathering on the continent.     
tani was not the only prominent Japanese religious figure active in Mongolia.  
In the spring of 1924, Deguchi Onisabur, leader of motoky, one of the ‘new 
religions’ that had emerged in Japan following the Meiji Restoration, travelled to Inner 
Mongolia.  Deguchi’s activities on the continent, which attracted a great deal of 
coverage in the Japanese press, ensured that Mongolia remained firmly in the public 
eye, and further added to the romantic aura that seemed to surround the region.   In the 
account of his travels written by Ueno Ken, no doubt with help from Deguchi, and 
published the following year, Ueno stated that Deguchi’s journey was a ‘pilgrimage’, 
the object of which was ‘to win the hearts of the Mongolian people and forge a spiritual 
union between the Japanese and Mongols’.
87  Ueno further claimed that Deguchi’s 
purpose was to ‘unify Sinkiang, Tibet, India and all of China under one religion, 
resulting in an East Asian Federation’,
88  presumably under Japanese guidance.    In this 
endeavour, Deguchi appeared to be following in the footsteps of the Japanese monks 
who visited Mongolia in 1873, who had also sought to establish an ‘East Asian 
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Buddhist Federation’.
89  On the other hand, Deguchi’s goal of uniting Inner and Outer 
Mongolia, which was laid out at a later point in the book
 ,
90 echoed the Japanese-
backed Pan-Mongol movement of 1918-22.     
Despite its seemingly peaceful objective, there was a distinctly martial side to 
Deguchi’s Mongolian mission.  Deguchi gave several names to the force he led, 
among them ‘divine army’ (shingun).
91  Moreover, according to Ueno, Deguchi 
claimed this army had ‘attempted a world-shaking undertaking in Mongolia’ (Mko no 
chi ni kyten-dchi no ichidai skyo o kokoromita).
92  Deguchi also referred to the 
force on one occasion as the ‘Army for the Rescue of an Independent Inner and Outer 
Mongolia’ (naigai-Mko dokuritsu kyengun), with himself assuming the position of a 
Dalai Lama.
93  Moreover, towards the end of his account of Deguchi’s journey, Ueno 
declared that Deguchi’s overall objective was to advance on Urga and drive the Red 
Army from the city,
94 thus providing confirmation of the martial nature of his 
endeavour.  Clearly, Deguchi’s ‘pilgrimage’ sought to do more than just ‘win the 
hearts of the Mongolian people’.     
Finally, according to Ueno, Deguchi gave his force yet another name, the ‘Army 
for Northwestern Autonomy’ (Seihoku jichigun).  Ueno’s book even included an 
illustration of the flag under which the force had marched.  While the colours on the 
flag — red, white, yellow and green — were supposedly chosen to represent Mongolia, 
the centre of the flag incorporates a star and crescent, traditional Islamic symbols 
(Figure 15).
95    While not conclusive, this suggests that Deguchi may have been seeking 
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to appeal to others apart from the Mongol population of the region.  The term 
‘seihoku’, as discussed in the previous chapter, was applied at the time to an undefined 
geographical area that included all of Outer Mongolia and significant portions of Inner 
Mongolia,
96 which suggests that it may have been chosen to reinforce the point that 
Deguchi’s objective encompassed both regions.     
 
  
Figure 15:    Flag of the 1924 ‘Army for Northwestern Autonomy’, 
reproduced from Ueno Ken, Oni Mko nyki, Kyto:   
Santo shinbunsha, 1925, reprinted Kameoka, Kyto:   
Aizen shuppan, 1994, opp. p. 238.     
 
Given the various names appended to the force that he led, there seems little doubt 
that Deguchi saw himself in a martial role during his time in Mongolia.  The photo at 
the front of the 1925 account of his journey showed Deguchi dressed in priestly robes; 
however, the photo taken while he was actually in Mongolia told a different story.  
Astride a Mongol pony, accompanied by a number of heavily armed soldiers, and 
apparently with a rifle over his shoulder, Deguchi looks more like a military than a 
religious leader (see Figure 16).     
 
                                                 
96  See map in Kaigun gunreibu, Seihoku Mko jij, Tky:  n.  publ.,  1913.    
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Figure  16:  Deguchi  Onisabur in Mongolia, 1924,   
reproduced from Ueno Ken, Oni Mko nyki, Kyto:   
Santo shinbunsha, 1925, reprinted Kameoka, Kyto:   
Aizen shuppan, 1994, preceding title page.     
 
Deguchi’s antics on the continent attracted an enormous amount of attention from 
the press in Japan, which openly speculated as to what exactly he was up to.   An early 
report seemed to suggest that Deguchi’s journey to Mongolia was purely for religious 
purposes.
97  Later press reports, however, alluded to the political dimension of his 
journey, suggesting in a general way that ‘leading politicians of Japan, bandit leaders of 
Manchuria, and distinguished people of China’
98 had supported Deguchi.  No doubt, 
part of the reason for press speculation was the fact that at the time, Deguchi was out on 
bail and pending trial for lèse majesté.    In 1921 he had been arrested and charged with 
this crime and with violating the Newspaper Law’s prohibition against printing material 
disrespectful of the emperor and the imperial house.  The charges resulted from his 
prophecy while preaching that, following war with America, the Emperor would move 
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to Ayabe in Kyoto and rule from there.    Deguchi was under house arrest at the time of 
his escape to Mongolia.
99   
For all his plans, Deguchi’s attempt to carve out a religious kingdom in Mongolia 
came undone.    In an attempt to further Japanese control of Outer Mongolia, he and his 
followers joined forces with Lu Chan-k’uei,
100 a former bandit who now had links to 
Chang Tso-lin.  According to McCormack, in aligning himself with Lu, Deguchi 
gained an armed force and a ‘means of promoting his own teachings in Mongolia’.
101  
Moreover, according to Tanin and Yohan, Deguchi also sought an alliance with both the 
native Mongolian Lamaism and the Chinese Fyflot Association, a humanitarian group 
in North China with ties to the Japanese right wing.
102    Presumably, in joining with Lu 
and seeking an alliance with such groups in the region, Deguchi hoped to gain the 
means to promulgate his beliefs, and allies to support the attempt.  Unfortunately for 
Deguchi, his apparent plan to march on Urga was stillborn, when, in early June 1924, 
Lu decided that returning to banditry was more profitable.  Chang Tso-lin was not 
amused by what he regarded as treachery, and Lu and a number of his followers were 
seized and executed on Chang’s explicit orders.
103    Deguchi and his Japanese followers 
were also arrested by Chang Tso-lin’s troops, and almost executed.  In the event they 
were handed over to the Japanese authorities in Manchuria, and Deguchi was then 
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returned to Japan to stand trial for the crimes with which he had originally been 
charged.
104   
Before the trial commenced, the Japanese press pondered at length on Deguchi’s 
exploits.  The middle-class monthly magazine Taiy, for example, serialised the story 
of Deguchi’s Mongolian escapades in a four-part piece entitled ‘Dreams of a Mongolian 
Kingdom’.
105  Some writers opined that Deguchi had not acted alone, one headline 
specifically noting his connection to certain Shina rnin (China adventurers), usually a 
term for the Japanese right-wing bravados associated with unofficial Japanese schemes 
on the continent.
106  If the Japanese press and public, however, had hoped for 
revelations at his trial about official involvement in Deguchi’s escapades, they were 
disappointed.  Deguchi was vague as to why he had travelled to Mongolia, simply 
stating that he had ‘originally intended to proceed to Manchuria and Mongolia for the 
propagation of his own tenets’, but that he had not intended to ‘make a religious 
community or body in Mongolia by his propaganda’.
107  The press continued to ask 
questions about Deguchi’s motives, specifically and repeatedly asking why he had gone 
to Mongolia, and noting the failure of the trial to answer these questions.
108   
There was a further twist to the story of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventures, when 
newspapers suggested that he had not gone to proselytise, but was in fact fleeing to 
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Mongolia in the company of Chinese bandits,
109   presumably to avoid the 
aforementioned trial for lèse majesté.  The story subsequently changed again with the 
claim that Deguchi was actually in search of buried treasure allegedly left behind in 
Mongolia by Ungern-Sternberg.
110  The idea of Deguchi searching for buried treasure, 
accompanied by bandits, must have added to Mongolia’s aura of romance:  as 
Narangoa Li notes, reports of Deguchi’s Mongolian foray ‘inspired many people who 
had romantic ideas about Manchuria and Mongolia’.
111  Stalker  concurs  that  Deguchi’s 
adventure ‘built upon the common notion of the romantic Mongolian frontier’, adding 
that reports of Deguchi’s activities also implied that Mongolia was ‘ripe for Japanese 
civilizational guidance’.
112   
The story of Ungern-Sternberg’s supposed buried treasure had appeared some 
years earlier in Ferdinand Ossendowski’s hugely successful 1922 book, Beasts, Men 
and Gods.
113  In this autobiographical narrative, Ossendowski recounted his travels 
through Siberia and Mongolia, which included an encounter with Ungern-Sternberg, 
and made a passing mention of the baron’s reported treasure.  According to recent 
accounts by Baabar and Jamie Bisher, the treasure does exist.
114  Presumably, it 
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consists of the proceeds of looting by the baron during his rampage across the region.  
Prior to his assault on the Far Eastern Republic in 1921, Ungern-Sternberg, according to 
Baabar and Bisher, had decided to send the treasure to Hailar, in Northern Manchuria, 
for safekeeping.    Both authors claim that the treasure-trove was substantial, consisting 
of many valuable artifacts, as well as 1,800 kilograms of gold, silver and precious 
stones.    For reasons unknown, the soldiers carrying the treasure were reportedly unable 
to cross the Mongolian border and buried it in the steppes of Eastern Mongolia.
115  
According to Baabar, nobody has yet found the cache and, therefore, of course, rumours 
surrounding the treasure have grown into legends.
116  Bisher suggests that an attempt 
was made by the Japanese in the early 1930s to recover the treasure, but that the attempt 
failed when the recovery team was arrested and expelled from Outer Mongolia by 
Soviet forces stationed there.
117  Presumably, the treasure is still there.  Given the 
reputed size of the hoard, it is not surprising that it caught the attention of the Japanese 
press at the time.     
In Ueno’s account of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventures there is no mention of any 
search for buried treasure, but there is confirmation of the connection between Deguchi 
and the Japanese military.  Specifically, Ueno noted that an SIA major-general had 
been ordered to Mongolia by the General Staff to liaise between Deguchi and the 
Chinese, although the officer’s name was censored in Ueno’s book.
118  The fact that 
Ueno was allowed to publish an account of Deguchi’s exploits in Mongolia at all, with 
such an acknowledgement of military support, suggests that the Japanese military was 
not averse to its part in Deguchi’s escapade receiving public attention in Japan.  
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Presumably, if the military had not wanted its part in the operation revealed, it would 
have taken steps to see that the book was censored accordingly, just as the officer’s 
name had been.    Moreover, in his account, Ueno detailed the part played in Deguchi’s 
activities by Inoue Kanekichi, one of Deguchi’s senior followers, who, in 1924, acted as 
Deguchi’s liaison with Chang Tso-lin.  While a reserve officer, Inoue had been 
involved in the 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence movement.
119  Though not 
conclusive, this connection confirms the evident complicity of the Japanese military in 
Deguchi’s activities.   Ueno’s account was reprinted four times in a matter of weeks in 
1925,
120 which further suggests that whatever Deguchi’s aims on and for the continent 
had been, leading Japanese figures were not opposed to the publicity he attracted.     
Subsequent analyses of his Mongolian adventures all agree that Deguchi favoured 
Japanese control of both Inner and Outer Mongolia, though there are differing views of 
the extent of Japanese control that he sought.  The Kokurykai account of Deguchi’s 
trip, published in the 1930s, asserted that, prior to his departure, he had proclaimed that 
Japan ‘should see the plains of Mongolia as a gift from heaven to our nation’, and that it 
was Japan’s responsibility ‘to develop greater Mongolia, heaven’s gift’.
121  Presumably, 
this meant that the region should be controlled by Japan.  The Kokurykai also 
documented Deguchi’s links to the Japanese military,
122 substantiating Ueno’s claims 
that Deguchi had been acting with the assistance of the military.  In post-war 
scholarship, Gavan McCormack concludes that Deguchi was involved in a plan to seize 
Urga, an undertaking in which he was aided by an Inner Mongolian prince and by an 
associate of the Japanese-backed Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin.
123  The  objective 
of this plan was, presumably, to increase the size of the region over which Chang held 
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sway.  Nancy Stalker agrees that the object of Deguchi’s mission was to gain control 
of Outer Mongolia, but posits the view that Chang offered his support in an attempt to 
exploit the spiritual vacuum in Outer Mongolia following the death of the Bogd Khan, 
the Outer Mongolian religious leader:  Chang now hoped to rally the population 
behind another charismatic leader, that is, Deguchi.
124    If he had been successful, Outer 
Mongolia would then have fallen under indirect Japanese control.     
From the available evidence there seem to be two possible explanations for 
Deguchi’s Mongolian foray.  The first is that he was on an intelligence-gathering 
mission for the Japanese military, but because of the unreliability of the Chinese who 
accompanied him, events moved beyond his control, necessitating the intervention of 
Chang Tso-lin, who had long been associated with the Japanese.    As we have seen, the 
Japanese military had made use of religious figures before for intelligence-gathering, 
and, as noted above, both Ueno’s and the Kokurykai’s versions of Deguchi’s activities 
openly mentioned his links to the military.
125   
The second possibility is that the Japanese military had more concrete aims than 
intelligence-gathering in using Deguchi.  The military may have seen in Deguchi a 
means to revive the earlier Pan-Mongol movement and to achieve Japanese control of 
Mongolia.  The evidence for this is, admittedly, tenuous, and I am here engaging in 
conjecture.    What evidence there is relates to the activities around this time of Grigorii 
Semenov, the former White Russian leader whose fortunes were closely tied to the 
Japanese military from 1918 onwards.    In late May 1924, Semenov was reported to be 
‘seeking his fortune in Mongolia again’, having apparently been ‘visited by a 
Mongolian envoy’.
126  Given Semenov’s involvement with the earlier Pan-Mongol 
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movement and his relationship with the Japanese military, it is possible that his decision 
to return to Mongolia may have been prompted by inside information as to what 
Deguchi had planned.  The two apparently worked together a few years later:  
Deguchi and Semenov are said to have been involved together in a 1929 plan, backed 
by the Japanese Army and the Kokurykai, to declare Siberia independent of the Soviet 
Union.
127  Overall, Semenov was closely associated with Japanese military schemes 
involving both Manchuria and Mongolia,
128 remaining in Japanese employ for the 
better part of twenty-five years, until his capture by the Soviets in August 1945.
129  I t   i s  
unlikely, given this close association with the Japanese military, that he would have 
decided to return to the continent in 1924 without the approval of his military patrons.  
Again, the probable reason for the failure of this Pan-Mongol revival, if it was 
attempted, was the unreliability of the Chinese involved in the scheme.  Which 
explanation of Deguchi’s Mongolian adventure is correct will probably never be known, 
but his activities certainly highlight the ongoing propensity of the Japanese military to 
work through surrogates in their efforts to gain control of Mongolia.     
 
The Japanese Military and the Mongolian Horse 
For much of the 1920s, the army’s ambitions in Mongolia were less evident than were 
economic activities, and also less evident than they had been earlier.    Towards the end 
of the 1920s, however, one particular military concern was prominently displayed, in a 
specific media campaign, probably prompted by the military itself, to promote the 
importance of Mongolia to Japan as a potential source of horses for the army.  
                                                 
127 See  Unno  Hiroshi,  Inb to gens no dai-Ajia, Tky:    Heibonsha, 2005, p. 133.     
128  See, for example, Gaik shirykan, Tokyo, ‘“Semiyonofu” rai-H ni kansuru ken’, 6 
August 1930, in Foreign Ministry papers, A·22·2·C·R2, ‘“Semiyonofu” no Mko 
shinshutsu kaikaku kankei iken’.     
129 Richard Luckett, The White Generals:  An Account of the White Movement and the 
Russian Civil War,  London:  Longman,  1971,  p.  391.    
193 
Arguably, the emphasis on horses in this period was an indirect way of continuing to 
highlight the apparent need for Japanese military control of the region and its resources.     
The Japanese military’s need for horses in the 1920s was not new.    From the early 
1870s, as the military sought to reconfigure itself along Western lines, a sufficient 
number of horses, to serve either as cavalry mounts or as draft animals, was essential.  
For example, at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, one Japanese Army division 
required 4,700 horses.
130  Moreover, the perceived need to improve the quality of the 
Japanese horse was of such importance around this time that in 1906 Emperor Meiji 
himself raised the topic in conversation with a British Mission then visiting Japan.
131  
By the late 1920s, a Japanese Army division required almost 5,000 horses, meaning that 
the army as a whole, then numbering some twenty-one divisions, needed in excess of 
100,000 horses.
132    Even with the shift to mechanisation that occurred at the end of the 
1930s, a standard Japanese infantry division still required more than 2,000 horses for its 
three infantry regiments alone, with more needed for the attached headquarters and 
ancillary components.
133  By 1941, the Japanese Army required more than 382,000 
horses for its fifty-one divisions.
134   
From the beginning of the twentieth century, Mongolia, with its long history of 
breeding horses, was an important potential source of the mounts required.   It was not 
until the late 1920s, however, that a concerted campaign appears to have been 
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undertaken by the Japanese military to bring this fact to the attention of a wider 
audience within Japan.  One method was to publish books dealing with the subject.  
As we will see below, a more unusual method was tried in early 1928, when a well-
publicised horse ride was staged from Manchuli to Dairen, and then from Fukuoka to 
Tokyo.   
As noted in the Introduction, Mongolia was especially attractive as a source of 
horses because of the type of horse bred in the region.    Of great stamina and endurance, 
the Mongol horse required watering only once a day, and for the most part fed on 
grass.
135    This offered the Japanese military a mount with distinct advantages.    With a 
Mongol horse there was no need to carry extra fodder.    This, coupled with the animal’s 
stamina and endurance, would allow the army to carry more supplies for the men and 
larger quantities of ammunition.  This factor was of particular importance when the 
Japanese Army considered the likelihood of conflict with the Soviet Union in the 
Russian Far East, an immense, sparsely populated region.     
The potential of Mongolia as a possible source of horses for the Japanese military 
had been officially noted as early as 1907.
136    The need for a reliable supply of mounts 
was also brought to the attention of the Japanese public in a newspaper article in that 
year,
137 although no mention was made of Mongolia as a potential source.  In the 
1910s and 1920s, however, other official reports again noted Mongolia’s potential to 
supply horses.
138  These reports, though, were all classified as secret and, apart from 
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the 1907 newspaper story, the public had little or no reason to know of the army’s 
ongoing attention to the issue.     
This situation changed in the late 1920s, with the publication of two books.  In 
1927, Yoshida Heitar produced Mko tha ki (An Account of a Walk through 
Mongolia), concerning surveys undertaken by the Japanese Army General Staff in Inner 
Mongolia in connection with the supply of horses.
139    Then, in 1929, the T-A shinzen 
kijkai (East Asian Goodwill Horse-Riding Association) produced Nichi-Man-Mkan 
chto kij tettei sanzen ri (Three Thousand Li Horseshoes:  A Great Distance on 
Horseback across Japan-Manchuria-Mongolia), which documented a horse-ride 
undertaken at the beginning of 1928 by members of the Association.
140   
The author of the first book, Yoshida Heitar, was a former army officer, who had 
undertaken his journey through Inner Mongolia eight years earlier on orders from the 
chief of the Army Ministry’s Cavalry Bureau (Rikugunsh kihei kach) and the chief of 
the army’s Horse Supply Section (Bahoj honbuch).
141  Although Yoshida had left 
the army by the time the work was published, in advertisements for the book, his former 
rank of lieutenant-general and service with the army’s Horse Supply Section were both 
stressed.
142  Yoshida’s work is important for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which is that it was published by a Japanese association devoted to research on 
Manchuria and Mongolia.     
The book detailed Yoshida’s journey through Inner Mongolia from late March to 
early October 1919.  No explanation was given for the delay between the journey and 
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the publication, but it was probably because of a perceived need for military secrecy.  
As noted in the Introduction, Inner Mongolia was technically Chinese territory, and in 
practice was controlled by a number of Han Chinese warlords.  Some in the Japanese 
military may well have wanted to bring the area under Japanese control, but if so, they 
needed to act with great caution.  This raises the question of why the book was 
published at all.    Presumably, in 1927, it was intended to assist the army’s campaign to 
justify Japanese control of Inner Mongolia by promoting the importance of the region, 
partly because of the significance of its horses.     
In the course of his six-month journey in 1919, Yoshida had travelled extensively 
throughout Inner Mongolia, traversing Jehol, Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, and 
eventually ending his outward journey at the capital of Suiyuan province, Kweihwa.  
The book based on his travels contained an introduction, covering Yoshida’s journey 
from Tokyo to the continent, then thirteen sections, each of which dealt with one stage 
of the journey, in the form of a travel diary.    Much of Yoshida’s account was devoted 
to the historical places he visited, though he often made specific mention of horses in 
connection with those places.    There was a certain air of mystery to Yoshida’s writing, 
which came from his habit of referring to many of the people he encountered only by 
the initial of their last name.  In doing this, Yoshida transformed what is essentially a 
travel diary into something like a thriller, where readers must have wondered at the need 
for secrecy.  For example, Yoshida recounted his unexpected meeting with a party of 
four or five Japanese near Uchumuchin, in the eastern part of Silingol League, naming 
only a ‘Mr S’.
143    The omission of full names in this case tantalizes, especially as there 
were hints of Japanese military activity in the region some pages earlier, where Yoshida 
had explained that the Japanese Army’s Horse Supply Section and Equestrian Affairs 
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Office (Nihongun bahojbu oyobi baseikyoku) maintained breeding pastures near 
Uchumuchin.
144  The presence of Japanese people at Uchumuchin was probably a 
result of the 1915 Sino-Japanese Treaty that allowed Japanese the legal rights of travel 
and residence in Inner Mongolia.
145  Such legal rights make the need for secrecy 
puzzling, but it may be that the persons mentioned only by initial were serving army 
officers covertly engaging in some sort of activity not sanctioned by the 1915 Treaty.     
In the section of his book that recounted his journey across the Hsingan Ranges to 
West Uchumuchin, Yoshida specifically discussed the army’s breeding pastures in the 
region, noting, for example, that the herds numbered in the hundreds and that the 
pastures covered a considerable area.  He then detailed the steps being undertaken to 
improve the quality of the Mongolian horse, explaining how bloodlines were selected to 
produce a mount that had superior pulling power, as well as speed and endurance.    The 
object of this breeding program was to produce a horse that rivalled the Arab, widely 
recognized as having the greatest endurance among horses.
146   
Mongolia’s horses were next promoted by a highly publicised horse-ride from 
Manchuli to Dairen, and then from Fukuoka to Tokyo, by a party of five members — 
two Japanese and three Mongolians — from the T-A shinzen kijkai, an association 
whose objective appears to have been to forge stronger ties among Japan, Manchuria 
and Mongolia.   The horse-ride began in January 1928 and ended two months later.  
In the association’s book about the ride, Lieutenant-Colonel shima Matahiko,
147 
chairman of the executive committee of the T-A shinzen kijkai, explained in the 
Foreword that the idea of undertaking the ride had first been raised at a meeting of the 
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Nichi-M shinzen kykai (Japan-Mongolia Goodwill Association), another group in 
Japan that presumably sought to improve relations between Japan and Mongolia.    This 
meeting, held at shima’s house in Tokyo in early October 1927, outlined a plan that 
was subsequently approved by Nishikubo Hiromichi, who was then both the chairman 
of the T-A shinzen kijkai and the mayor of Tokyo, having held a succession of other 
important posts in earlier years.
148   
shima noted that in line with Japanese Army and Foreign Ministry policy 
towards Manchuria and Mongolia (Man-M), Sino-Japanese relations were an 
important consideration in the planning of the ride.  Presumably, given that the riding 
party’s leader was an army lieutenant-colonel, this meant that the Chinese authorities 
needed to be assured that the ride was not for the purpose of intelligence-gathering.  
shima observed that the approval of the Han Chinese military governor of 
Heilungkiang province, Wu Chün-sheng, had been vital to the success of the planned 
ride, presumably because Wu’s approval lessened suspicion on the Chinese side.  
While the possibility that illicit intelligence-gathering did take place cannot be 
dismissed, the fact that the Japanese sought Wu’s prior approval suggests that it was not 
the primary purpose of the ride, or that they were at least trying to avoid the appearance 
of such activities.     
The book about the horse-ride had all the makings of an adventure story, telling of 
the long distances travelled by the party in conditions that were often quite harsh.    The 
temperature on the day of departure from Manchuli was minus twenty-two degrees 
Celsius at one o’clock in the afternoon, dropping to minus thirty-seven degrees 
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overnight.
149    In temperatures this extreme, a good mount was vital, and the account of 
the journey included ten pages on the different types of Mongolian horse, describing 
their height and weight, stamina, and other characteristics.
150  The book listed those 
regions of Mongolia that were believed to produce the best horses, noting that in Inner 
Mongolia it was around Uchumuchin,
151  an assertion that explains why, as recorded by 
Yoshida in the earlier book, the Japanese Army’s Horse Supply Section and Equestrian 
Affairs Office maintained breeding pastures there.  The 1929 book also discussed, as 
had Yoshida, the steps being taken to improve the bloodlines of Mongolian horses to 
make them more suitable for military use, in particular either as cavalry mounts or for 
hauling artillery pieces, observing that the army hoped to use Mongolian horses in these 
roles as they could operate at extremely cold temperatures, unlike Japanese horses.
152   
Even before it began, the planned ride had attracted the attention of the press.  
Two important points emerge from early newspaper reports.
153  The first is an 
emphasis on the fact that the ride was not to be exclusively a Japanese undertaking.    In 
having riders from both Japan and Mongolia in the party, the object was presumably to 
foster closer ties between the two through a shared undertaking and through the 
publicity the ride generated.    The second point relates to the political and geographical 
definition of the region.  The town of Manchuli, where the ride began, was usually 
understood to be part of Manchuria, but at least one newspaper report placed it in 
Mongolia.
154  The map that appeared in the front of the book about the ride, showing 
the course that the party took, also placed Manchuli in Mongolia.
155  The  ambiguity  as 
                                                 
149 T -A shinzen kijkai, Nichi-Man-Mkan, p. 235.     
150  Ibid., pp. 204-14.     
151  Ibid., p. 204.     
152  Ibid., p. 209.     
153 ‘Japanese-Mongolian Horseback Party to Journey to Tokyo’, Japan Times, 2 
November 1927, p. 3; ‘Riding from Mongolia’, JCWE, 3 November 1927, p. 475.     
154  ‘Riding from Mongolia’.     
155 T -A shinzen kijkai, Nichi-Man-Mkan, map at front of book.      
200 
to Manchuli’s location again confirms that political and geographical boundaries on the 
Chinese continent were quite fluid in Japanese perceptions at the time.     
 
  
Figure 17:    1928 Poster advertising events connected with the erection of 
memorial tower commemorating the defeat of the Mongol invasion of Japan 
in 1281, reproduced in Nagoshi Futaranosuke, Shwa no sens kinenkan 
dai-ikkan:  Dran no hattan:   Mansh jihen to Shina jihen, Tky:  
Tentensha, 2001, p. iv.     
 
On the arrival of the party in Japan in early March 1928, the riders attended a 
ceremony in Hakata in Kyushu marking the erection of a memorial tower 
commemorating the anniversary of the defeat of the Mongol invasion of Japan in 1281.   
While it appears odd that commemorating the defeat of the Mongols might be 
considered a way to bring the two peoples closer together, that was apparently the 
purpose.  The tower, known as the ‘Mkogun dai-kuyt’ (Mongol Army Great 
Memorial Tower), was intended to stand as a symbol of reconciliation between the  
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Japanese and Mongols.
156    From the poster promoting the ceremony, it is clear that the 
arrival of the ‘Japan-Mongolia Friendship Riding Party’ (Nichi-M shinzen h-Nichi 
daikiba ryoktai) was just one of a number of events connected with the ceremony that 
aimed to promote Japanese-Mongolian friendship (Figure 17).    Other events included a 
series of lectures designed to promote Japanese friendship with East Asia generally, as 
well as Mongolia specifically, and an exhibition of photographs showing life in 
‘Manchuria-Mongolia’.
157   
On 7 March 1928, a ceremony was held at the memorial tower to commemorate 
the fallen soldiers of 1281 from both Japan and Mongolia.    The role of Buddhism was 
highlighted in this ceremony, presumably in order to emphasise that through a shared 
religion the two regions, once enemies, were reconciled and co-operating.
158  A 
Japanese Nichiren Buddhist prelate was on hand to conduct the memorial ceremony,
159 
while the Royal Great Lama (Mko-o dairama), obviously an important Mongolian 
religious leader, was also due to attend.
160  The connections and goals apparently 
shared by Mongolia and Japan were also indicated by the list of Mongol and Japanese 
notables who were to attend the ceremony.  Among the Mongol dignitaries present 
was to be Han Shao-hong, characterised as the son of ‘the famous general, the late 
Babujab’, that is, the Mongol leader involved in the 1916 Japanese-sponsored 
Manchuria-Mongolia ‘independence’ movement.
161  While it was his Chinese name 
that was given, this presumably was Kanjurchap, Babujab’s second son, who in 1927 
had married Kawashima Naniwa’s adopted daughter, Yoshiko, at a ceremony in Port 
Arthur attended by an array of Japanese notables, among them high-ranking Kwantung 
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Army officers.
162  Also in attendance at the March 1928 ceremony in Hakata were an 
unnamed ‘special Mongolian missionary’ (Mko tokumei senkyshi), and Lientzu, the 
fourth daughter of Prince Su, the Manchu prince who had worked with Japanese forces 
in attempting to separate Manchuria and Mongolia from the rest of China in 1912.
  
‘Lientzu’ was most probably none other than Kawashima Yoshiko herself, now 
Kanjurchap’s wife.
163  Japanese  dignitaries  present  included Kawashima Naniwa, who, 
as we have seen, had also been involved in the 1912 and 1916 ‘independence’ 
movements.
164    The presence of such people implied that, in the same manner in which 
Japan and Mongolia had co-operated on the ride, they had earlier co-operated, albeit 
unsuccessfully, to achieve Mongolian independence.     
Yoshida’s 1927 book on the army surveys of horses in Inner Mongolia, together 
with the 1928 ride by the T-A shinzen kijkai, and the subsequent book detailing the 
ride, suggest that towards the end of the 1920s there was a considerable effort on the 
part of the military, and groups with ties to the military, to highlight the importance of 
Mongolia for Japan.    There was certainly a specific emphasis on Mongolia as a source 
of mounts for the Japanese Army.  The promotion of Mongolia as a source of horses 
continued into the 1930s and 1940s, in a context in which the Army Ministry was 
seeking to reinforce the importance of the horse to the military in general.     
One way in which it did this was by gathering and publicising songs that told of 
the bond between soldiers and their steeds, such as ‘Aiba yuki’ (Travelling with My 
Beloved Horse) or ‘Aiba shingunka’ (Song of My Beloved Horse and the Advancing 
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Army).
165  The army’s campaign to publicise horses, both in general and with specific 
reference to Mongolia, later expanded to include films in which horses featured.
166  
The military also held ceremonies at which horses killed in battle were commemorated 
(see Figure 18); one such ceremony was held in Hibiya Park in October 1938 for the 
‘spirits of horses which have fallen on China battlefronts’.
167  The  military  specifically 
emphasised Mongolia as a source of horses to an English-speaking audience, as well as 
to the Japanese public.  Mongolia and its horses in the Japanese military featured 
prominently in English-language Japanese photo magazines about the military, for 
example.
168   
 
  
Figure 18:    Army ceremony commemorating fallen army horses, late 
1930s, reproduced in Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Infantryman 1937-45:  
Sword of the Empire, Oxford:    Osprey Publishing, 2005, p. 43.   
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The Japanese press continued to play its part in publicising the importance of army 
horses.
169  It also highlighted the efforts of the Zenrin kykai, an organisation whose 
activities will be discussed in Chapter Five, in connection with the breeding of horses.  
In September 1938, for example, it was reported that the Zenrin kykai planned to breed 
horses as well as cattle and sheep in Mongolia and Sinkiang.
170  Given the importance 
that the Japanese Army placed on the supply of horses it is likely that the army had a 
hand in the development of the Zenrin kykai’s stock-breeding facilities in the region.   
 
Conclusion 
Between 1922 and 1931, the focus of Japanese-Mongolian relations shifted, when 
compared with the previous period, with the civilian elites in the ascendancy and the 
chief public focus on Mongolia centering on its natural resources rather than its 
strategic value.  This shift may have been due, in part, to the fall in favour that the 
Japanese Army experienced in the aftermath of the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention, and 
in the comparatively liberal atmosphere of the 1920s in Japan.  As shown in this 
chapter, however, there is abundant evidence that the army, for much of the decade, 
continued its attempts to increase its control over Mongolia, sometimes operating 
through surrogates, albeit with little or no success.    When the political climate changed 
towards the end of the 1920s, the army’s ambitions in Mongolia were once again more 
publicly evident, primarily through the publicity given to the importance of Mongolian 
horses.  The academic and literary promotion of Mongolia, through the writings of 
Torii Ryz, Yosano Akiko and others, were also more in evidence towards the end of 
the decade.  Such intellectual contributions to the strengthening of the Japanese-
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Mongolian relationship had been overshadowed before the 1920s, when military and 
political concerns had been more prominent.     
The next chapter will analyse the steps taken by the Kwantung Army in the wake 
of the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 to achieve greater control of Inner 
Mongolia.  It will also examine the various works produced between 1932 and 1945, 
both in Japanese and in English, that promoted or discussed Japan’s claims to the region.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
INNER MONGOLIA:    JAPANESE MILITARY ACTIVITY 
AND ITS CULTURAL SUPPORT, 1932-45 
 
 
To the ends of the Great Wall,  
To the ends of Mongolia,  
In search of light 
Did I travel afar.   
But what do I find 
Now that I’ve come …  
Only cold winds of greed,  
Oh!   cold winds of greed.
1   
 
 
 
With Japanese domination of Manchuria after the Manchurian Incident of September 
1931, the number of ethnic Mongols who fell under direct Japanese control steadily 
grew, because, as discussed in the Introduction, parts of the three north-eastern 
provinces of China were predominantly populated by Mongols.    One consequence was 
that the question of the significance of Mongolia itself within the broader framework of 
Japanese imperialistic ambitions moved into the mainstream of government discourse.  
The Japanese Army, elements of which had sought to gain control of Mongolia for 
strategic reasons for the better part of two decades, now saw its ambitions in the region 
supported to a much greater extent by the government and the bureaucracy.    In tandem 
with these changes within official circles, there was also a significant increase in the 
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publication of cultural works justifying Japan’s claims to a special relationship with the 
Mongols.  Such works often incorporated themes familiar from previous decades.  
For example, the romantic image of sweeping plains, lone horsemen and noble 
inhabitants was a strong element.  The role that Japanese women could play in 
ongoing Japanese schemes in Mongolia was promoted too, again echoing themes from 
the early part of the twentieth century.  Attempts by Japanese authors to mobilise 
Japanese public opinion behind the various official policies on Mongolia also attracted 
attention from Western writers, and in some cases were reinforced by those writers.     
While a number of studies have examined the actions of the Kwantung Army in 
Manchuria and North China between the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the outbreak 
of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937,
2 the military’s promotion of Japan’s claim to 
Mongolia in this period has received significantly less attention.  This chapter 
examines Japan’s relationship with Mongolia between 1932 and 1945.    Specifically, it 
focuses on those parts of Mongolia in which it was still possible to extend Japanese 
power in this period, that is, Inner Mongolia.  As we have seen, Outer Mongolia had 
fallen under Soviet control following the defeat of Ungern-Sternberg in 1921; thus, for 
some time, Japan’s territorial ambitions had been largely directed at the part of 
Mongolia still under nominal Chinese control, namely Inner Mongolia.     
One theme that has been particularly neglected in scholarly analyses is the crucial 
connection between the Manchurian Incident and Inner Mongolia, a connection based 
                                                                                                                                              
Rakudakai honbu (ed.), Omoide no Uchimko:  Uchimko kaikoroku, Tky:  
Kdansha sbisu sent, 1975, pp. 271-2.     
2 For example Lincoln Li, The Japanese Army in North China 1937-1941:  Problems 
of Political and Economic Control, London:  Oxford University Press, 1975; Shimada 
Toshihiko, ‘Designs on North China’, in James W. Morley (ed.), The China Quagmire, 
Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933-1941, New York:  Columbia 
University Press, 1983, pp. 11-230; Alvin D. Coox, Nomonhan, Japan Against Russia, 
1939, Stanford:  Stanford University Press, 1985, pp. 1-73; Marjorie Dryburgh, North 
China and Japanese Expansion 1933-1937:  Regional Powers and the National 
Interest, London:    Curzon Press, 2000.      
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principally on the importance of Jehol province, situated to the west of the three 
provinces of Manchuria.  Jehol, which had a predominantly Mongol population, was 
absorbed into the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo in January 1933.    The Japanese 
architects of Manchukuo subsequently combined Jehol province with the largely 
Mongol region of Holunbuir, which stretched across Heilungkiang and Fengtien 
provinces in Manchukuo, to create the supposedly autonomous Mongol-governed 
Hsingan province.  The establishment of Hsingan was then promoted by the Japanese 
authorities to those Mongols living outside the borders of Manchukuo as evidence of 
Japan’s willingness to recognise the Mongols’ desire for ‘independence’ from Han 
Chinese domination.
3   
In this chapter I argue that from the early 1930s onwards, both military strategists 
and civilian writers worked to construct an image of Japan as the champion of the 
Mongols, building on a particular interpretation of past history and the opportunity to 
appeal directly to Mongols in Jehol and Hsingan, as a precursor to further incursions 
into the predominantly Mongol provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan in the years prior to 
the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War.  After 1937, however, as Inner 
Mongolia’s significance for the Japanese military declined with the shift in strategic 
focus, first to southern China and then to Southeast Asia, the purpose of promoting 
closer Japanese-Mongolian relations changed:  now the goal was to strengthen the 
Japanese military’s grip on the region, presumably because of its strategic importance 
as a buffer zone between the Soviet Union and Republican China, and because of Inner 
Mongolia’s economic potential.     
                                                 
3 Larry Moses and Stephan A. Halkovic, Jr, Introduction to Mongolian History and 
Culture, Indiana University Uralic and Altaic Series, vol. 149, Bloomington, Ind.:  
Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, Indiana University, 1985, p. 155; Sechin 
Jagchid,  The Last Mongol Prince:  The Life and Times of Demchugdongrob, 1902-
1966, Bellingham, Wash.:  Center for East Asian Studies, Western Washington  
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Japanese authors continued to write about Mongolia in this period, and a number 
of Western writers also examined Japan’s relationship with the region.  I argue that 
Japanese perceptions of a special relationship with the Mongols were widely known 
outside of Japan and were, to a certain degree, appreciated and promoted by Western 
writers.  Moreover, a number of those Western writers clearly believed that Japanese 
stewardship of the Mongols would serve to counter Soviet Russia’s threat to the region, 
given that the USSR had already subsumed Outer Mongolia and seemed poised to make 
inroads into the relatively weak Chinese Republic to the south.     
The chapter first reviews the various military operations, both covert and overt, 
that the Kwantung Army undertook between 1932 and 1937 with the aim of imposing 
Japanese control over Inner Mongolia, and the subsequent establishment of the 
Japanese-backed government of Mengchiang once control had been achieved, following 
the outbreak of full-scale war in July 1937.  Next, I examine the continued promotion 
of Japan’s claim to a special position in Mongolia in Japanese-language books 
published during the period, considering the various ways in which Japan’s supposedly 
unique relationship with Mongolia was presented to the Japanese reading public.  
Finally, I discuss those works aimed at an English-speaking audience that served to 
promote this ‘special’ relationship to a far larger audience and, no doubt, also helped to 
bolster and perhaps legitimise Japan’s claims in the eyes of the Japanese elites.     
 
 
                                                                                                                                              
University, 1999, p. 331; O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia:  The Great Game, 
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Figure 19:    Map of the contested region, c. 1936,   
compiled from various sources 
 
The Japanese Military in Inner Mongolia, 1932-6 
In the Manchurian Incident of September 1931, direct military action was successful as 
a means of furthering the Kwantung Army’s continental aims, unlike in 1928, when the 
assassination of Chang Tso-lin by army hotheads had failed to garner widespread 
support from the high command.  In 1931, the situation was quite different compared 
to 1928:  because sections of the army high command did support the actions in the 
field this time, the authorities in Tokyo, both military and civilian, were unable to rein 
in the Kwantung Army as it sought to gain control of Manchuria.  From September 
1931, the Kwantung Army advanced steadily northward, bringing the three provinces of 
Manchuria under Japanese control.  Among those supposedly involved in the army’s 
seizure of Manchuria was Kawashima Yoshiko, the adopted daughter of Kawashima 
Naniwa, who included a romantic account in her 1940 memoir of her participation,  
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alongside the soldiers of the Kwantung Army, in the advance north from Mukden.
4  I n  
March 1932, the Kwantung Army engineered the creation of the ‘new state’ of 
Manchukuo, and, in January 1933, it expanded the borders of the new ‘nation’ with the 
seizure of Jehol province.
5   
The inclusion of Jehol in Manchukuo is a crucial landmark in Japanese-
Mongolian relations because it brought a far larger Mongol population under direct 
Japanese control
6 than had previously been the case.  While the Japanese military 
already held sway over the Mongol-populated Holunbuir region in the northern part of 
Manchukuo, the decision by the architects of Manchukuo to meld Jehol and Holunbuir 
into the supposedly autonomous Mongol-governed Hsingan province gave them a 
significant opportunity for propaganda aimed at Mongols living outside the borders of 
Manchukuo.  Some Mongols, inside and outside of Jehol, undoubtedly supported the 
new regime in Manchukuo.
7    One decision that helped to bolster such support was the 
installation by the Japanese military, in March 1932, of Pu-yi, the last Ch’ing Emperor, 
as nominal head of the ‘state’ of Manchukuo.  This was crucial to Mongol sentiment 
towards the new arrangement, as it harkened back to the days when the Ch’ing had 
ruled over China and the Mongols had been a dominant part of the ruling elite.
8  T h e  
                                                 
4 Kawashima Yoshiko, Dran no kage ni – watakushi no hanseiki, Tky:  Jidaisha, 
1940, reprinted Tky:  zorasha, 1997, pp. 248-9.     
5 Sadako N. Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria:  The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 
1931-1932, Berkeley:    University of California Press, 1964, pp. 90-117.     
6 Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938:  From 
the Manchurian Incident through the Initial Stages of the Undeclared Sino-Japanese 
War, Cambridge, Mass.:    Harvard University Press, 1964, p. 151.     
7 Walther Heissig, translated by D. J. S. Thomson, A Lost Civilization:  The Mongols 
Rediscovered, London:    Thames and Hudson, 1966, p. 190.     
8 Karl Kiyoshi Kawakami, Manchoukuo:  Child  Of Conflict, New York:  Macmillan, 
1933, pp. 85-7; A. R. Lindt, Special Correspondent:  With Bandit and General in 
Manchuria, London:    Cobden-Sanderson, 1933, p. 251; Owen Lattimore, The Mongols 
of Manchuria:  Their Tribal Divisions, Geographical Distribution, Historical 
Relations with Manchus and Chinese, and Present Political Problems, New York:  
John Day, 1934; reprinted, New York:  Howard Fertig, 1969, p. 61; Owen Lattimore,  
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subsequent installation of Pu-yi in 1934 as the ‘emperor’ of Manchukuo also had 
important ramifications, because, as noted by both Japanese and Western writers, it 
increased his capacity to serve as a rallying-point for those Mongols living outside of 
Manchukuo who desired independence from Republican China.
9   
The Japanese authorities adopted a relatively benevolent attitude towards the 
Mongol inhabitants of Manchukuo.  For example, in the nominally independent 
province of Hsingan in the northwest, the Japanese trumpeted a ‘policy of rule of the 
Mongols by the Mongols’ (Mjin M-ji seisaku), installing a Mongolian prince as head 
of the Hsingan regional administration.
10  The willingness of the architects of 
Manchukuo to grant a degree of autonomy to its Mongol inhabitants was a powerful 
drawcard to the Mongols in Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, outside Manchukuo, who 
sought greater autonomy from the Han Chinese Republic.  At the same time, the 
Japanese policy constituted a challenge to the Chinese authorities.  Owen Lattimore, 
writing shortly after the creation of Manchukuo, declared that:     
 
in Manchuria they [the Chinese] are confronted with an 
autonomous Mongol province [Hsingan] in which Chinese are 
forbidden to settle and in which the development and 
improvement of the pastoral economy is to the interest of Japan.   
It is not too much to say that the Mongols are once more an 
ascendant people, so far as the Chinese are concerned.
11 
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Though Lattimore does here acknowledge the dominance of the Japanese, he also 
clearly points to a changed balance between the Mongols and the Chinese.     
The Japanese decision to grant the Mongols of Manchukuo some autonomy was 
not made for idealistic reasons; there were clear political and strategic motives.  
Principally, it allowed the Japanese authorities to present themselves to the populations 
of Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia and Han Chinese-controlled Inner Mongolia as 
potential liberators.  This image was further exploited by the Japanese military in the 
following years,
12  as we will see.     
From 1933 to 1935, in tandem with its push into North China, the Japanese 
military sought to remove any potential Han Chinese opposition to Japanese control of 
Inner Mongolia.  First, in May 1933, the Tangku Truce was signed, officially ending 
hostilities in Manchuria and providing for the ‘demilitarisation’ of an area of some 
13,000 square kilometres lying between the Great Wall and a line running just north of 
Peking and Tientsin.
13  The term ‘demilitarised’, however, is misleading:  while the 
Chinese Republican military was largely excluded from the zone, the Kwantung Army 
had complete freedom.  The Tangku Truce was important for Japanese-Mongolian 
relations because, as Lincoln Li has observed, the removal of the Han Chinese 
authorities from the region gave the Kwantung Army more opportunities to encourage 
an ‘ongoing Mongol revival’, which worked against the Nanking regime.
14  Such a 
revival could then be exploited to further strengthen the military’s hold over the region 
through the infiltration of Japanese military officers serving as ‘advisors’.     
                                                 
12 Owen Lattimore, Nomads and Commissars:  Mongolia Revisited, New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 131-2; Diluv Khutagt, Owen Lattimore and Isono 
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Two years later, in June 1935, two additional instruments, the Ho-Umezu and the 
Chin-Doihara Agreements, enlarged the ‘demilitarised’ area in North China, setting the 
stage for the Kwantung Army-backed North China Autonomy Movement.
15  With the 
Chinese Republican forces thus banished from most of North China, the Kwantung 
Army now attempted, using the threat of military intervention, to separate the five 
provinces of North China — Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shansi and Shantung — from 
Chinese control entirely and to make them a ‘compact autonomous bloc, independent of 
Nanking, and deriving its inspiration, its politics – and its goods – from Tokyo’.
16  T h e  
army high command in Tokyo, however, had reservations about further incursions into 
North China at this time, in part because of the heavy-handed manner in which the 
attempt was made, and scotched the attempt to detach the five provinces.
17   
Along with reducing Han Chinese control in North China, the Kwantung Army 
also sought to strengthen its position by insinuating itself into the predominantly 
Mongol provinces of Chahar and Suiyuan.  First, the Kwantung Army formed a 
number of Japanese-backed Manchurian and Mongolian irregular forces, using them in 
March 1933 to seize control of Dolonnor, a town near the Chahar-Jehol border, which 
gave the Japanese military control of the eastern strip of Chahar province from this date 
onwards.
18  The Kwantung Army then established a number of Special Intelligence 
Agency (SIA) offices close to Dolonnor, to prepare for further encroachments into 
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Chahar province and to gather intelligence on Outer Mongolia.
19  Despite the fact  that 
this region had declared itself, with Soviet backing, as the Mongolian People’s Republic 
in November 1924, the Japanese military continued to gather intelligence on the region, 
alert to any change that might signal an opportunity to increase Japanese influence there.    
With a presence established in Northeastern Chahar, the Japanese military now 
moved to sponsor meetings of Mongol representatives from the various leagues and 
banners throughout Chahar and Suiyuan at Pailingmiao, a Mongol settlement in the 
centre of Suiyuan province, between July and October 1933.
20  The policies to be 
implemented at these meetings were laid out in two documents.  The first, ‘Zank 
Mkojin shid hshin yryan’ (An Outline of Policy to Guide the Mongols), produced 
in July 1933, called for the reduction of Han Chinese domination of Mongol lands, the 
improvement of stock and breeding programs, the improvement of medical facilities 
and the provision of educational opportunities for the Mongols.
21  The second, 
‘Mkokoku kensetsu ni kansuru iken’ (Opinion Regarding the Construction of 
Mengkukuo), written by Matsumuro Takayoshi in October 1933, went further.  
Matsumuro, an army officer and Mongolian specialist who, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, had served in the region on and off since the early 1920s, called for 
the establishment of a ‘Mongol’ nation — that is, ‘Mengkukuo’ — to include the 
leagues of Silingol, Ulanchap and Ikh-Chao in Suiyuan province, as well as the ‘Eight 
Chahar Banners’ and the region lying between the inner and outer sections of the Great 
Wall.  In this plan, ‘Mengkukuo’ was to have its own army and serve as part of 
                                                 
19  Ibid., p. 150; Matsui Tadao, Naim sangokushi, Tky:  Hara  shob, 1966, p. 157.     
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Japan’s defence against both Russia and China.  The new army was to be formed 
around the Mongol irregulars who had seized Dolonnor and was to be bolstered by 
additional Japanese and Mongolian personnel who would oversee the various offices 
administering ‘Mengkukuo’.
22  It seems likely that these two plans served as the 
blueprint for Japanese operations in Inner Mongolia from this point on, and while not 
all of their provisions were fulfilled, much of what was proposed was later implemented, 
as will be discussed in Chapter Five.     
In August 1935, as part of the Kwantung Army’s plan to improve the 
infrastructure of Inner Mongolia, the army, in co-operation with the kura trading 
company, whose connection to Mongolia, as we have seen, dated back to the 1910s, 
established the Dai-M k shi (Great Mongolia Trading Company).  This company, 
according to Mori Hisao, was formed to facilitate the Kwantung Army’s cultural and 
economic penetration of Inner Mongolia and thereby to promote greater Japanese 
political and military advances.  The company’s chief objective in concrete terms was 
to change the operation of Sino-Mongol trade so that the trade route would run not from 
Kalgan, via Peking, to Tientsin, but rather from Dolonnor to Manchukuo,
23 thereby 
directing trade away from Han Chinese merchants and bringing it under Japanese 
control.   
By late 1935, as one consequence of the Ho-Umezu and Chin-Doihara 
Agreements, the Kwantung Army indirectly controlled a significant portion of Chahar 
province.  Then in December 1935, Japanese forces directly occupied Chahar to the 
north of Kalgan, putting them in a better position to also exercise influence over the 
                                                 
22 B eich shirykan, Tokyo, ‘Mkokoku kensetsu ni kansuru iken’, October 1933, 
contained in ‘Mko ni kansuru shoruitei moto Rikugunsh shsh Matsumuro 
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provinces of Shansi, in North China, and Suiyuan, in Inner Mongolia.
24  The 
Kwantung Army now prepared for operations designed to remove Suiyuan from Han 
Chinese control.    Among the plans drafted for operations in Suiyuan, the January 1936 
‘Tai-M (seihoku) shisaku yry’ (Outline of Policy towards (Northwest) Mongolia) is 
the most significant.
25   
The plan was based on a careful amalgamation of military, political, economic 
and cultural measures designed to further the army’s stated objective — control of Inner 
Mongolia — which, it was noted, was in turn part of the Japanese Army’s larger 
strategy for operations against Soviet Russia.  As a part of the plan, it was deemed 
necessary to facilitate the creation of an ‘independent’ Inner Mongolia under Prince Teh, 
the leader of a group of progressives known as the ‘Young Mongols’ who sought 
greater autonomy from the Nanking government.
26  The plan outlined the steps to be 
taken to achieve Japanese control of Inner Mongolia.  These steps included the fusion 
of Japanese political, military, economic and cultural influences within Inner Mongolia, 
to be accomplished, in part, through non-military organisations such as the South 
Manchurian Railway Company, the Zenrin kykai, whose activities will be examined at 
greater length in the next chapter, and the kura dai-M kshi,
27 mentioned above.  
Promotion of the ideal of the ‘harmony of the five races’ (gozoku kywa), which had 
been publicised in Manchuria as one means of legitimising the formation of Manchukuo, 
                                                 
24 ‘Relationship between the Mother Country and its Dependencies:  Sino-Mongol 
Relations’, 17 July 1936, United States Military Intelligence Reports:  China, 1911-
1941 (hereafter USMIRC), Frederick, Md:  University Publications of America, 1983, 
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Prince.    
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was also recommended for Mongolia.    In this instance the five ‘races’ in question were 
the Japanese, Mongolians, Han Chinese, Muslims and Tibetans,
28  whereas  in 
Manchuria, they were the Han Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Japanese and Korean.
29  T h e  
perceived importance of the cultural aspect of Japanese-Mongolian relations was also 
evident in the plan’s declaration that the promotion of Lamaism and Islam would 
counter the anti-religious policies of Soviet-controlled Outer Mongolia.
30   The 
educational and medical facilities to be provided by the Zenrin kykai were also 
outlined.
31  Lastly, the plan detailed the proposed structure of an Inner Mongolian 
army, to consist of cavalry, supported by a range of light and heavy weapons, including 
machine guns, mortars and horse artillery.
32   
By the end of January 1936, the Kwantung Army General Staff had adopted ‘Tai-
M (seihoku) shisaku yry’ and moved to implement it.  The first step was to 
amalgamate the four western banners of Chahar that had come under Japanese control 
into a new administrative league under Japanese sponsorship.  At the ceremony to 
launch the new league, Lieutenant-Colonel Tanaka Hisashi, a Kwantung Army SIA 
officer,
33 delivered a speech emphasizing the importance of Japanese-Mongolian 
friendship and co-operation.  To better achieve such co-operation, Japanese advisors 
would assist the head of the new league.
34  Chahar province was still technically 
Chinese territory, and thus the Han Chinese Republican government moved to check the 
Japanese initiative in February 1936, sponsoring the foundation of the Suiyuan 
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Mongolian Political Council, which was made up of Mongol princes opposed to Prince 
Teh.
35  The Japanese press noted these developments, commenting that Mongolia was 
likely to become a flashpoint.
36  The expected clash came nine months later, in 
November 1936, with the so-called Suiyuan Incident.     
As the Suiyuan Incident has been examined in a number of existing works,
37 I 
will provide only a brief summary here of what occurred.  In early February 1936, a 
Japanese-sponsored Mongolian Military Government (M-gun seifu) was established at 
West Sunid; Prince Teh assumed a senior position in the new government.
38  American 
officials in Peking noted that it was ‘only a matter of time’ before Teh ‘declared 
“independence” with Japanese assistance’.
39  Then, in April, the Kwantung Army 
sponsored the Mongolian State-Founding Conference (Mko kenkoku kaigi).  The 
conference was attended by representatives, most probably either selected or vetted by 
the Kwantung Army, from Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, as well as from Outer 
Mongolia and the western leagues of Alashan, Ejine, Ikh-Chao and Tsinghai.  Among 
the policies adopted were support for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia 
together with Tsinghai, a province in North China located to the west of Kansu province 
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and bordering Tibet, with a substantial Mongol population.  The conference also 
expressed support for a mutual aid treaty between Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo.
40   
By mid-July 1936, Kwantung Army plans for the military occupation of Suiyuan 
had advanced to the stage where Lieutenant-Colonel Tanaka Rykichi
41 was  made  fully 
responsible for coordinating the projected Japanese invasion and occupation.
42  
Tanaka’s ties to Mongolia dated back to the late 1920s, when he had first met Prince 
Teh, and were part of the reason he was chosen to oversee the Kwantung Army plan.
43  
Tanaka was also associated with right-wing figures favouring Japanese control of 
Mongolia.  In early 1917, for instance, he had attended a memorial service in Kyoto 
for those Japanese killed during the 1916 Manchurian-Mongolian independence 
movement,
44 suggesting a more than passing acquaintance with those involved.  
Tanaka later denied that the Japanese had been the driving force behind the Mongols’ 
attempt to seize Suiyuan, claiming that Japan had merely acceded to Prince Teh’s own 
wishes.
45  His denials, however, were made to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal, and 
thus must be treated with circumspection; furthermore, they are contradicted by other 
sources, including contemporary reports filed by the United States military attaché in 
Peking that detail the steps undertaken by the Japanese military to gain control of 
Suiyuan.
46   
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For the planned invasion, Tanaka assembled a Mongolian-Manchukuoan force to 
which was attached a further unit of Han Chinese irregulars.
47  To ensure that the 
Mongolian-Manchukuoan force achieved its objective, the Kwantung Army provided 
additional support in the form of a Japanese air unit, equipped with a small number of 
fighters, light bombers and transport aircraft.
48    There was also a generous provision of 
army funds, with Tanaka receiving in excess of one million yen for the operation.
49  
Despite all the preparations, however, the November 1936 Suiyuan operation was a 
complete debacle, with the Japanese-backed Mongols being soundly defeated by the 
Han Chinese Republican forces of Fu Tso-yi.
50  The unexpected Chinese victory had 
important ramifications, inflaming nationalist fervour throughout China and triggering a 
rapprochement between the Kuomintang (Nationalists) and the Chinese Communists 
that eventually united them against the common enemy, Japan.
51  
The change in relations between the Nationalists and Communists did not happen 
smoothly.  In early December 1936, as Fu Tso-yi’s troops drove the Mongols back 
from Pailingmiao in Suiyuan province, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek flew to the city 
of Sian in nearby Shensi province to meet with Chang Hsueh-liang, the former ruler of 
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Manchuria.  Chiang’s purpose was to convince Chang that the Chinese Communists 
posed a greater threat to the republic than the Japanese did, despite calls from diverse 
groups in Chinese society — students, business figures, military leaders and others — to 
resist Japan’s encroachments on Chinese territory,
52 instead of accommodating the 
Japanese as in the past.  Shortly after Chiang Kai-shek arrived in Sian, however, he 
was kidnapped and held for almost two weeks by Chang Hsueh-liang, who convinced 
the Generalissimo of the need for a unified front against the Japanese.   Writing later of 
his decision to seize Chiang, in what was subsequently known as the Sian Incident, 
Chang specifically mentioned the Suiyuan invasion as one of the reasons for his 
action.
53  Kwantung Army Vice Chief of Staff Kawabe Torashir concluded for his 
own part that the Suiyuan invasion had prompted the kidnapping.
54    In seeking to gain 
control of Inner Mongolia, the Kwantung Army had awakened the sleeping Chinese 
dragon.   
 
Japanese-Inner Mongolian Political and Diplomatic Relations, 1937-45 
After the December 1936 Sian Incident and the release of Chiang Kai-shek, calm 
appeared to return to the region, with no indication that Sino-Japanese relations were 
about to change so dramatically.    Indeed, according to one contemporary source, it was 
the quietest spring in more than a decade.
55    The sense of calm was shattered, however, 
on the night of 7 July 1937 when Chinese and Japanese troops clashed at the Marco 
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Polo Bridge, not far from Peking.  What sparked the clash remains a subject of 
dispute,
56  but the consequences for Mongolia were clear.     
With the outbreak of full-scale war between Japan and China in July 1937, the 
Kwantung Army moved to seize Suiyuan and Chahar, the two provinces that comprised 
the majority of Inner Mongolia.  In a lightning-fast campaign, the army swept along 
the Peking-Suiyuan railway, and by mid-October had reached Paotou, the terminus of 
the line, supported by Inner Mongolian cavalry units.
57  The Japanese military now 
controlled the majority of ‘Inner Mongolia’, with only Ninghsia province remaining in 
Chinese hands.     
In Japanese press reports of the Kwantung Army’s advance, much was made of 
the assistance rendered by the Inner Mongolian Army, the force that had been set up by 
the Kwantung Army in February 1936, and cavalry was particularly emphasised.  In 
early September, for example, Dmei, the official Japanese news agency, issued a press 
release highlighting the role of the Inner Mongolian cavalry in the campaign
58 (see 
Figure 20).  Two months later, the Yomiuri shinbun ran a series by Tokyo Imperial 
University professor Yokoo Yasuo, entitled ‘Mko no kihei wa naze tsuyoi ka’ (Why is 
the Mongolian Cavalry Strong?).
59  In December, the magazine Pictorial World also 
carried a number of stories about Japan and Inner Mongolia, two of which specifically 
highlighted the part played by the Inner Mongolian cavalry in assisting Japanese 
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military operations in the region.
60    The effect of the media reports was, presumably, to 
emphasise Inner Mongolia’s importance to Japan, both as a potential ally and because 
of the horses that the region could provide, as well as the supposed friendship and co-
operation between Japan and Mongolia.  This coverage thus echoed the Japanese 
promotion of Mongolia in the late 1920s, especially the type of publicity surrounding 
the T-A shinzen kijkai’s ride from Mongolia to Japan, examined in the previous 
chapter.   
 
  
Figure 20:    Mongol cavalry in Japanese service, September 1937, 
reproduced from Nagoshi Futaranosuke, Shwa no sens kinenkan dai-
ikkan:  Dran no hatten:  Mansh jihen to Shina jihen, Tky:  
Tentensha, 2001, p. 127.     
 
After the failure of the Suiyuan Incident in December 1936, the Japanese victories 
following the Marco Polo Bridge Incident must have seemed like a godsend to Prince 
Teh and his supporters.    By late October 1937, the region north of the Great Wall was 
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free of Han Chinese Republican forces and the time looked ripe for Inner Mongolia to 
gain its independence from China.  In November, the prince and his supporters 
gathered in anticipation at Hohhot, as Suiyuan city had been renamed, for a conference 
to announce the foundation of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government 
(Mko renmei jichi seifu).
61  The attendance of Lieutenant-General Tj Hideki, 
commander of the Kwantung Army, greatly enhanced the prestige and authority of the 
congress.    Moreover, many Mongol delegates viewed his presence as evidence of tacit 
Japanese support for the basic principles of Mongol nationhood.
62   
The sense of joy, however, was short-lived.  Less than a month later, in 
December 1937, the Japanese military amalgamated the new Inner Mongolian 
government with two smaller North Chinese puppet regimes, naming the new entity 
‘Mengchiang’.
63    Exactly why the name ‘Mengchiang’ was adopted is unclear, but the 
term dates back to at least 1921, when Chang Tso-lin used it to draw together parts of 
Inner Mongolia that were supposedly under his control.
64  The new government was 
created, according to Jagchid, to ensure the provision of natural resources to feed 
Japanese industry back home.
65  The capital was established in Kalgan, rather than at 
Hohhot, bringing it firmly under Japanese control, as all of the Japanese military and 
civilian administration of Mengchiang was based there.  Prince Teh, his objections 
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overruled by his Japanese ‘advisors’, found himself appointed as nominal head of the 
new administration.
66   
 
  
Figure 21:    Prince Teh and other Mongol notables in Japan, October 1938, 
reproduced in Rakudakai honbu (ed.), Kgen senri (Mko kaikoroku), 
Tky:  Rakudakai  honbu,  1973,  frontispiece. 
 
In spite of his lack of real power, Teh remained important to the Japanese 
authorities for symbolic reasons.  He twice travelled to Japan, first in 1938 and again 
in 1941, and on both occasions was treated as a head of state, with full diplomatic 
protocol observed
67  (Figure 21).    On his first visit to Japan, Prince Teh was granted an 
audience with the Japanese emperor,
68 ‘the highest honour they [the Japanese] could 
bestow upon a visitor’.
69    He was also decorated with the ‘Grand Cordon of the Rising 
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Sun of the First Grade of Merit’, another very high honour for a foreign leader.
70  T h e  
meeting with the emperor and the awarding of honours clearly indicates that the 
Japanese authorities wished to keep up the public pretence that Teh was the head of an 
independent  government.   
Despite the trappings of state, the pomp and ceremony and the honours that Teh 
received, the situation in Inner Mongolia gradually deteriorated, from the point of view 
of Mongolian autonomy, as the Japanese extracted the maximum they could from the 
region.  Japanese civilian visitors to ‘Mengchiang’ noted the extent to which the 
Japanese administration exploited the region.    One visitor, the ultranationalist Kodama 
Yoshio, lamented that Mengchiang was ruled by ‘bayonet politics’,
71 quoting the 
Shinohara poem that appears at the beginning of this chapter.  Nor was this appraisal 
limited to Japanese observers.    An Australian who visited the region quipped that Inner 
Mongolia was ‘where the income tax was collected with machine guns’.
72   
In the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the Japanese military’s seizure 
of large portions of North China, the Japanese government moved to have the Chinese 
Nationalists formally recognise the ‘independence’ of Inner Mongolia, even before the 
creation of ‘Mengchiang’.  In October 1937, as part of a Japanese peace initiative, it 
was proposed to the Chinese government that a settlement could be reached if ‘China 
would concede Japan’s “righteous” demands in Inner Mongolia and … also recognize 
the present status of Prince Teh’.
73    Nothing came of this initiative and meanwhile, the 
perceived importance of Mengchiang to Japan declined.  From 1938 Mengchiang was 
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little more than a backwater as the Japanese military’s strategic focus moved south, first 
in the campaigns on the Chinese continent and then into the Pacific and Southeast Asia, 
following the December 1941 attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor.     
During the same period, the Kwantung Army, which had been the driving force 
behind the seizure of Suiyuan and Chahar provinces following the outbreak of the Sino-
Japanese War in July 1937, and the creation of Mengchiang in November of the same 
year, suffered a similar decline in importance.  First, in September 1939, it was 
catastrophically defeated by the Soviet military, following a clash at Nomonhan on the 
Outer Mongolia-Manchukuo border.  Then, in April 1941, with the signing of the 
Russo-Japanese Non-Aggression Pact, the primary reason for the Kwantung Army’s 
existence, that is, the likelihood of a future military offensive against the Soviet Union, 
disappeared at least for the time being, and from this point onwards its personnel and 
equipment were used to re-supply other battlefronts.
74  By 1945, the supposedly 
formidable Kwantung Army was a shadow of its former self.
75   
The economic significance of Mongolia, however, continued to be promoted in 
some quarters.  In 1942, for example, at a time when there was considerable official 
emphasis on the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, anthropologist Nishimura 
Shinji highlighted the part that Mongolia could play within the sphere, in his book Dai 
T-A kyeiken (The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere).
76  After covering the 
geographical position of Mongolia and the makeup of its population, Nishimura devoted 
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several pages of his book to the various natural resources that Mongolia could supply to 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere.  The list was divided into eight different categories, 
including livestock, mineral resources and vegetable produce.
77  Moreover,  like  earlier 
writers, Nishimura also stressed the role that parts of Mongolia, in particular 
Uchumuchin, played in the breeding of strong, healthy horses.
78  In an unlikely twist, 
the final part of Nishimura’s assessment of Mongolia’s potential dealt with the role that 
women such as Kawahara Misako had played in Japanese-Mongolian relations.  This 
section was given the romantic sub-heading ‘Nichi-M o musunda kinkaku no te’ (the 
women’s hands that connected Japan and Mongolia).
79  ‘ Kinkaku no te’ (women’s 
hands) is a quite poetic term, ‘kinkaku’ being a woman’s hair ornament.  Evidently, 
even a work of serious scholarship was not immune to romantic, poetic allusions.  
Japanese officials, too, continued to declare that the Mengchiang regime was both 
important to Japan and an integral part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
80   
Mengchiang’s fortunes, however, were undoubtedly declining.  In November 
1943, the Greater East Asian Conference, held in Tokyo under the auspices of the 
Japanese government, brought together the leaders of six of the newly ‘independent’ 
nations in the region, including Manchukuo and the Nanking regime of North China 
headed by Wang Ching-wei.
81  Mengchiang, however, was not represented at the 
conference.  While the Japanese administrative apparatus remained in place at Kalgan 
and the region remained under the control of the military, the idea of Mengchiang as an 
                                                 
77 Nishimura,  Dai T-A kyeiken, pp. 128-9.     
78  Ibid., p. 130.     
79  Ibid., pp. 130-1.     
80 For examples of such assertions, see Yabe Teiji’s 1940 position paper, ‘Dai T-A 
kyzonken’, translated in Joyce C. Lebra (ed.), Japan’s Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere in World War II:  Selected Readings and Documents, Kuala 
Lumpur:    Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 31-2; Shimomura Hiroshi’s 1941 speech, 
quoted in Oguma Eiji, Tan’ichi minzoku shinwa no kigen, Tky:  Shinysha, 1995, p. 
248.   
81  IMTFE, vol. 16, p. 39,723.      
230
‘independent’ state had vanished.  After all of the Kwantung Army’s plotting and 
subterfuge to gain control of Inner Mongolia, once the strategic focus changed, the 
significance of the region for Japanese military planners evaporated and Mengchiang 
was largely forgotten.     
Regardless of the shift in the Japanese military’s strategic focus and the decline of 
the Kwantung Army’s own prestige, for those Japanese lucky enough to be stationed in 
Mengchiang between 1937 and 1945, life was not that bad.    True, there was always the 
danger of ambush by the Han Chinese guerilla bands that roamed the countryside.  
Despite this danger, however, the Japanese in Mengchiang were spared the bombings 
and food shortages experienced by their compatriots at home in 1944-5, as the conflict 
in the Pacific became a war of attrition.  The relative safety of Mengchiang, on the 
other hand, came to a crashing end in August 1945, when the Soviet military juggernaut 
raced across the border from Outer Mongolia.
82  While the memoirs of Japanese 
residents of Mengchiang who lived through the Soviet invasion are generally less grim 
than those produced by Japanese in Manchukuo, some in Mengchiang were certainly 
carried off to Outer Mongolia as prisoners-of-war.
83   
Well before it was evident that Mengchiang had declined in importance in 
Japanese eyes, Prince Teh’s dissatisfaction with the Japanese had led him to make 
contact with both Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists.  By late 1939, the 
prince had contacted the Kuomintang and offered to defect.  Chiang, however, 
believed that it would be better for Prince Teh to remain in Mengchiang and ‘deceive 
the enemy’.
84    Exactly when Teh contacted the Chinese Communists is not known, but 
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most likely it was after he had communicated with the Kuomintang.
85  In  August  1945, 
with the defeat of Japan, Prince Teh was free to escape from the Japanese.  He fled 
first to Peking, where the Chinese Nationalists welcomed him.  In 1948 he made 
another attempt to found an independent, non-Communist Mongolian regime.
86  T h e  
victory of Mao’s People’s Army in 1949, however, put an end to any chance of the 
Inner Mongolians achieving independence from China, and Teh fled once again, this 
time north into Outer Mongolia.  Unfortunately for him, the Outer Mongolian 
government returned Teh to China in 1950.  The Chinese Communists put the prince 
on trial, and sentenced him to a lengthy prison term.    Teh was later paroled, and died at 
Hohhot in 1966.
87   
 
Japanese Writers and Mongolia, 1932-45 
Following the Manchurian Incident of September 1931 and the creation of the 
‘independent’ state of Manchukuo in 1932, a number of Japanese authors wrote books 
that not only justified those actions, but also drew favourable attention to Japanese 
activities in Mongolia.  Indeed, Unno Hiroshi has recently noted that from 1938 
onwards there was something of a ‘Mongolia boom’ in Japan.
88  Published in both 
Japanese and English, works on Mongolia included memoirs, biographies, travel 
accounts, and economic analyses of the region.  Films and songs were also produced; 
their main characteristic is that they cast Mongolia and its inhabitants in a distinctly 
romantic light.     
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One category of writing specifically recapitulated the exploits of Japanese 
individuals who had played prominent roles in Mongolia decades earlier.  Thus, 
Kawahara Misako, Kawashima Naniwa and Fukushima Yasumasa were presented once 
again to the Japanese public, clearly as brave, patriotic and self-sacrificing figures to be 
admired.  By now, their activities had been woven into a narrative of longstanding 
Japanese connection with and investment in Mongolia, a narrative that justified new 
actions and more sacrifice, and in particular helped to legitimise further Japanese 
encroachment on the region.  Kawashima Yoshiko, too, the adopted daughter of 
Kawashima Naniwa, published her own memoir in 1940.
89   
One of the first books to appear after the momentous changes of 1931-2 was 
Mko o atarashiku miru (A New Look at Mongolia), published in 1932.
90  In essence, 
the book was an introduction to the region, in the context of the new conditions there.  
The author, Ishizuka Tadashi, chairman of the Nichi-M beki kykai (Japan-Mongolia 
Trade Association), declared that thanks to the creation of Manchukuo, Mongolia was 
now ripe for trade with Japan,
91 presumably because there was now a shared border 
between Mongolia and a region in which Japanese people were very active.  While 
little is known about the Nichi-M beki kykai, it is clear that its objective was the 
economic exploitation of Mongolia, and it was evidently large enough to fund its own 
publications.
92    Ishizuka’s book briefly summarised research on Mongolia by Japanese 
and foreign academics, then detailed the customs of the Mongols, as well as conditions 
in Outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia (within both Manchukuo and the Chinese Republic), 
Western Mongolia, Holunbuir and Manchukuo.
93  Ishizuka’s view of ‘Mongolia’ thus 
resembled the broad nineteenth-century definition discussed in the Introduction.   Some 
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years later, in 1939, Ishizuka also published Nazo no Mko (Mysterious Mongolia),
94 
its title echoing the tone of the 1920s newspaper reports discussed in Chapter Three.
95   
While Ishizuka drew attention to the economic potential of the region, other 
writers in this period trumpeted Japan’s long-running mission to ‘liberate’ Northeast 
Asia.  Among their works was the three-volume official history of the Kokurykai,
96 
the right-wing organisation founded by Uchida Ryhei in 1901.
97  This massive work, 
published between 1933 and 1936, was produced by Kuz Yoshihisa, whose ‘patriotic’ 
credentials were so impeccable that when Uchida died in 1937, Kuz succeeded him as 
head of the Kokurykai.
98  Part collective biography of those who had sallied forth to 
further Japan’s control of the continent, part adventure story, the three volumes of the 
association’s history described the activities of the covert military intelligence-gathering 
missions of the 1880s onwards,
99 detailed the first and second Manchurian-Mongolian 
independence movements,
100  documented the support rendered by Japanese institutions 
to Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg at the time of the Siberian Intervention,
101 and 
recorded the attempt by Deguchi Onisabur to establish a Mongolian kingdom.
102  I n  
short, anything that the right wing had done to further Japanese control of Manchuria 
and Mongolia seems to have been documented.  The activities of Kawahara Misako 
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and Kawashima Naniwa were included,
103 but in the period 1932-45 both these 
individuals also warranted whole books devoted solely to their activities.     
In the case of Kawahara, it was Fujo shinbun, the women’s magazine that had 
reported her activities at the beginning of the twentieth century, that now promoted her 
exploits further.  As discussed in Chapter One, throughout its existence, Fujo shinbun 
had a particular focus on women’s education and often presented prominent women to 
its readers as role models.    The magazine was also very conscious of its own standing, 
and had a connection to the imperial household, as the editor liked to remind his 
readers.
104  Thus, despite the magazine’s ostensibly pacifist objectives,
105 it was not 
shy about lauding Kawahara.  Given that Fujo shinbun was still devoting space to 
Kawahara and her earlier life in the 1930s, we can assume that her past activities, 
including espionage on behalf of the Japanese military, were considered highly 
creditable.  In 1935, as part of the commemoration of the magazine’s thirty-fifth 
anniversary,  Fujo shinbun published a book about Kawahara’s exploits during the 
Russo-Japanese War.
106    One effect was to keep the topic of Japanese ties to Mongolia 
before the reading public.     
The book, written by Fukushima Sadako, the wife of Fukushima Shir, editor of 
Fujo shinbun, linked Kawahara directly to Fukushima Yasumasa, the officer famed for 
his lone horseback-ride across Siberia in 1892-3.  The first chapter, for example, was 
entitled ‘Shiberiya tanki dan no Fukushima taish to shin’y Kawahara Ch’ (General 
Fukushima, who crossed Siberia alone on horseback, and his intimate friend Kawahara 
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Ch [Misako’s father]).
107  By drawing the reader’s attention to the links between 
Kawahara’s father and Fukushima Yasumasa, a national hero, Fukushima Sadako 
clearly intended to present Kawahara Misako’s exploits in Mongolia as equally heroic.  
She also included the dramatic extract from Kawahara’s diary, quoted in Chapter One, 
where Kawahara vowed to take her own life if captured, to reinforce the idea that 
Kawahara had performed a heroic and dangerous mission in providing Japan with 
intelligence regarding Russian troop movements.
108   
Fukushima’s book sought to influence not only Japanese readers’ view of 
Kawahara, but also their image of Mongolia.  She mentioned the garden party, 
discussed earlier, at which Kawahara’s students sang Japanese and Mongolian songs for 
the assembled guests, adding that Prince Gung, his consort and Kawahara took this 
opportunity to discuss the necessity of women’s education with those present.
109  I n  
this way, Fukushima presumably sought to imply that it was through the agency of 
Japan that the topic of education for Mongol women came to prominence.   
Fukushima’s use of photographs may also have been intended to illustrate how alike the 
two ethnic groups actually were.     
One photograph shows the aforementioned garden party, an idyllic scene in which 
Mongolian men and women are gathered.  The protagonists, however, are obviously 
alien from a Japanese point of view, given both the style of dress worn and the 
background.
110  In contrast to this, a second photograph (Figure 22) shows Kawahara, 
Prince Gung and his consort, together with some of Kawahara’s students, on the day of 
Kawahara’s departure from the banner.    In this photograph all are in Mongolian dress, 
with only Kawahara’s hairstyle distinguishing her from the others.  This second 
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photograph is striking, in that although the clothes of the Mongols would still have 
seemed alien to Japanese readers, the people themselves are physically very similar to 
Japanese people.  It is tempting to speculate that the average Japanese on seeing the 
photograph most likely thought that the two ethnic groups were not all that different.  
Perhaps, then, they were destined to tread the same path.     
 
  
Figure 22:    Farewell portrait, Kharachin Banner, Inner Mongolia, 1906, 
reproduced from Fukushima Sadako, Nichiro sens hishich no Kawahara 
Misako, Tky:    Fujo shinbunsha, 1935, reprinted Tky:  zorasha, 
1992, opp. p. 73.     
 
Nor was Fukushima’s book the only work on Kawahara published around this time. 
Fukushima’s final chapter lists a number of other books and magazine articles focusing 
on Kawahara’s exploits.  These included Komai Tokuz’s Dai-Manshkoku kensetsu 
roku (A Record of the Building of Greater Manchukuo); an article by shima Yokichi, 
a member of one of the 1904-5 ‘special operations teams’, who also published a book in 
1933 entitled Bakuhayuki hishi (The Secret History of a Bombing Mission); and an 
eighteen-page pamphlet with the title Hokuman no ochibana (Fallen Flowers of North 
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Manchuria),
111 which was also the title of a film.
112  Even Torii Ryz mentioned 
Kawahara’s time as a teacher in Inner Mongolia in his 1936 memoir of his early visits 
to Mongolia.
113   
While the general public in Japan largely forgot Kawahara after the Second World 
War, the sheer number of works about her that appeared during the 1930s suggests that 
she was a figure of some importance at that time.   Fujo shinbun, at any rate, evidently 
continued to hold her in high regard, as shown by the magazine’s recapitulation of her 
exploits during the Russo-Japanese War when commemorating its thirty-fifth 
anniversary in 1935.   Through the magazine’s pages, the reading public was reminded 
not only of a tale of individual ‘heroism’, but also of Japanese activity in Mongolia 
more generally.  The connection with Fujo shinbun was clearly close and one that 
Kawahara maintained.    Her name figured prominently, for example, in the list of those 
who sent New Year greetings to the paper in 1932.
114    The prominence of Kawahara in 
the eyes of the magazine’s editors is reinforced in Nagahara Kazuko’s 1997 analysis of 
Fujo shinbun’s view of Asia.  Nagahara devotes six pages to Kawahara, as well as 
including a photograph of her at the beginning of the chapter.
115   
Kawashima Naniwa’s activities on the Chinese continent, in particular in relation 
to the two Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements, were similarly lauded in a 
1936 book about his life, entitled Kawashima Naniwa-.
116  Even the title of the book 
struck a hagiographical note.  The use of the term ‘’ or ‘okina’, meaning ‘sage’ or 
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‘venerable old man’, suggests that the author, Aida Tsutomu, wanted the reader to see 
Kawashima as a figure worthy of great respect.  Aida’s book detailed Kawashima’s 
relationship with Prince Su, as well as Kawashima’s part in Sino-Japanese, Japanese-
Manchurian and Manchurian-Mongolian relations from the 1890s onwards, including 
his involvement in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 and the Russo-Japanese War 
of 1904-5.  Two lengthy chapters were devoted to his association with the 
Manchurian-Mongolian independence movements of 1912 and 1916.  Aida further 
linked these two movements to the activities of Semenov and Ungern-Sternberg during 
the 1918-22 Siberian Intervention.
117  In doing so, his object was presumably to fix in 
the minds of his readers a connection among Semenov, Ungern-Sternberg and 
Kawashima, and to convey the sense that all were individuals who, with official 
Japanese assistance, had struggled for the ‘independence’ of Manchuria and Mongolia.     
Aida implied that Kawashima’s evident fascination with Mongolia was long-
standing.    As far back as the early 1880s Kawashima had allegedly dreamt of Genghis 
Khan, and then of himself ‘leading an army of one hundred thousand across the great 
desert of Mongolia’.
118  Later in the same decade, according to Aida, when the 
Russians moved into the Ili region of Northeast Sinkiang, Kawashima first began to 
think about the possibility of an independent Manchurian-Mongolian entity (Man-M 
kenkoku ris no shohokki), to comprise Manchuria and the eastern part of Mongolia 
(Mko no tbu).
119  Presumably, Aida wanted his readers to conclude that Kawashima 
was already a visionary, even before he became involved in the various concrete 
schemes to create an ‘independent’ Manchurian-Mongolian kingdom, because 
Kawashima had foreseen the need to create ‘Manchukuo’ almost five decades before it 
became a reality.     
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A few years later, in 1940, Kawashima Yoshiko, Kawashima Naniwa’s adopted 
daughter and the thirteenth child of his former associate, the Manchu Prince Su, 
published her own memoir, evocatively entitled Dran no kage ni – watakushi no 
hanseiki (In the Shadow of Chaos – A Record of My Life Till Now).  The book was 
filled with romantic images, not the least of which was the description of Kawashima as 
a ‘Far Eastern Joan of Arc’, both in the Foreword by Igaue Shigeru and by Kawashima 
herself.
120    Kawashima recalled that in childhood, she had dreamt of herself leading an 
army in China, much as her father had done, presumably in this case to free China from 
the Republicans, just as Joan of Arc had freed France from the English.
121  The sense 
of romance in her book was extended to her activities in Manchuria and Mongolia.  
When discussing her supposed exploits with the Kwantung Army, following the 
Manchurian Incident of September 1931, Kawashima detailed the Japanese advance 
north from Mukden, towards the Chinese Eastern Railway, in which she had apparently 
participated, in a section entitled ‘Rakuda no chtai’ (Camel company).  One feature 
of this section is her romantic blending of the image of the camel corps and the 
Mongolian ger (the traditional Mongolian tent, also known as a ‘yurt’).
122   
In 1927, as noted earlier, Kawashima had married Kanjurchap, the second son of 
Babujab, ‘hero’ of the 1916 Manchuria-Mongolia independence movement, at a 
ceremony attended by a range of Japanese notables, including high-ranking Kwantung 
Army officers.
123    In her memoir Kawashima implied that this was a dynastic marriage 
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joining the Ch’ing and Mongol noble lines.
124    Her account of the wedding was entitled 
‘Mko no yoru’ (Mongolian nights), a romantic image evoking Scheherazade and the 
tales of the Arabian nights.
125    Kawashima Yoshiko’s public emphasis on the romantic 
associations of Mongolia was also evident in August 1933, when she recorded the song 
‘Kyaraban no rin’ (Caravan Bell) for Columbia Records Japan.
126  The title alone 
conjured up the image of caravans of camels along the Silk Road.    At around the same 
time, Kawashima also recorded two Mongolian folksongs, although it is unclear 
whether these were released.
127   
The exploits of Fukushima Yasumasa, the army officer famous for his lone 
horseback-ride from Berlin to Vladivostok in the early 1890s, were also lauded in two 
books published in the early 1940s.
128  Both were edited by ta Ayama and were 
substantial works.  The first reprinted Fukushima’s own account of his epic ride, 
originally published in 1894, together with a small selection of other pieces about his 
achievement.  The second reprinted Fukushima’s account of a journey he made in 
1895-6 through Northern Persia, Turkish-controlled Arabia, India and Burma.  The 
publication of these two works shows that Fukushima remained in the Japanese public 
memory long after his death, at least partly because of his activities in Mongolia.  
Indeed, the prominent army general, Matsui Iwane, at his last meeting with the Buddhist 
chaplain of Sugamo prison on the eve of Matsui’s execution as a war criminal in 
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December 1948, specifically recalled Fukushima, naming him as one of the four 
‘fathers of the Japanese Army’.
129   
In the wake of the July 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident and the onset of full-
scale war between Japan and China, together with the extension of Japanese control into 
Chahar and Suiyuan provinces, Japanese authors shifted their attention from the 
potential offered by control of Inner Mongolia, presumably because the region was now 
under Japanese control, to discussion of the actual relationship between the Japanese 
and the Mongols, and the assistance already being provided by Japan in Inner 
Mongolia.  In 1941, for example, journalist Iiyama Tatsuo and photographer Hazama 
Otohiko produced an illustrated record of their July 1938 travels through 
Mengchiang.
130  Iiyama contributed a sixty-four-page essay, discussing the changes 
that had occurred in the region since the outbreak of war in July 1937.  He drew 
particular attention to the work being undertaken by the Zenrin kykai, pointing to the 
idealism of the young Japanese who had opted to work in the region.
131  The majority 
of the book, however, was given over to Hazama’s photographs.  What is noteworthy 
about these is that there are no images of soldiers, even though the book’s title refers to 
the North China Army.  Rather, there are idyllic scenes of happy Mongols inhabiting 
seemingly endless plains.  The only Japanese apparently present are serious young 
men, presumably members of the ‘noble’ Zenrin kykai, evidently eager to lift up their 
less fortunate Mongolian brothers.     
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Other visitors, too, wrote about the region in this period.    For four months, from 
late 1937 to early 1938, Hasegawa Haruko, an artist trained in both Japanese and 
Western styles of portraiture, travelled through North China and Mengchiang, 
subsequently publishing an illustrated diary of her journey.
132  Hasegawa, who 
travelled as special correspondent for the saka mainichi shinbun (Osaka Daily News) 
and the magazine Kaiz (Reconstruction), wrote a number of articles that dealt 
specifically with the new regime in Mengchiang.  Several of her reports were 
published not only in the saka mainichi shinbun, but also in other newspapers, 
including the Yomiuri shinbun, prior to being gathered together and included in the 
book.
133    Thus, quite a wide audience presumably read Hasegawa’s work.     
In the first section of her published book, Hasegawa expressed her opinion that it 
was not Russia or America that ensured Mongolia’s future prosperity, but rather the 
Zenrin kykai,
134  the Japanese organisation most active in the region at the time.   In a 
similar vein, she described Prince Teh, and his supporters whom she met, as ‘the new 
men for a new Mongolia’, and as ‘passionate’ and ‘ambitious’.
135  She also recorded 
her encounter with a young Mongol boy who had spent two years at elementary school 
in Japan and who spoke to her in Japanese, which clearly impressed Hasegawa.
136  
Throughout this section, whether praising Teh or mentioning the young boy who had 
studied in Japan, Hasegawa’s objective seems to have been to make her reader aware of 
the ways in which Japan was helping the Mongols to fulfill their destiny.  In many 
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respects, Hasegawa echoed the sentiments expressed in Kawahara Misako’s book, 
Mko miyage, published some thirty years before.
137    Both works, that is, conveyed the 
idea that it was with the help of Japan, at all levels of Mongolian society, that the 
Mongols could build a ‘new Mongolia’.     
 
  
Figure  23:  ‘Mongolian  boy’,  
reproduced from Hasegawa Haruko, Hokushi Mky sensen, Tky:  
Bunshsha, 1939, reprinted Tky:  Yumani  shob, 2002, p. 21.     
 
As an artist, Hasegawa sought to capture not only what she heard, but also what 
she saw, through a series of ink sketches.  The illustration that accompanies her 
recollection of the meeting with the young boy who spoke to her in Japanese, for 
example, shows someone, in all probability the boy in question, swaddled in furs and 
smiling (Figure 23).  There is a sense of peace and contentment to the drawing.  The 
boy gazes upwards at the sky, while behind can be seen a man with a rifle slung on his 
back and a child standing together with a horse.    The only other indications of life are 
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a dog walking away and the smoke rising from the chimney of the ger.  Hasegawa’s 
portrayal of Mongolia has an idyllic quality, no doubt influenced by the romantic 
perception of the region common among Japanese at the time.     
Hasegawa’s book also includes a section entitled ‘Sensen no josei tachi’ (women 
of the front-line).  Three of the five parts in this section dealt specifically with 
Mengchiang, each one accompanied by an ink portrait.    The first, ‘Mko h no shjo’ 
(Maiden of the Mongolian ger), not only mentioned the importance of the Zenrin 
kykai’s work in Mengchiang, but also included an illustration of an older woman, 
perhaps Hasegawa herself in Mongolian attire, walking with her arm around the 
shoulders of a young Mongolian girl (Figure 24).
  Here the image suggests maternal 
protectiveness, with the older woman shielding the innocent Mongolian maiden.  
Undoubtedly, what Hasegawa conveyed through the sketch was an idealized version of 
Japan’s relationship with the Mongols.     
 
  
Figure 24:    ‘Maiden of the Mongolian ger’,  
reproduced from Hasegawa, Hokushi Mky sensen, p. 151.     
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The part entitled ‘Chkak no taipisuto’ (Kalgan typist) was about the women 
attached to the SIA, serving with the Japanese military alongside the men.  The 
accompanying illustration of an elegant, overall-clad young woman, stylishly posed 
warming herself beside a stove, exudes sophistication (Figure 25).    The young woman 
portrayed would not have looked out of place in a Tokyo setting.  Through the 
illustration, Hasegawa implies that Kalgan is in some way similar to a Japanese 
metropolis, in that women there can be just as elegant and worldly as in Tokyo.  
Moreover, although the figure is, in all probability, that of a young Japanese woman, it 
could equally be a Mongol.    In this respect, while the previous drawing (see Figure 25) 
brings to mind the Mongols before the benefits of Japanese enlightenment have been 
fully absorbed, this one suggests that with Japanese assistance, the Mongols are 
fulfilling their potential.  In many ways, these two illustrations also echo the 
photographs that appeared in Fukushima Sadako’s book on Kawahara Misako (see 
Figures 22), which implied how physically similar the two peoples were.     
 
  
Figure  25:  ‘Kalgan  typist’,  
reproduced from Hasegawa, Hokushi Mky sensen, p. 153.     
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The part of Hasegawa’s book entitled ‘Ht no joj gunkisha’ (Woman military 
journalist at Paotou) concerned a German journalist attached to the Japanese Army.  
The illustration shows a woman swaddled in furs, with a plane in the background 
(Figure 26).  The image here is of the warrior woman, ready to join the ‘fellows’ in 
combat.  The illustration, however, could just as easily be meant to represent a 
Japanese woman, maybe even Hasegawa herself.  Indeed, earlier in the book, 
Hasegawa included a photo of herself, smiling and cheerful, dressed in much the same 
way (see Figure 27).  It is tempting to speculate that in the German woman journalist 
she encountered at Paotou, Hasegawa saw a reflection of herself.     
 
  
Figure 26:    ‘Woman military journalist at Paotou’,   
reproduced from Hasegawa, Hokushi Mky sensen, p. 157.     
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Figure 27:    Hasegawa Haruko with an artillery unit, Shantung province, 
December 1937, reproduced from Hasegawa, Hokushi Mky sensen, 
preceding the title page.     
 
The three different illustrations of women drawn by Hasegawa present Mengchiang as a 
place where a Japanese or even a Western woman could fill a number of different roles, 
among them the mother, the urban sophisticate and the warrior; indeed, almost whatever 
role she wished.    In this manner Hasegawa drew attention to the supposedly important 
contribution of women to Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, as Kawahara Misako had 
done some thirty years earlier.     
In contrast, when Hasegawa dealt with the role of Chinese women in the areas 
under Japanese military control, the illustration she included was of three young Han 
Chinese women holding white flags (see Figure 28).  While the three figures are 
certainly elegant, there is also a sense of fragility, giving an impression of inherent 
weakness to the picture.    The white flag, moreover, as a universal symbol of defeat and 
submission, reinforces the impression.  There is clearly a Japanese soldier in the 
background, illustrating the protection that the Japanese military offered to the Chinese 
population, but the women themselves appear to be mere watchers on the sidelines.  
Whether deliberately or not, this picture stands in stark contrast to others in the book.  
None of the three women in this image shows any of the vitality found in the three  
248
pictures portraying other women in Mengchiang.  Unlike the woman braving the cold 
with the child, the typist warming herself beside the stove, or the journalist ready to take 
to the skies, the Han Chinese women here appear beautiful but useless.  In the earlier 
images, by contrast, Hasegawa implies that it is through the agency of Japan (and 
possibly its German ally) that Mongolia can achieve a better future, as well as 
suggesting that there is a place in this future for Japanese women.     
 
  
Figure 28:    ‘Shihchiachwang’s golden princesses’,   
reproduced from Hasegawa, Hokushi Mky sensen, p. 155.   
 
In addition to this kind of popular publication, more scholarly works on Mongolia 
also appeared in this period.  For example, in 1941, under the auspices of the T-A 
kko gakkai Mko chsahan (East Asian Archeological Association’s Mongolian 
Survey Section), the archeologists Egami Namio and Yonebayashi Kiyoshio produced a 
volume detailing two fieldtrips undertaken in Inner Mongolia by researchers from the  
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association in 1931 and 1935.
138  Why it had taken so long to write up the fieldwork 
was not explained, but the book presented a thorough study of the Silingol and 
Ulanchap regions of Inner Mongolia.    An account of the experiences of another survey 
team, from Kyoto Imperial University, that spent a month in the region in September 
1938, also appeared in book form in 1943.
139  The team’s survey of Inner Mongolia 
had been carried out with assistance from Japanese Army units stationed in the 
region.
140  The introduction to the book included a comment to the effect that it was 
because of the Kwantung Army’s operations that the Inner Mongols had been able to 
found a new state, Mengchiang.
141   
Other visitors to Inner Mongolia in this period included the geographer Suda 
Kanji, who undertook an eight-month journey through the region, an account of which 
was later published as Ysha (Rickshaw).
142  Suda travelled extensively through 
Mengchiang, describing the Mongols’ way of life and touching on such topics as the 
kinds of fuel used, foodstuffs, Inner Mongolia’s rivers and lakes, roads, clothing and 
religion.  In one passage, Suda waxed lyrical about the taste of sheep cooked in miso, 
which he had eaten at Abagar in Inner Mongolia, at a building run by the Zenrin 
kykai.
143  There is possibly nothing more archetypically Japanese than miso, and the 
whole purpose of the passage seems to have been to illustrate the connection between 
the Japanese and the Mongols, by highlighting their enjoyment of the same product.  
Just as Fukushima Sadako, in her book about Kawahara Misako, had perhaps intended 
the juxtaposition of photographs to illustrate the similarities between the two peoples, 
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Suda used the most basic shared element, food.  Moreover, the mention of the Zenrin 
kykai no doubt served to remind the reader of the sterling work being done by that 
organisation in the ‘wilds of Mongolia’.     
A number of other Japanese writers and artists also visited Mengchiang after 1937 
and wrote about what they had seen and experienced.  A notable example is Mky 
(Mengchiang), by novelist Yasuda Yojr, the acknowledged leader of the Japan 
Romantic School (Nihon rmanha).
144    The book is quite dense in places, but it is clear 
that Yasuda, like other writers, perceived in Mengchiang a kind of romantic reflection 
of Japan and of Japanese power.    At one point he writes, ‘my romanticism is extremely 
gratified by the sight of our troops under the north wind in the Mongolian landscape’ 
(sakuf no shita no waga guntai ya Mko no fdo wa, watakushi no romanchishizumu o 
hij ni manzoku saseru).
145  The linking of Japan and Mongolia in such a romantic 
fashion was by now well established as a literary convention.  The addition of the 
reference to the military emphasised the role that the Japanese Army had played in 
bringing the region under Japanese control, and functioned to cast even the military in a 
romantic light.     
The attention paid to Mongolia by Japanese writers at this time is perhaps best 
demonstrated through the works of Yonaiyama Tsuneo, a former Foreign Ministry 
official who spent almost three years, from October 1933 until August 1936, stationed 
in Hsingan, a province of Manchukuo predominantly inhabited by Mongols.
146  During 
his time in Hsingan province, Yonaiyama wrote a number of articles about different 
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aspects of neighbouring Mongolia, on such topics as the people of the Holunbuir region, 
and Mongolia’s climate, flora and folk music.
147  On his return to Japan, he published 
extensively about Mongolia, and about both Japan’s and China’s relationship with the 
region.  Yonaiyama’s 1938 book, Mko fdoki (An Account of Mongolian 
Topography),
 was followed by two more, both published in 1942:  Mko sgen (The 
Mongolian Grasslands) and Mko ris (The Mongolian Ideal).
148  Not content with 
publishing three books on Mongolia in the space of five years, Yonaiyama published 
two more in 1943: Shina to Mko (China and Mongolia) and Mko oyobi Mkojin 
(Mongolia and the Mongols).
149    Both these works centred on the position of Mongolia 
in relation to China and Japan.     
In Shina to Mko, Yonaiyama focused his attention on Mongolia’s future, asserting 
that it was the dream of the Mongolians to found a Greater Mongolia (dai-Mko 
kenkoku) and that for this to eventuate three things needed to occur:  the population 
must increase, Mongolia must be completely separated from China, and traffic between 
Manchuria and Mongolia must be developed.  For the last to happen traffic between 
the Mongolian city of Kalgan and China must be stopped and a direct rail link between 
Manchuria and Mongolia, that is, between Mongolia and a Japanese-controlled region, 
must be built.
150    While Yonaiyama did not openly state it, it is clear that his plans for 
the modernisation of Mongolia were geared to Japanese interest:  everything was 
designed to facilitate Japanese control of the region.    With his call for the development 
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of trade between Kalgan and Manchukuo, for example, Yonaiyama was echoing one of 
the Kwantung Army’s proposals discussed earlier in this chapter.  Yonaiyama further 
argued that for East Asia as a whole to prosper, a new Mongolia must take shape, 
comprising all four regions — Inner, Outer, Eastern and Western Mongolia — each 
ruled by its own princes, with this confederation then to form a Greater Mongolian 
empire, to join with Manchukuo under the rule of the Manchukuo emperor, Pu-yi.
151  
In reality, given that Pu-yi was a Japanese puppet, the Greater Mongolian empire would 
also then be part of a Japanese puppet state.  In his second book published in 1943, 
Mko oyobi Mkojin, Yonaiyama covered a wide range of topics relating to the 
Mongols, beginning with their racial origins and the specific regions that they 
inhabited,
152 and continuing with a very thorough examination of all aspects of 
Mongolian society, including the Mongols’ nomadic lifestyle, their daily life and their 
religious customs.
153   
It is easy to dismiss many of the sentiments expressed by Yonaiyama, such as the 
desirability of a Greater Mongolian empire under the rule of the Manchukuo emperor, 
as well as the need for a cross-continental railway joining ‘Japan to Manchuria, 
Manchuria to Mongolia, and Mongolia to Central Asia, spreading the light [of Japanese 
benevolence] from the east to the west’.
154    Yet there was presumably a market for his 
writings.  The publication of five books on Mongolia in the space of six years by a 
single author certainly suggests that there was; and the fact that three of them were 
published by the same company, Kaizsha, further suggests that at least one publisher 
recognised the demand.  It seems likely that Yonaiyama’s audience included the 
seemingly idealistic young men and women who flocked to Mengchiang under the 
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banner of the Zenrin kykai, an organisation that will be examined in the following 
chapter.   
 
Western Writers and Mongolia, 1932-45 
Western assessments of Inner Mongolia’s strategic and economic potential no doubt 
served, in the eyes of the Japanese elites, to bolster Japanese claims to the region.  
They are also important in that they demonstrate that Japanese perceptions of Mongolia 
in this period were widely known and appreciated outside of Japan.  Indeed, some 
form of alliance between Mongolia and Japan appeared natural to certain Western 
writers at this time, if only because the Mongolians and the Japanese were ethnically 
similar, and the Japanese were both technologically advanced and territorially ambitious.   
For example, in 1933, the Danish journalist A. R. Lindt quoted a Buriat Mongol who 
said:   
 
To the south there is Japan.  We would accept the help of 
anyone, Japan, America, or England.    Perhaps, however, Japan 
is the power that could help us most.  She could serve as an 
example to us.  Like ourselves, the Japanese are a yellow race.  
Alone amongst the people of Asia they have managed to stand 
firm with no aid but their own.  They assimilated all the 
inventions of the West, but in spirit they remained unchanged.  
They are Asiatics still.  They have remained faithful to the 
religion of Buddha.  They have kept their emperor.  Like 
them we must learn to become a great nation without the 
sacrifices of our old institutions.
155   
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Here Lindt captured all of the points that the Japanese authorities trumpeted about 
Japan’s relationship with the Mongols — the racial, religious, and social aspects — if 
not the military dimension that was the most important in reality.     
The following year, Owen Lattimore agreed that Japan was wooing the Mongols, 
and that the Mongols were responding enthusiastically.
156  From his tone, Lattimore 
obviously viewed developments in Manchuria in 1931-2 as positive for the Mongols, 
although he was cautious about their future, in view of the fact that they were not ‘fully 
independent’ of either China or Japan.    Lattimore noted the strategic nature of Japan’s 
ambitions in Mongolia, stating that if the Mongols of Manchuria were won over by 
Japanese policies they could be ‘both an effective possible screen between the Japanese 
and Russian spheres of influence, as well as a way to extend the prestige of Japan and 
Manchukuo far out on the frontier between China and Inner Mongolia, thus cutting off 
the Chinese to terra irredenta’.
157  The idea that Japan actively sought to extend its 
sphere of influence so that it could create a strategic buffer was by now a relatively 
common theme in writings on the region.     
Other Western visitors to Inner Mongolia made similar comments.  English 
journalist Peter Fleming, who travelled through the region in late 1934, commented on 
the complex nature of the Japanese-Mongolian relationship at around this time, noting:     
 
The Mongols of Manchuria, whose territory lies along the 
northeastern frontier of Outer Mongolia, were regarded by the 
Japanese (in, I think, a rather woolly way) as a potential focus of 
Pan-Mongolian unity.  A successful movement of this kind 
might, theoretically, have detached Outer Mongolia from Russia, 
or anyhow disaffected the inhabitants; it might also have paid 
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dividends in Inner Mongolia, which was still an integral part of 
China.
158   
 
In making this comment, Fleming appeared to be harking back to the Japanese-backed 
Pan-Mongol movement of the time of the Siberian Intervention, and speculating as to 
whether the Japanese would now back a revived movement.     
The Soviet historians who wrote in 1934 as O. Tanin and E. Yohan commented 
on Japanese ambitions in Mongolia from the Soviet perspective.    They drew particular 
attention to the number of Japanese religious sects active in ‘furthering the penetration 
of Japanese influence in Korea, Manchuria, Mongolia, China, and the Pacific 
Islands’.
159  In relation to Inner Mongolia, they specifically named tani Kzui of 
Honganji, who, they reported, had been given the ‘special task’ by the Japanese General 
Staff of ‘directing the work among the Lama priesthood of the region’.  They also 
pointed to the use of Tenriky, a Shint sect founded in the early nineteenth century, to 
woo the non-Buddhist population of Inner Mongolia.
160  Tanin and Yohan’s work is 
important as a contemporary source that clearly notes the links between the Japanese 
military and religious groups in operations in Inner Mongolia, and also because it 
specifically names tani.  The inference is that the connection between Japanese 
military and religious activities in Mongolia was widely known at the time.     
Contemporary foreign commentators on the Japan-Mongolia connection tended to 
focus especially on Russo-Japanese relations.  It was widely believed that a conflict 
between the two nations was likely as they grappled for control of Northeast Asia, with 
Western writers often siding with Japan and against the Communist regime.   D. M. B. 
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Collier and Lt-Col. L’E. Malone noted in 1936 that Russian control of Outer Mongolia 
and Japanese control of Manchukuo and the subsequent arms build-up by the two 
countries meant a situation in which:     
 
incidents of no small significance are occurring almost every 
week in this district [Manchuria and Mongolia], and when we 
remember that both Russia and Japan are armed to the teeth, it is 
impossible not to visualize how easily any of these incidents 
might be claimed by the Power which desires war, as an insult 
to her prestige.
161   
 
P. T. Etherton, formerly the British Consul-General to Chinese Turkestan, and H. 
Hessell Tiltman, gave credit to the Japanese for their efforts to counteract the apparent 
Bolshevik campaign to sway the Mongols.
162  Harry Wildes went further and declared 
that Japan should occupy Mongolia to counteract the ‘Soviet menaces [sic] to the far 
interior of Asia’.
163  In 1936, Guenther Stein wrote at length on the position of Inner 
Mongolia in Russo-Japanese relations, noting that the ‘Mongolian problem may even 
become of crucial importance in the near future’ in relations between the two.
164  
Tiltman echoed Stein’s view the following year.  Now that full-scale war between 
Japan and China had broken out, Tiltman concluded that Japan’s fears of Soviet 
expansion into China and of Soviet military power in general had ‘assumed the 
dimensions of phobias in the minds of the Japanese militarists’, and that Japan had:     
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decided to get her blow in first, and by creating a cordon 
sanitaire of Japanese-controlled territories from Dairen to Ulan 
Bator, to checkmate Soviet Russia in Asia, while at the same 
time providing the Japanese forces with a strategic base from 
which she could, in necessity, effectively demonstrate to Russia 
her determination to remain the Overlord of Asia.
165   
 
Some five years later, in 1942, Simon Harcourt-Smith, who had previously served at 
one of the British legations in China and then in the Far Eastern Department of the 
Foreign Office, agreed with Tiltman, adding that the idea of Russia as a menace 
‘continues to obsess them [the Japanese] even to this day’.
166   
While much of the attention of Western writers was focused on the geo-strategic 
nature of Japanese ambitions in Mongolia and the perceived Soviet threat to Japan’s 
growing continental empire, a number of them were aware of the economic potential of 
Inner Mongolia from Japan’s point of view.  Tiltman, for example, appears to have 
shared Ishizuka’s assessment that Inner Mongolia had vast economic potential for Japan, 
noting that ‘the plains of Inner Mongolia, including Suiyuan, offer magnificent grazing 
land for sheep at a time when Japan is striving to diminish her dependence upon 
Australia for her supply of raw wool’, and that ‘there is gold in abundance in both 
Chahar and Suiyuan’.
167  Henry May made a similar point, listing the wide array of 
resources that would benefit Japan if it gained control of the region.
168   
 
Conclusion 
For the Mongols of Inner Mongolia, the implementation of direct Japanese rule 
following the heady days of ‘liberation’ from the Chinese in September 1937, and the 
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foundation of the Mongolian Federated Autonomous Government two months later, 
meant that in reality, the expulsion of Han Chinese authority from the region brought 
little political change other than a new overlord.  On the cultural front, however, the 
story of Japanese-Mongolian relations was more complex.    Japanese writers continued 
to recognise the racial, cultural and religious ties that existed between the Japanese and 
Mongols, but also drew attention to other aspects of Japanese-Mongolian relations.  
Recent history provided a rich vein to be exploited anew for a fresh audience.  The 
role played in the past by Kawahara Misako, Kawashima Naniwa and others, for 
example, was recounted once again, in part, no doubt, in order to justify Japan’s current 
actions on the continent.    Such works suggested longstanding Japanese effort on behalf 
of Mongolia, and the heroism and sacrifice of a number of individuals in the cause of 
Mongolian independence from China.  Western writers, for their part, made much of 
the geo-strategic position that Mongolia occupied and speculated on whether the region 
would prove to be the flashpoint in Russo-Japanese relations, or on what would 
eventuate as Japan occupied the region.  The strategic importance of Mongolia was 
clearly more significant for Western writers than were the racial, cultural or religious 
ties that Japanese writers often focused on.    Other writers, both Japanese and Western, 
trumpeted the economic potential of Mongolia, at a time when the Japanese military 
sought to extract the maximum benefit from Inner Mongolia.     
While Inner Mongolia may not have been granted independence by the Japanese 
military, it did benefit from Japanese humanitarian endeavours, which were chiefly 
channelled through the Zenrin kykai.    The next chapter will examine the activities of 
the Zenrin kykai in Inner Mongolia from the early 1930s until the end of the Second 
World War, as the organisation brought together an array of Japanese groups and 
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individuals who sought closer ties with the Mongols and waged a campaign to win the 
‘hearts and minds’ of the Mongol population of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces.     
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
 
CULTURAL DIPLOMACY IN ACTION:     
THE ZENRIN KYKAI IN INNER MONGOLIA, 1933-45 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the Zenrin kykai, a semi-official Japanese organisation that 
provided medical assistance and educational opportunities to the Mongols of Chahar 
and Suiyuan provinces, that is, to an Inner Mongolian population living on the fringes 
of the Han Chinese Republic.    From the outset, the Zenrin kykai fulfilled two distinct 
purposes.  While it was on one level a humanitarian organisation, it was also an agent 
of Japanese expansionism.    It had a close association with the Kwantung Army, and in 
practice the humanitarian operations of the Zenrin kykai allowed for far greater 
Japanese penetration of the region adjoining Manchukuo than would have been possible, 
without arousing overt Han Chinese hostility, if the Kwantung Army had relied solely 
on military force as a means to gain a foothold in the region.  The Japanese military 
thus used the Zenrin kykai to facilitate its strategic aims in Mongolia.    As this chapter 
will show, the association’s humanitarian activities in Inner Mongolia, in conjunction 
with its campaign in Japan to promote better ties between the two peoples, suggest that 
Japanese policy-makers, both military and civilian, saw distinct benefits in the use of 
cultural diplomacy or ‘soft power’.     
Despite the important role that it played, the Zenrin kykai has been largely 
overlooked in post-Second World War studies of Japanese-Mongolian relations.  
Furthermore, when its activities in Inner Mongolia have been mentioned, the 
association has generally been dismissed as no more than a front for Japanese Army  
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intelligence.
1  That there were close links between the Zenrin kykai and the 
Kwantung Army Special Intelligence Agency (SIA) is undeniable, as will be 
demonstrated later in this chapter, but the Zenrin kykai should not be dismissed simply 
as a cover for intelligence-gathering.  Moreover, although the civilian groups and 
individuals associated with the organisation undoubtedly sympathised with the 
Kwantung Army’s expansionist aims, such groups and individuals also had their own 
separate agendas to pursue in Mongolia.  Thus, the Zenrin kykai was not merely a 
tool of Japanese imperialism.     
This chapter will do four things.  First, it will examine the background to and 
formation of the Zenrin kykai, showing that the association brought together 
representatives from across the Japanese elites who sought control of, or closer ties with, 
Mongolia.  Second, it will discuss the association’s activities, both in Inner Mongolia 
and in Japan, showing how the Zenrin kykai sought to improve the lot of the Mongols 
and to act as an advocate in Japan of the empire’s ‘civilising mission’ in this part of 
Asia.  Third, I analyse the relationship between the Zenrin kykai and the Kwantung 
Army, especially the SIA, and the army’s use of cultural diplomacy in Inner Mongolia.   
Finally, I demonstrate that, after 1937, the Japanese authorities were willing to modify 
and expand the role of the Zenrin kykai to woo the minority Muslim population of 
Inner Mongolia, much as they had previously wooed the Mongols, presumably as a 
precursor to further expansion into the predominantly Muslim areas under Han Chinese 
or Soviet Russian control bordering Inner Mongolia.     
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Much of the information in this chapter is taken from Zenrin kykai shi:  
Uchimko ni okeru bunka katsud (A History of the Zenrin Kykai:  Its Cultural 
Activities in Inner Mongolia),
2  which was produced in 1981 by former members of the 
association.    Of particular importance for this thesis is its account of the background to 
the formation of the Zenrin kykai, and the chronology of the association’s activities, 
which provides a comparatively thorough picture of the Zenrin kykai’s work in both 
Inner Mongolia and Japan.
3  
 
Force versus Persuasion 
Undoubtedly, following the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the Japanese Army’s 
advance on to the Chinese continent after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in July 
1937, the military relied primarily on brute force to control the local population.  In 
Manchuria, despite Japanese claims that the region was the ‘country of the Manchu’, 
the Japanese military and civilian authorities were faced with a population that was 
predominantly Han Chinese,
4 a proportion of whom were opposed to Japanese rule.
5  
Thus the Japanese military experienced major problems in Manchukuo with ‘bandits’, a 
term that was liberally applied to any overt opposition.
6  Beginning in 1932, the 
Kwantung Army launched a series of costly and time-consuming military campaigns 
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designed to eliminate the ‘bandit problem’ and make the country safe for Japanese 
settlement.  In 1937, almost six years after the imposition of Japanese rule, the 
Japanese administration still devoted more than half the Manchukuoan defence budget, 
or some 175 million yuan (US$52,500,000), to the ‘bandit-suppression’ campaigns.
7  
The need to suppress Han Chinese opposition continued as the Japanese military 
advanced into Northern and Central China after July 1937.  The Japanese military’s 
behaviour in the occupied areas of China was brutal, leaving a legacy that haunts Sino-
Japanese relations to this day.
8   
In contrast, Japanese-Mongolian relations do not appear to be burdened with the 
same level of residual bad memories.  The reason is probably that from the beginning 
of Japanese control of Inner Mongolia, starting in Jehol from the early 1930s, the 
Japanese authorities were met with a lower level of overt opposition, and consequently 
adopted a less hostile attitude towards the local population.  Among immediate 
Japanese policies in Manchukuo were the decision to restrict Han Chinese immigration 
into Mongol lands, and the establishment of a supposedly autonomous Mongol region 
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in Northwest Manchukuo, that is, Hsingan province.
9  Both these actions were 
presumably popular with the Mongols.  In general, the Japanese authorities chose to 
‘woo’ the Mongols through policies amounting to ‘cultural diplomacy’ rather than to 
cower them through brute force, as they had done to the Han Chinese.  This was only 
possible because the Mongols responded relatively well to the Japanese overtures, 
perhaps seeing the decision to restrict Han Chinese immigration onto their lands, for 
example, as a step towards Mongol independence.     
There were good reasons for the Japanese authorities to adopt a comparatively 
conciliatory approach in Mongolia after 1937.  First, the Mongols occupied a 
strategically important region that, if brought under Japanese control, could serve as a 
buffer zone between Soviet Russia and Japanese-occupied Republican China, as indeed 
it did.  A hostile local population would have reduced the significance of this 
important territorial gain to the Japanese military.  Second, given the sheer size of 
Inner Mongolia, co-option of the Mongols eliminated or lessened the need either to 
station a large garrison force there, or to raise and equip a compliant puppet force, as 
was done in Manchukuo.    There were also reasons to expect that overtures towards the 
Mongols might be successful.  In particular, the Mongols were a distinct ethnic group 
who had already shown themselves to be both anti-Han Chinese and anti-Communist, 
and whose sympathies could be played upon to Japan’s advantage.    The major agent of 
this Japanese cultural diplomacy in Mongolia was the Zenrin kykai.   
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Agents of Japanese Cultural Diplomacy 
The Zenrin kykai in Inner Mongolia resembles two Japanese organisations active in 
Manchukuo:  the Kywakai (Concordia Association) and the Research Section of the 
semi-official South Manchurian Railway Company.    All three were agents of Japanese 
cultural diplomacy, and, while established for different purposes, were used in practice 
to extend Japanese influence into areas not always under direct military control.  On 
the other hand, as this section will illustrate, there are distinct differences in the manner 
in which the Zenrin kykai operated, in comparison to the other two.     
The Japanese authorities established the Kywakai in July 1932, in order to 
mobilise the population of Manchukuo in support of Japanese rule through the ideal of 
the ‘harmony of the five races’ (gozoku kywa).  To this end, according to Gavan 
McCormack, the Kywakai pursued an ideology that was ‘vague and nebulous, anti-
capitalist, and anti-communist’,
10 although, as Louise Young notes, the anti-capitalist 
stance was soon dropped, as it proved inconsistent with the Kywakai’s purpose of 
supporting Japanese rule.
11  McCormack  adds  that  the  Kywakai gradually assumed an 
extra security role as an adjunct to the Kwantung Army, though he does not explain 
what this involved; at the same time, the association also sought to incorporate the 
whole population of Manchukuo into one or other Kywakai-dominated structure.
12  
While the Zenrin kykai similarly sought to mobilise the Mongols and played on the 
Mongols’ anti-Communist feelings, it does not appear to have had any specific 
ideology, nor to have been anti-capitalist at any point.  In fact, the Zenrin kykai 
played a part in the development of capitalism in Inner Mongolia by promoting various 
business schemes in the region, both on its own and in co-operation with the Dai-M 
                                                 
10 Gavan McCormack, ‘Manchukuo:  Constructing the Past’, East Asian History, no. 
2, December 1991, p. 115.     
11 Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire:  Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime 
Imperialism, Berkeley:    University of California Press, 1998, pp. 289-90.    
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kshi (Great Mongolia Trading Company), an kura-affiliated company,
13  the 
establishment of which was noted in the previous chapter.     
The South Manchurian Railway Company Research Department, established in 
April 1907, underwent considerable restructuring in the years that followed.
14  Its 
purpose, however, remained unchanged:  it was directed towards building a modern 
nation in Manchuria.    It focused on introducing technology that would facilitate urban 
planning and renewal, and, according to Young, on the eventual construction of a 
‘utopia’ in Manchukuo.
15    Numerous young, educated and idealistic Japanese appear to 
have gravitated to the Research Department.
16  As for the Zenrin kykai, while it did 
try to improve the living conditions of the population of Inner Mongolia, its aims seem 
to have been more limited than those of the Research Department of the South 
Manchurian Railway Company.  It does not appear to have aimed specifically at 
building a modern nation in Inner Mongolia, nor to have been guided by the type of 
‘utopian’ ideals that Young believes motivated the staff of the Research Department.  
On the other hand, the Zenrin kykai did have its share of romantics.  One such 
individual was Morishima Kadofusa, whose connection with Japan’s activities in 
Mongolia in the 1920s was discussed in Chapter Three.  Morishima, who was clearly 
idealistic and somewhat romantic, was closely connected with the Zenrin kykai’s 
operations from the 1930s onwards.
17   
Yet the Zenrin kykai perhaps attracted a broader cross-section of Japanese 
society than did the South Manchurian Railway Company.  Members included 
                                                                                                                                              
12  McCormack, ‘Manchukuo’, p. 116.     
13 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 415; Mori, Toku- no kenky, pp. 112-13.     
14 For a brief history of the Research Department, see Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 
pp. 270-1, n. 65; for a chart showing the evolution of the Research Department, see 
Kobayashi Hideo, ‘Mantetsu chsabu’, in Imawaki Ryji (ed.) Mansh teikoku (Rekishi 
gunz shiriizu, no. 84), Tky:    Gakkan, 2006, p. 141.     
15 Young,  Japan’s Total Empire, pp. 242-4, 246-7.     
16  Ibid., p. 302.      
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individuals with a long association with Mongolia, who had connections either with the 
Japanese military or with the right wing, and who were subsequently employed by the 
Zenrin kykai or closely associated with its operations.  The political activist 
Maekawa Tsuneyoshi is one case in point.  Maekawa was a member of the Zenrin 
kykai from shortly after its establishment until his death in 1946.
18  His connection 
with Mongolia, however, was much longer:  as described in Chapter Two, it dated 
back to 1916 and his involvement in the Japanese-sponsored second independence 
movement.
19   
If the South Manchurian Railway Company Research Department was filled with 
idealistic, educated Japanese dreaming of a ‘utopian future’ in Manchukuo,
20 and the 
Kywakai evolved into a mere extension of the Kwantung Army, the object and 
activities of the Zenrin kykai were different.  The overt aim of the association was 
simply to provide the Mongols of Inner Mongolia with a better standard of medical care 
and more educational opportunities than had previously been offered to them by the 
Han Chinese authorities.  There was, of course, an ulterior motive to this apparently 
benevolent objective.  Zenrin kykai activities were also designed to make the 
Mongols regard the Japanese more favourably and to encourage them to be more 
amenable to the imposition of Japanese control.  The Zenrin kykai, then, in no way 
worked against the Kwantung Army; yet its activities went beyond a desire to extend 
military control.     
 
                                                                                                                                              
17 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 412-13.     
18 ‘Zenrin kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, pp. ii; ‘Zenrin kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 412-
18.   
19 Kuz	 Yoshihisa, T-A senkaku shishi kiden, Tky:  Kokury	kai shuppanbu, 1933-
6, reprinted Tky:  zorasha, 1997, vol. 2, pp. 635-6; Uchida Y	jir, Uchimko ni 
okeru dokuritsu und, Fukuoka:  Asahi shinbun seibu honsha hensh	 shuppan sent, 
1984, p. 9.     
20 Young,  Japan’s Total Empire, p. 302.      
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The Genesis of the Zenrin Kykai 
Although it was not founded until November 1933, the origins of the Zenrin kykai, at 
least in terms of its main concerns and of the people involved in it, can be traced back to 
Taiten College (Taiten gijuku), a school established by Sasame Tsuneo in Tokyo in 
1928.  Sasame’s aim was to provide educational opportunities for young Mongols 
from the Mongol-inhabited Holunbuir region in Northern Manchuria, the region that 
was amalgamated in 1933 with Jehol province to form the Manchukuoan province of 
Hsingan.
21  This concern with providing Japanese-style education for Mongols was 
more fully exemplified a few years later in the Zenrin kykai, with which Sasame was 
also closely connected.  Following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, Sasame closed 
Taiten College, so some of its pupils could return to Inner Mongolia to work with 
Prince Teh, presumably to aid the prince in his quest for Inner Mongolian autonomy.
22  
Some years later, Sasame also participated in another unofficial program that brought 
Mongol children to schools in Japan.
23   
Sasame, however, was not merely an education-minded idealist.  He was also 
connected to various right-wing groups in Japan.  Mori Hisao labels him a ‘Mko 
rnin’ (Mongolian adventurer),
24 presumably meaning that just as the ‘tairiku rnin’ 
(continental adventurers) sought the imposition of Japanese control in China, so Sasame 
sought the same in Mongolia.  Sasame was subsequently connected with both the 
Nichi-M kykai (Japan-Mongolia Association), discussed below, and the Zenrin 
kykai.
25  Taiten College, meanwhile, was linked not only to the right wing through 
                                                 
21 Mori,  Toku- no kenky, p. 91, n. 3.     
22 Ibid.   
23 Narangoa Li, ‘Educating Mongols and Making “Citizens” of Manchukuo’, Inner 
Asia, issue 3, 2001, p. 120.     
24 Mori,  Toku- no kenky, p. 91, n. 3.     
25 ‘Zenrin  kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii; ‘Zenrin kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 413.      
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Sasame, but also to motoky, through Taiten’s principal, shima Yutaka.
26  shima, 
who later served as Zenrin kykai chairman, was an acquaintance of Deguchi 
Onisabur,
27  and thus provided a connection to a religious group that had demonstrated 
a strong desire to bring part, if not all, of Mongolia under more direct Japanese control.     
In March 1933, Sasame and shima, together with a number of other important 
military and civilian figures, among them Hayashi Senj	r, briefly to become Prime 
Minister in 1937, Matsui Iwane, later to become famous as commander of the Japanese 
force responsible for the Nanking massacre, and Yamamoto Jtar, a prominent 
politician and former president of the South Manchurian Railway Company, established 
the Nichi-M kykai,
28 an organisation which sought to foster closer ties between 
Japan and Mongolia.  To achieve this goal, the association, almost immediately after 
its foundation, dispatched an emissary to Inner Mongolia to court Prince Teh.    Thus in 
the summer of 1933, Sasame Tsuneo arrived at the prince’s Sunid Banner disguised as a 
lama and carrying a letter from two Japanese Army generals, Hayashi and Matsui, 
offering Japanese aid to Teh.
29  Exactly what assistance was offered is unclear, but 
according to Sechin Jagchid, it was designed to foster Mongol ‘independence’, 
presumably under Japanese guidance.    No doubt Sasame was selected by the Japanese 
military to act as its intermediary with Prince Teh because of his connection to the 
Nichi-M kykai and his earlier involvement with Mongolia through Taiten College.     
In November 1933, the Nichi-M kykai changed its name to the ‘Zenrin kykai’.  
The reason for the change is not explained in the association’s history, but according to 
Jagchid, the establishment of the Zenrin kykai was Sasame’s idea, so it was probably 
                                                 
26 For details of shima’s career, see Shwa jinmei jiten dai-ikkan, Tky:  Teikoku 
himitsu tanteisha, 1943, reprinted Tky:  Nihon  tosho  sent, 1987, vol. 1, p. 206.     
27 ‘Zenrin  kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.     
28 Ibid.   
29 Jagchid,  Last Mongol Prince, p. 58.      
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he who was responsible for the new name.
30  The association’s president was Prince 
Ichij Sanetaka, a member of the House of Peers who was related to the imperial family 
through marriage.  The prince’s presidency indicates the standing of the new 
association.
31  Jagchid claims, however, that the real administrators were Sasame, the 
political activist Maekawa Tsuneyoshi, who was later closely connected with the Zenrin 
kykai’s activities in Inner Mongolia itself, and shima, the former principal of Taiten 
College.
32  While the name changed in November 1933, all those connected with the 
Nichi-M kykai apparently became members of the new association.
33  Hayashi 
Senjr, for one, remained associated with the Zenrin kykai until his death in 1943.
34   
From its establishment, the Zenrin kykai thus had links to a number of groups in 
Japan, including the military, the organised right wing and motoky, which favoured 
greater Japanese control of Mongolia.   The name of the association itself is significant, 
in that it provides evidence of the link with motoky:  the word ‘zenrin’, meaning 
‘good neighbourly relations’, came directly from the texts of motoky.
35  There are 
also other indications of the connection.  For instance, according to Jan van Bremen, 
motoky had sympathizers in the Kwantung Army who encouraged the religious 
organisation to establish contacts with Mongol leaders.
36  The Japanese government 
and major Japanese business concerns were also connected with the association’s 
founding.  The Foreign Ministry apparently had a hand in its creation, although the 
                                                 
30  Ibid., p. 127.     
31 ‘Zaidan hjin Zenrin kykai yakuinroku’, in ZKS, p. 268; Selçuk Esenbel, ‘Japan 
and Islam Policy during the 1930s’, in Bert Edström (ed.), Turning Points in Japanese 
History, Richmond, Surrey:    Japan Library, 2002, p. 203.     
32 Jagchid, Last Mongol Prince, p. 127.  Jagchid’s translation of Japanese names is 
often quite idiosyncratic.    He refers to Maekawa Tsuneyoshi as ‘Maikawa Hirokichi’.     
33 ‘Zenrin  kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.     
34 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 415.     
35 Jan van Bremen, ‘Wartime Anthropology:  A Global Perspective’, in Akitoshi 
Shimizu and Jan van Bremen (eds), Wartime Japanese Anthropology in Asia and the 
Pacific, Osaka:    National Museum of Ethnology, 2003, p. 26.     
36 Ibid.    
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exact role it played is unclear.
37  The involvement of such a prestigious ministry 
suggests that the establishment of the Zenrin kykai had official support, and that the 
government might also have sanctioned the association’s later operations.  The Zenrin 
kykai received generous financial support from Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo, 
amounting to 130,000 yen in total (approximately US$33,400).
38    Exactly why the new 
association attracted such financial largesse is unclear.  Presumably, however, these 
businesses perceived a potential economic benefit in supporting it.     
 
The Zenrin Kykai’s Activities in Inner Mongolia, 1933-7 
In December 1933, the Zenrin kykai established an office at Hsinking, the capital of 
Manchukuo.
39    The association’s activities in Inner Mongolia itself began in early 1934, 
after several months of planning, and were initially restricted to the Mongol population 
of the northern region of Chahar, the province bordering Manchukuo.  The movement 
of Japanese civilians from the Zenrin kykai across the border between Manchukuo and 
Inner Mongolia, then under Republican Chinese control, for humanitarian purposes was 
something to which the Han Chinese authorities were presumably unlikely to raise 
strong objections.     
First, the Zenrin kykai provided the Mongol population of Chahar with an 
extensive series of medical examinations, conducted at a number of locations 
throughout the Silingol League, in Northern Chahar.  In a seven-month period, 
                                                 
37 Ibid.   
38 ‘Zenrin kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii; Tsuzuku Muneo, Konagaya Yuki, 
Harayama Akira and Philip Billingsley (eds), Zenrin kykai no hibi:  Tsuzuku Muneo 
shi danwa kiroku, saka:  Momoyama gakuin daigaku sg kenkyjo, 2006, p. 31.  
In 1933, 1 US dollar was equal to 3.89 Japanese yen.  See 1933 US$/Japanese yen 
exchange rate, Economic History Services, http://eh.net/ hmit/exchangerates 
/answer?yBegin=1933&yEnd=&nation%5B%5D=Japan, accessed 27 November 2007.     
39 This office was abolished in March 1938, by which time the Zenrin kykai was 
firmly established throughout Mengchiang and presumably no longer had any need of a 
base in Manchukuo.    See ‘Zenrin kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 412, 414.      
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between August 1934 and March 1935, Japanese doctors from the association examined 
and treated more than 2,500 patients.    The association also built clinics at a number of 
the places where examinations were conducted, to provide ongoing medical assistance, 
as well as launching campaigns aimed at eradicating diseases in livestock, such as 
anthrax.
40  The local population no doubt welcomed the improved health care for 
humans, but the eradication of anthrax, a disease that affects sheep, was probably even 
more useful, given that sheep were the primary source of the Mongols’ wealth.     
Contemporary observers make it clear that the Mongol population of the region 
was in dire need of even the most basic medical assistance.    A Japanese who observed 
a Zenrin kykai medical team in operation at West Sunid in Northern Chahar in July 
1938 noted that the team examined a total of 173 patients on this occasion, of whom 
sixty-one had venereal disease, twenty-eight had eye disease, twenty had skin diseases, 
seven had respiratory problems, and five had rheumatism.
41  Two  Western  observers  in 
Inner Mongolia in late 1935 similarly commented that ‘many of the babies, particularly 
among the Mongols, are born with severe eye trouble and skin affections [sic] due to the 
enormous amount of venereal disease prevailing among the parents’.
42   
It must be stressed that Chahar province, which abutted Jehol, the province the 
Kwantung Army had incorporated into Manchukuo in 1933, was at the time still Han 
Chinese-controlled territory.  There appears, however, to have been no official Han 
Chinese response to the medical examinations, or to the construction of clinics by the 
Japanese, raising the question of why the Zenrin kykai was allowed to operate as it did.   
Part of the answer doubtless lies in the fact that the Han Chinese authorities paid little 
                                                 
40 Zenrin kykai chsabu (ed.), Mko nenkan:  Shwa jichinen han, Tky:  Zenrin 
kykai, 1936, pp. 162-7; ‘Zenrin kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 412.     
41 Iiyama Tatsuo and Hazama Otohiko, Mky no tabi:  Hokushi hakengun hdbu 
ken’etsusai, Tky:  Sanseid, 1941, p. 49.     
42 D. M. B. Collier and Lt-Col. L’E. Malone, Manchoukuo:  Jewel of Asia, London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1936, p. 76.      
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attention to the Mongols.  Evidently they had little respect for them and treated them 
as second-class citizens or worse.
43  In his post-war memoirs, Owen Lattimore 
recounted a meeting with Fu Tso-yi, the Han Chinese governor of Suiyuan from 1931 to 
1947, at which Fu flatly stated that the Mongols were ‘sheng-k’uo’ (domestic animals), 
indicating a considerable disdain for them.
44  As will be discussed later in the chapter, 
during the especially severe winter storms that swept Inner Mongolia in 1935-6, the 
Republican government ignored an opportunity to court the Mongols by providing 
humanitarian aid, despite calls from at least one English-language newspaper in China 
for it to do so,
45 while the Zenrin kykai was actively involved in fund-raising back in 
Japan to provide relief supplies.  The shortsightedness of the Han Chinese authorities 
probably helps to explain why, following the Japanese victories of late 1937, the 
Mongols of Chahar and Suiyuan provinces were, at least initially, quite welcoming of 
the Japanese military.  In a region where medical facilities were primitive and disease 
widespread, the provision of even the most basic medical care must have gone a long 
way to improving the lives of ordinary people.    The fact that this aid was provided by a 
Japanese organisation no doubt influenced the inhabitants of Inner Mongolia when it 
came to deciding where their loyalties lay.     
In addition to providing medical aid and constructing clinics, the Zenrin kykai 
also established and staffed schools for Inner Mongolian children.  In providing such 
facilities, the association was more or less following the example of Kawahara Misako 
and others like her.  The provision of schools also accorded with Kwantung Army 
                                                 
43  See, for example, M. Sanjdorj, Manchu Chinese Colonial Rule in Northern 
Mongolia, translated by Urgunge Onon, with a preface by Owen Lattimore, London:  
C. Hurst & Company, 1980, for an examination of the discriminatory Han Chinese 
policies towards the Mongols during the late Ch’ing period, policies that presumably 
continued into the Republican era.     
44 See Owen Lattimore, compiled by Fujiko Isono, China Memoirs:  Chiang Kai-shek 
and the War Against Japan, Tokyo:    University of Tokyo Press, 1990, p. 30.     
45 ‘Mongol  Distress’,  North China Herald, 8 April 1936, p. 45.      
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priorities, which will be discussed in more detail below.    Between November 1935 and 
September 1936, the Zenrin kykai opened schools throughout the Silingol League, 
although the number of pupils was admittedly small.    For example, at the Abaga No. 1 
Primary School in Northern Chahar, which opened in November 1935, the initial intake 
was only thirty-five students.
46   
 
  
Figure 29:    Mongolian girls studying, c. 1938, 
reproduced in Ueda Hisako, ‘Tsuioku no ki’,   
in Rakudakai honbu (ed.), Kgen senri (Mko kaikoroku),  
Tky:    Rakudakai honbu, 1973, p. 575.     
 
The Zenrin kykai continued the specific commitment that had been displayed by 
earlier activists to the provision of education for girls.  One photograph from a 
collection of Japanese reminiscences published in the 1970s captures something of the 
nature of the association’s educational work among girls in Inner Mongolia (Figure 29).   
While the photo shows only one classroom, each of the girls present has a desk and a 
book of her own, and the classroom, while spartan, is clearly fitted out with the 
necessary teaching-aids.  This classroom could easily have been situated in a pre-
                                                 
46 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 412-13.      
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Second World War school in Japan itself.  It is not known if the photograph was 
published before the war, but if it was, its purpose was probably twofold.  First, it 
showed the Zenrin kykai in action as an agent of Japan’s civilising mission, and how 
similar the two peoples were in appearance.   In this latter respect it was much like the 
photos that had appeared in Fukushima’s book, discussed in the previous chapter.  
Second, as the classroom shown was a girls’ classroom, it focused on the supposedly 
progressive and egalitarian nature of the Zenrin kykai, which apparently provided an 
education to all who warranted it.     
A few Mongolian students who excelled in particular fields were given 
opportunities through Zenrin kykai programs to pursue further studies elsewhere.    For 
example, those students deemed to have an aptitude for medicine were sent to the 
Manchurian Medical University (Mansh i-dai) in Mukden.
47  The Zenrin kykai 
probably intended to train future staff in this way for the clinics it had established in 
Inner Mongolia.   The association also contributed to the education of several Mongols 
who later played a prominent role in the development of Mongolian studies in the West, 
following the Second World War.  Both Onon Urgunge and Hangin Gombojab, for 
instance, benefited from Japanese-sponsored educational opportunities.  Onon, a 
Mongol Daur from Northern Manchuria, attended a Japanese-controlled school in 
Tsitsihar, before studying at Tokyo Imperial University.  Onon’s Japanese sponsors 
must surely have seen his admission to the university, the pinnacle of Japan’s highly 
competitive education system, as a great honour.  Hangin, from Chahar province, 
attended the Zenrin kykai’s school at Dolonnor, before going to Hokkaid Imperial 
                                                 
47 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 412.      
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University.    Following their studies in Japan both men returned to Inner Mongolia and 
worked closely with Prince Teh in the Mengchiang administration.
48   
 
The Zenrin Kykai’s Activities in Japan, 1933-7 
Throughout its existence the Zenrin kykai fulfilled two roles.  In Inner Mongolia it 
worked to improve the lot of the Mongol population, while in Japan it sought to 
publicise the good work it was doing on the continent and to educate the Japanese 
public about the importance of Mongolia to Japan.  To some degree, members of the 
Zenrin kykai could be compared to nineteenth-century Christian missionaries seeking 
to civilise the ‘natives’, in that many Zenrin kykai activities were designed to improve 
the lot of the Mongols.  Moreover, like the missionaries, members of the Zenrin 
kykai took great care to make the association’s activities known back home, 
presumably in order to attract greater support, both moral and financial, from the 
Japanese public at large.     
Within a matter of months of its establishment, the Zenrin kykai began 
publishing books in Japan about Mongolia.   In the eighteen months between January 
1934 and June 1935, it published at least eight books on Mongolian society.  They 
included works on the current situation in both Inner and Outer Mongolia, a translation 
of Owen Lattimore’s Mongols of Manchuria, completed within months of the original 
English-language publication, and works on Lamaism and Buriat Mongolia,
49 a 
predominantly Mongol region lying east of Lake Baikal, deep in Soviet territory.    The 
                                                 
48 Robert A. Rupen, Mongols of the Twentieth Century, Bloomington, Ind.:  Research 
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speed with which Lattimore’s book was obtained and translated suggests that the Zenrin 
kykai either had members or sympathisers living in the United States, or maintained 
contact with overseas Japanese organisations, either official or private.  Although the 
number of copies of each title sold is unknown, the Zenrin kykai evidently believed 
there was a market for eight books dealing with Mongolia in the space of a year and a 
half.   
While some of the books published by the Zenrin kykai were general 
introductions to the region, others had a more direct agenda.  The provocatively titled 
1934 publication Mko wa naze sukuwanabanaranuka (Why Must Mongolia Be 
Saved?), for example, was most likely intended to strengthen the impression that 
‘saving’ the Mongols was Japan’s responsibility.  In addition to the book titles, from 
March 1935, the association also published the Zenrin kykai chsa gepp (Zenrin 
Kykai Monthly Research Report).  Originally monthly, from issue thirty-four it 
appeared every ten days, that is, three times a month,
50 or thirty-six times a year.  
Among the articles in this periodical were translations of works on Mongolia published 
overseas, further evidence that the association had members, sympathisers or contacts 
abroad.
51    Publication of the ‘Zenrin Kykai Monthly Research Report’ ceased in April 
1939 when the association began publishing the journal Mko (Mongolia), which was 
produced until August 1944.
52   
One example of the more general type of book the association published was 
Yoshimura Chz’s 1935 Gaimko no gensei (The Current Situation in Outer 
                                                                                                                                              
gensei and Buriyto Mko no zenb, January 1935; and Uchimko – chiri, sangy, 
bunka, June 1935.     
50 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 412.     
51  For example, in March 1936 a translation appeared of Edward Dunn’s pamphlet, The 
Truth About Outer Mongolia, originally published in Shanghai, while in September 
1937 selections were translated from J. Lévine’s La Mongolie, Historique, 
géographique, politique, originally published in Paris.  See Rupen, Mongols of the 
Twentieth Century, pp. 29, 65 of bibliography.      
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Mongolia).
53    Little is known about Yoshimura’s background, except that he was head 
of the Zenrin kykai’s research section from its inception.
54  In the course of eleven 
chapters, his book covered Outer Mongolia’s diplomatic relations, education system, 
religious beliefs, trade and economy, agriculture, industry, communications and major 
cities.  It also described in detail the various peoples termed as ‘Mongol’,
55 probably 
to convey the impression that Japan could claim ties with a large range of people under 
the banner of Japanese-Mongolian relations, even if some of those people lived in 
territory controlled by the Soviet Union.     
The book constituted both a primer to Outer Mongolia, and a call for greater 
vigilance on the part of Japan to the danger apparently arising from Soviet domination 
of that region.  Chapter Three, for example, examined Outer Mongolia’s relationships 
with the Soviet Union, China, Manchukuo and Inner Mongolia in some detail.
56  T h e  
focus here was on the threat posed by Soviet control of Outer Mongolia to the other 
regions that could be designated ‘Mongol’, such as parts of Manchukuo, as well as 
Inner Mongolia.
57  Indeed, Yoshimura’s objective seems to have been to stress the 
separate Japanese and Soviet ‘spheres of interest’ in the northern parts of the Chinese 
continent, and the need to defend Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, that is, the territory 
that he believed fell under Japan’s purview, from the Soviets.     
The potential threat posed by the Soviet Union to an area perceived to fall within 
Japan’s specific ‘sphere of interest’ was even more closely examined in Chapter Four of 
the book.    Yoshimura claimed that, as a part of its military preparedness in the Russian 
Far East, the Soviet Union was bolstering its military forces in Outer Mongolia.  
                                                                                                                                              
52 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 415-18.     
53 Yoshimura  Chz, Gaimko no gensei, Tky:  Nihon  kronsha, 1935.     
54 ‘Zenrin  kykai no enkaku’, in ZKS, p. ii.     
55 Yoshimura,  Gaimko no gensei, pp. 1-5, 19.     
56 Ibid.,  pp.  53-76.   
57 Ibid.,  pp.  61-3.    
279
Moreover, Yoshimura also declared that the Soviet Union was pursuing an ‘anti-
Japanese-Manchukuoan policy’ (tai-Nichi-Man seisaku).
58  While relations between 
the Soviet Union and Japan were strained during the early 1930s, with ongoing 
negotiations over the sale of the Soviet-controlled Chinese Eastern Railway in 
Manchuria and skirmishes along the Manchukuo border,
59 Yoshimura’s assertion that 
the Soviet Union was pursuing an ‘anti-Japanese-Manchukuoan policy’ is baseless.  
Indeed, for much of the 1930s, as several studies have noted, Soviet Russia was on the 
defensive in the region.
60    The perception of the Soviet threat, however, was almost an 
obsession for the Japanese Army throughout this period,
61 and it was evidently an 
obsession shared by Yoshimura.    Yoshimura went on to give details of the various Red 
Army units stationed in Outer Mongolia, and of the composition of the smaller Outer 
Mongolian Army.
62   
In 1936, the Zenrin kykai also published Mko nenkan, its Mongolian yearbook,
63 
for the first time.  While Yoshimura’s book was a fairly slim volume of around two 
hundred pages, Mko nenkan was a substantially larger work of more than seven 
hundred pages, although it covered much the same topics as the other work, including 
the threat posed by a Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia.
64  More important was the 
manner in which the yearbook and its topic, Mongolia, were publicised:  one 
advertisement proudly proclaimed that ‘tomorrow’s Asia comes from Mongolia’ (ashita 
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no Ajia wa Mko yori).
65  The suggestion that Mongolia would in some way produce 
the future of Asia seems surprising, given the conditions in Mongolia at the time.  
Most likely, the book’s authors intended to suggest that it was through the civilising 
agency of Japan and the Zenrin kykai that the lot of the Mongols would improve, and 
that Mongolia would go on to serve as a template for the rest of Asia.     
Alongside its publishing activities, the Zenrin kykai was also active in educating 
people in Japan about Mongolia in other ways.  In February 1935, for example, the 
association established its own school in Tokyo, the Zenrin Kykai Technical College 
(Zenrin kykai senmon gakk).  The avowed purpose of this new institution was to 
provide a cadre of young Japanese who would graduate into the ranks of the Zenrin 
kykai.  The college had places for fifty students, although the initial intake was only 
thirty.
66  The association also established a facility in Inner Mongolia for young 
Japanese who wished to study the Mongolian language.
67  One person who attended 
the facility, Kimura Hisao, later wrote about his subsequent experiences in Mongolia.  
Only eighteen when he joined the Zenrin kykai, Kimura noted that he, like many of the 
other students, had been ‘young, a bit romantic, and — at least in [sic] the outset — 
incredibly innocent and brimming with idealistic fervour’.
68   
In addition to the chance that the Zenrin kykai provided for young Japanese to 
travel to and experience life in Inner Mongolia, the association also made opportunities 
available for young Mongols to travel to and experience life in Japan, in accordance 
with its objective of promoting bilateral exchange.  Part of the reason for sponsoring 
such exchanges was undoubtedly that they were conspicuous, providing obvious 
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examples to the association’s Japanese supporters of the ‘good work’ that the 
organisation was doing in Inner Mongolia.  The Zenrin kykai’s annual summer 
exchange, for example, a program that allowed young Mongols to travel to Japan, began 
in 1934 and continued until at least 1943.
69    Those chosen to participate in the program 
spent around one month visiting a variety of places in Japan.
70  The visitors were 
encouraged to record their impressions, which were then published in the Zenrin 
kykai’s research report.
71    The ‘most trusted intellectual followers’ of Prince Teh who, 
with the help of the Zenrin kykai, were sent to Japan in the summer of 1934,
72 
probably represent the first group to take advantage of this program.     
Other educational activities in Japan were facilitated by the Zenrin kykai’s links 
with the Japanese Army General Staff.    In May 1934, for example, the association was 
entrusted with the care of ten Mongol students, brought to Japan by the General Staff.
73  
How long the students were in Japan and the precise purpose of their visit are not 
known, but it seems likely that they went on to form the cadre of Japanese-trained 
Mongol personnel who led the Japanese-backed Inner Mongolian army that was 
established in early 1936.
74   
Lastly, the Zenrin kykai was involved in charitable work in Japan, raising funds 
to aid Inner Mongolia in times of natural disaster.  As mentioned earlier, in 1935-6, 
there was a particularly severe winter in Inner Mongolia.  Though the scale of the 
humanitarian crisis facing the Mongols was immense, with the loss of approximately 
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ninety percent of all livestock in addition to human casualties, the Han Chinese 
Republican government apparently provided very little in the way of relief.
75  In  Japan, 
the Zenrin kykai coordinated a fundraising drive in co-operation with two major 
Tokyo newspapers, the Asahi (Rising Sun) and Tky nichinichi (Tokyo Daily).  
Those in Japan who wished to strengthen ties with Inner Mongolia must have seen the 
terrible natural disaster and the subsequent fundraising drive as a golden opportunity.  
The substantial sum of 40,000 yen (US$12,000) was raised for the Inner Mongolian 
Snow Damage Relief Fund (Uchimko setsugai gienkin bosh).
76  The press in Japan 
noted that following an urgent appeal from Prince Teh, the Manchukuo government, ‘in 
co-operation with the Japanese authorities’, had also agreed to provide daily necessities 
and foodstuffs worth a further 14,000 yuan (US$4,200) to the inhabitants of the 
afflicted region.
77   
Having appealed to the sympathy of the Japanese public as to the plight of the 
Inner Mongolians, the Zenrin kykai staged another event a few months later, 
presumably designed to keep Mongolia in the Japanese public eye.    In September 1936, 
in conjunction with Mitsukoshi Department Store in Tokyo, one of the most prestigious 
stores in the Japanese capital, the Zenrin kykai sponsored an exhibition to promote 
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Mongolia,
78 probably in part to show how Japan’s humanitarian assistance was being 
used.  Another similar event was held in Tokyo in early 1938, again with Zenrin 
kykai involvement.
79   
 
The Kwantung Army and the Zenrin Kykai 
In early 1934, when the Zenrin kykai started operations in Northern Chahar, the 
Kwantung Army had control of the three northeastern provinces that comprised 
Manchuria, and of Jehol, one of the four Inner Mongolian provinces, and had begun to 
mould them into the ‘independent’ nation of Manchukuo.  Nevertheless, as we have 
seen in the previous chapter, the Kwantung Army sought control of still more Chinese 
territory.  To this end, it brokered a number of agreements, both before and after the 
Zenrin kykai commenced operations — the 1933 Tangku Truce and the 1935 Ho-
Umezu and Chin-Doihara Agreements — that removed the majority of Han Chinese 
Republican military forces from a vast swathe of the region north of the Great Wall and 
adjoining Manchukuo.  It was into this region that the Zenrin kykai moved, together 
with the Kwantung Army’s SIA, with which it worked closely.    A variety of evidence 
suggests that the Kwantung Army and the Zenrin kykai shared broadly similar aims in 
Inner Mongolia, and supported each other’s activities in the region.     
Kwantung Army reports filed from 1933 onwards, as Japanese control of 
Manchukuo solidified, make it clear that cultural diplomacy was considered an 
important accompaniment to the projected military penetration of Inner Mongolia as 
well.  In October 1933, for example, shortly before the establishment of the Zenrin 
kykai, the Kwantung Army General Staff produced a report entitled ‘Nekkash yori 
                                                                                                                                              
‘Manchukuo to Send Food to Stricken in Inner Mongolia’, Japan Times, 9 April 1936, 
p. 2.     
78 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 413.      
284
mitaru Mko minzoku ni tsuite’ (The Mongol Race as Seen from Jehol Province).  
After noting the low level of education among the Mongols and the small number of 
schools in the province, the writer or writers advocated Japanese efforts to improve the 
standard of education in Jehol as one way of raising general prosperity.
80  Presumably, 
this would facilitate Japanese economic penetration of the region, which would no 
doubt be accompanied by an increase in Japanese military personnel there.  It seems 
likely, given the links between the military and the Zenrin kykai, that Kwantung Army 
leaders were aware of the forthcoming establishment of the association, and were 
making plans to use it as one means of strengthening Japanese control of Jehol.     
While the author of the October 1933 report is unknown, a second Kwantung 
Army report on Mongolia, dated January 1934, was clearly attributed to Colonel 
Matsumuro Takayoshi.
81  It seems probable that Matsumuro’s reports on Inner 
Mongolia received close attention within the Kwantung Army.  From his service 
record Matsumuro was closely connected with Inner Mongolia, where he had held a 
number of important posts.  It was he who had brokered the June 1925 meeting 
between Japanese business magnate kura Kihachir and the Han Chinese warlord 
Feng Yü-hsiang, discussed in Chapter Three.
82  Matsumuro’s assignment to this task 
indicates that he was seen as a capable officer who could be entrusted with politically 
and diplomatically sensitive projects.  Matsumuro remained on the continent until his 
return to Japan in 1927 and then served in a number of positions, including a one-year 
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attachment to the Army General Staff.  From January 1933, he was the chief of two 
Kwantung Army SIA offices in succession:  first at Tsitsihar, in Northern Manchuria, 
and later at Jehol city, in Jehol province.
83   
Matsumuro’s January 1934 report, which was addressed to Koiso Kuniaki, 
Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, dealt, in part, with the potential benefit to Japanese 
military ambitions in Inner Mongolia if the infrastructure of the region were improved.  
In addition to the establishment of such basic facilities as roads, Matsumuro noted a 
particular need for schools and hospitals throughout the region.
84   That both 
Matsumuro’s report and the earlier report of October 1933 called for the establishment 
of schools and the promotion of education suggests that the Kwantung Army perceived 
in cultural diplomacy certain long-term benefits to its ambitions in Inner Mongolia.  
Presumably, Matsumuro also urged the Kwantung Army to fund the building of schools 
and hospitals because it was a way in which individual Japanese people, as well as 
organisations, could be infiltrated into the region.  In many respects, Matsumuro’s 
report foreshadowed what the Zenrin kykai sought to accomplish in Inner Mongolia in 
later  years.   
Some eighteen months later, in late July 1935, the provision of education was 
again recommended by Major Katakura Tadashi and other officers of the Kwantung 
Army’s General Staff, in ‘Tai-Naim shisaku yry’ (Essentials of Policy on Inner 
Mongolia).
85  The potential role of the Zenrin kykai in connection with education, 
health care and the economic development of Inner Mongolia was specifically outlined 
here, as part of a recommendation that the army facilitate co-operation between Japan 
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and Prince Teh.  The long-term objective of this proposed co-operation was, 
presumably, greater Japanese control of the region adjoining Manchukuo, and it appears 
from the prominence given to the Zenrin kykai in this plan that the Kwantung Army 
regarded that organisation as one means to achieve such control.     
This inference is borne out by the January 1936 Kwantung Army plan, ‘Tai-M 
(seihoku) shisaku yry’ (Essentials of Policy on (Northwest) Mongolia),
86 which was 
written by officers of the Kwantung Army General Staff, and has been examined at 
length in the previous chapter.  The Zenrin kykai was mentioned three times in this 
document.    The first time was in a list of the non-military organisations
87  that could be 
expected to contribute to what Mori terms the ‘cultural and economic aspects of the 
Kwantung Army’s Inner Mongolian plan’.
88  Next the Zenrin kykai was specifically 
linked to the promotion of an independent Mongolia with the five ‘races’ (Japanese, 
Mongol, Han Chinese, Muslim and Tibetan) living in harmony,
89  an ideal similar to the 
‘racial harmony’ (minzoku kywa) earlier proclaimed in Manchukuo.
90  Incidentally, it 
is noteworthy that the authors of this document, as well as other pronouncements, 
treated the Muslim population as members of a ‘race’ rather than as adherents of a 
religion.  Finally, the Zenrin kykai was mentioned in connection with the actual 
educational and medical assistance that it was providing by this stage.
91  Evidently,  the 
                                                                                                                                              
85 B eich shirykan, Tokyo, Kantgun sanb honbu, ‘Tai-Naim shisaku yry’, 25 
July 1935, card no. 659, in Rikugun file box no. 56:    ‘Sens shid’.   
86 B eich shirykan, Tokyo, Kantgun sanb honbu, ‘Tai-M (seihoku) shisaku 
yry’, January 1936, card no. 178, in Rikugun file box no. 1:  ‘Sgun’, subsection:  
‘Man-M’.   
87 ‘Tai-M (seihoku) shisaku yry’, p. 1b.  ‘a’ refers to the obverse and ‘b’ to the 
reverse of the page.     
88 Mori,  Toku- no kenky, p. 136.     
89 ‘Tai-M (seihoku) shisaku yry’, p. 1b.     
90 See Hirano Ken’ichir, ‘Racial Harmony — A “Cover-up” Ideology for a Puppet 
State’, Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, vol. 6, part 1, 1981, 
p. 97.     
91 ‘Tai-M (seihoku) shisaku yry’, pp. 4a-4b, 9a.      
287
Kwantung Army regarded the Zenrin kykai as an important component of its plans to 
gain control of Inner Mongolia.     
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the view that the Zenrin kykai was 
merely a front for Kwantung Army intelligence-gathering has been favoured by a 
number of writers, and there is evidence to demonstrate that the association did perform 
this function.  In June 1934, for example, when the Zenrin kykai established its first 
offices in Inner Mongolia to support humanitarian work in Northern Chahar at the West 
Sunid and West Uchumuchin banner administrations, the Kwantung Army seconded 
two members of its Mongolian Research Team to assist the Zenrin kykai.
92  T h e  
Mongolian Research Team was a Kwantung Army think-tank, established in September 
1932, and was evidently a component of the army’s SIA.  It comprised five 
Mongolian- and two Russian-language specialists, who gathered intelligence and 
carried out strategic surveys of that part of the Russian Far East that bordered 
Manchukuo.
93  The two Kwantung Army personnel remained attached to the Zenrin 
kykai until June 1935, when both were re-assigned to the SIA.     
For the officer already stationed at West Sunid this simply meant that his job 
designation changed, as re-assignment came when an SIA office was established at that 
banner administration.  For the other officer it involved a transfer and a new 
assignment, again to West Sunid:  he was appointed to liaise with the religious leader 
known as the Outer Mongolian Living Buddha, Dilowa Khutugtu, who had fled to West 
Sunid.  The emphasis on West Sunid on the part of both the Zenrin kykai and the 
Kwantung Army is probably attributable to the fact that it was the seat of Prince Teh’s 
administration.  Opening an office there would thus place a number of Japanese 
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personnel in close proximity to the prince.  In addition to liaising with the Living 
Buddha, the second Kwantung Army officer was also given the task of gathering 
intelligence on Outer Mongolia from the large number of refugees who had settled at 
that banner after the purges carried out by the Moscow-backed Outer Mongolian 
government in the early 1930s, in which monasteries were disbanded and numerous 
monks executed or imprisoned.
94   
From the manner in which personnel moved between the Kwantung Army SIA and 
the Zenrin kykai, as illustrated in this case, it is evident that the relationship between 
the two was close.    In general, where there was an SIA office there was also some kind 
of Zenrin kykai facility; on the other hand, where there was only an office of the 
Zenrin kykai, one of its staff was probably an army officer serving with the SIA.
95  
The manner in which the groundwork was laid for the new SIA office in West Sunid 
further illustrates the close links between the two.  According to Mori, when the 
Kwantung Army dispatched an officer in early 1935 to seek permission from Prince 
Teh to establish the new office, that officer travelled under an assumed name and in the 
capacity of a director of the Zenrin kykai.
96  Mori does not explain why it was 
necessary for the officer to travel incognito, and it seems odd, given that there were 
already a number of Japanese personnel stationed at West Sunid.  Here, however, we 
have a clear example of the Kwantung Army using the Zenrin kykai as a cover for its 
operations, in much the same manner as Japanese military officers had used the guise of 
Buddhist monk in the late nineteenth century.     
In addition to obtaining permission to set up an SIA office at West Sunid, the 
officer who had travelled incognito also sought permission to establish a radio station at 
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the prince’s banner.
97    Even allowing for Japanese personnel being assigned more than 
one duty, the establishment of an SIA office, plus a radio station, which usually 
required a crew of eight
98 (Figure 30), and a Zenrin kykai facility at an Inner 
Mongolian league or banner meant that upwards of a dozen Japanese military and 
civilian personnel might have been stationed in the one place.  With the rotation of 
personnel and the need to replenish supplies, this implies a steady stream of Japanese 
crossing back and forward across what was ostensibly Han Chinese territory.    Through 
the establishment of such facilities, the Kwantung Army was thus able to insinuate a 
steadily increasing number of personnel deeper and deeper into Inner Mongolia.
99   
 
  
Figure 30:    Japanese Army radio section in China, c. 1938,   
reproduced from Gordon L. Rottman, Japanese Army in World War II:   
Conquest of the Pacific 1941-42, Oxford:    Osprey Publishing, 2005, p. 56.     
 
The evident movement of personnel between the Zenrin kykai and the SIA raises 
a number of questions.  It is unclear, firstly, what the chain of command for the SIA 
offices in Inner Mongolia was, and, secondly, how this command hierarchy operated in 
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relation to the Zenrin kykai.  For example, when Kwantung Army personnel were 
seconded to the Zenrin kykai, to whom were they answerable for their actions?  
Despite such ambiguities, it is too limiting to see the Zenrin kykai as merely a ‘front’ 
for the Kwantung Army.  While the association was undoubtedly used as a cover for 
intelligence-gathering, this was not the fundamental reason for its establishment.  Nor 
was the Kwantung Army short of other means by which to gather intelligence.  As 
mentioned above, for example, the army had formed the Mongolian Research Team in 
September 1932, more than a year prior to the establishment of the Zenrin kykai, 
apparently for just such a purpose.  There were also a number of SIA offices dotted 
throughout Manchukuo, some of which were situated close to the Manchukuo-Soviet or 
Manchukuo-Outer Mongolian borders.
100  The Zenrin kykai, then, was a convenient 
means by which the Kwantung Army could gather intelligence, given that it was often 
on the spot, but it was not the only means.  Moreover, the Zenrin kykai’s 
humanitarian work was also important in its own right.  Following the failure of the 
1936 Suiyuan Incident, in fact, the links between the Kwantung Army and the Zenrin 
kykai appear to have weakened.  Even as late as 1943, however, Zenrin kykai 
personnel were still being used for intelligence-gathering.
101   
 
The Zenrin Kykai’s Activities after 1937 
The Zenrin kykai followed in the wake of the Kwantung Army’s North China 
blitzkrieg from July 1937 onwards, remaining active in the Japanese-sponsored regime 
                                                 
100  For a partial list of the SIA offices located throughout Manchukuo and Mengchiang, 
see Hata, Nihon riku-kaigun sg jiten, pp. 377-80.     
101 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 417; Nakajima, Toku-, p. 165.    For the story of 
one of the two Japanese agents of the Zenrin kykai dispatched on intelligence-
gathering operations in 1943, see Kimura, Japanese Agent in Tibet, which recounts the 
author’s journey from Inner Mongolia to Tibet.    Kimura travelled disguised as a monk, 
reminiscent of the Japanese military operatives dispatched in the late nineteenth 
century.    
291
of Mengchiang until Japan’s defeat in August 1945.    The association also continued to 
play an active part in the promotion of Japanese-Mongolian ties in Japan.  The range 
of activities the Zenrin kykai was involved in after 1937 was essentially the same as in 
the earlier period:  the provision of health and education services throughout 
Mengchiang and the promotion of Mongolia and the Mongolian language in Japan.  
The earlier Japanese romanticism about Mongolia also continued to live on in the 
Zenrin kykai in this period.  At least some of the young Japanese, both men and 
women, who went off to the newly-created Mengchiang to teach or heal were inspired 
by high ideals:    to work alongside their Mongolian brothers and sisters to build a better 
Asia.
102   
In Japan, the association continued to publish books about Mongolia, although not 
as prolifically as it had during the earlier period.  In 1937 and 1938, for example, the 
Zenrin kykai produced Mko kokushi (A History of Mongolia); a three-part work, 
Mko gaku (Mongolian Studies); and an edition of Mko taikan (A General Survey of 
Mongolia).
103  The last ran to around six hundred pages and covered all parts of 
Mongolia, including those regions controlled by the Soviet Union.
104  It  was  extremely 
detailed.  The section discussing Mongolia’s international position over the previous 
two decades, for example, amounted to more than forty pages,
105 while the section on 
Mengchiang alone filled almost sixty pages, covering the political structure, industry 
and agriculture of the region, together with its military.
106  T h e  Mko taikan was not a 
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one-off publication, but appears to have been an ongoing work that was revised every 
few years.  Production continued until late into the war, with the 1945 edition being 
cancelled only in late 1944.
107  At seven yen, the 1938 Mko taikan was more than 
three times as expensive as the 1936 Mko nenkan.  Nevertheless, the revision of 
Mko taikan every few years suggests that the Zenrin kykai considered it an important 
piece of work for which there was a market.     
The association’s commitment to educational opportunities for young Mongols 
remained  consistent.  The  summer exchange program to Japan, for example, continued 
until at least 1943, with around 130 Mongol students participating in the program 
between 1937 and 1940.
108  The Zenrin kykai’s schools in Inner Mongolia also 
continued to operate.    One contemporary observer noted that by 1940 there were more 
than 1,000 Japanese-sponsored elementary schools and sixteen high schools in the 
eastern area of Hsingan province alone, where more than 50,000 boys and girls were 
taught by both Japanese and Mongol teachers.  Mongolian nationalists, however, 
became disillusioned with the educational opportunities offered by the Japanese 
authorities,
109 presumably because the goal of Japanese education was to make the 
Mongols feel they were part of the larger Japanese empire, something the vast majority 
of Mongols undoubtedly did not desire to be.  In this sense, this particular form of 
cultural diplomacy was probably less successful than those implementing it might have 
hoped.   
The Zenrin kykai continued to provide medical care for the civilian population at 
clinics throughout Mengchiang, along with facilities to train a local cadre of medical 
personnel.
110  In September 1938, the association also established a large-scale 
                                                 
107 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, p. 418.     
108 Ibid.,  pp.  413-17.   
109 Heissig,  Lost Civilization, pp. 190-1.     
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Mongolian Army medical facility at Paotou Hospital, in Western Suiyuan,
111 a move 
that promoted closer links between the association and the Japanese-sponsored Inner 
Mongolian Army.  A year and a half later, in March 1940, the Japanese military 
established an additional Mongolian Army medical facility, probably at Kalgan, where 
the headquarters of the Japanese Army in Mongolia (ch-Mgun) was located.    One of 
its tasks was to dispatch three Mongol and two Japanese youths each year to study at the 
Manchukuo Army Medical School (Manshkoku rikugun guni-i gakk) in Harbin.
112  
While it is not known if the Zenrin kykai was connected with this second medical 
facility, it seems probable that it was.     
Clearly, the Zenrin kykai was still willing to invest in long-term projects designed 
to improve the overall quality of Inner Mongolian society.    While there was obviously 
an ulterior motive for doing so, the humanitarian aspect of such work should not be 
overlooked, especially when one considers, as discussed earlier, the generally poor 
treatment of the Mongols by the Han Chinese authorities.     
 
The Zenrin Kykai and the Muslims of Mengchiang 
The most significant change in the Zenrin kykai’s activities from 1937 onwards was 
that it began directing attention to the Muslim population of Mengchiang, who in ethnic 
terms comprised Uighurs and Hui (Han-Chinese Muslims).    This change in the Zenrin 
kykai’s scope is hardly surprising, given the eagerness of the Japanese authorities, both 
military and civilian, to co-opt local sub-populations within their colonies and spheres 
of influence wherever possible, and given that politically, the Muslim population shared 
similar characteristics with the Mongols of Mengchiang.  Like the Mongols, the 
Muslim population represented a distinct group, exhibiting anti-Han and anti-
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Communist sentiments that made them attractive to Japanese policy-makers.  The 
Japanese military could once again present itself as a ‘liberator’ rather than as an 
‘invader’, potentially reducing resistance among the local population.    Moreover, with 
the implementation of various forms of cultural diplomacy aimed at the local Muslim 
population, Japanese rule could subsequently be presented in a positive light to other 
Muslims, especially those living in the regions abutting Mengchiang.     
The Muslim population of Mengchiang was not large, perhaps no more than a few 
hundred thousand.    The efforts of the Zenrin kykai to court it, therefore, indicate that 
the Japanese authorities were prepared to go to considerable lengths to co-opt the local 
population.  Such efforts also suggest that the Japanese authorities were actively 
looking for distinct groups to separate from the rest.     
In late 1937, the Japanese military was still considering further expansion, either 
westward into Han Chinese-controlled Sinkiang or northwards into the Soviet Union.  
Both regions had significant Muslim populations, and efforts to co-opt them could be 
expected to bring advantages to the Japanese military.  American military intelligence 
took note of Japanese overtures to the Muslim population in areas under Japanese 
control during the 1940s;
113 and these activities have also received some attention in 
recent scholarship.
114  In both wartime intelligence reports and postwar scholarship, 
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however, the humanitarian activities of the Zenrin kykai among the Muslim population 
of Mengchiang and the association’s promotion within Japan of better ties between 
Japan and the Muslim world have been overlooked.     
Exchange between Japan and the Muslim world in the modern period dates back to 
the late nineteenth century.  Contact went both ways.  Beginning in the late 1890s, 
Japanese individuals, often connected with one or more of the Pan-Asianist groups that 
flourished in Japan, or with the right-wing Kokury	kai, travelled to the Middle East 
seeking to foster closer ties between that region and Japan.  On the other hand, a 
number of important Pan-Islamic figures in the Muslim world saw in Japan a source of 
inspiration and assistance in throwing off Western colonialism, and were prepared to 
travel to Japan to seek support to achieve this aim.
115  Official overtures were also 
made:  in addition to the efforts of individuals and particular interest groups, the 
Japanese authorities sought to learn more about the Middle East from the late nineteenth 
century onwards.  In the 1890s, for example, the Japanese Army General Staff 
dispatched Colonel Fukushima Yasumasa to Northern Persia and Turkish-controlled 
Arabia, as well as India and Burma, to gather information on these countries.
116  
Intelligence-gathering by the Japanese military as well as other links between Japan and 
the Muslim world continued into the twentieth century.
117   
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By September 1931, the Japanese military had already taken steps not only to woo 
important Muslim leaders in North China, but also to provide them with concrete aid.  
For example, around the time of the Manchurian Incident, the military dispatched a 
number of ‘advisors’ to serve with Ma Chung-ying, the leader of a group of Muslim 
separatists in Sinkiang, the Chinese province to the west of Inner Mongolia.
118  Exactly 
what the ‘advisors’ were to do is not recorded, but in late 1937, during Ma’s subsequent 
rebellion against Sheng Shih-t’sai, the Han Chinese governor of Sinkiang, some among 
the rebels apparently believed that ‘Japan would support Tungan [Han Chinese Muslim 
converts] and Turkish Moslems by sending Inner Mongolian troops’ to the region.
119  
While direct Japanese military involvement in the rebellion in Sinkiang actually appears 
to have been minimal,
120 the fact that the Muslim rebels reportedly expected material 
support from Japan suggests that the Japanese authorities’ intention to better their ties 
with the Muslim world had been moderately successful.     
Friedrich Otte, a German academic and longtime foreign resident of Peking, 
suggested in an article published in 1936 in the prestigious journal Die Welt des Islams 
(The World of Islam) that the Japanese military’s ultimate objective in cultivating the 
Muslims of Mongolia was to separate the majority of Western and Central Asia from 
the control of both the Han Chinese Republic and the Soviet Union.  This was 
apparently to be achieved through the creation of a huge ‘Central Asian Muslim 
Empire’, a nominally independent state under Japanese control, which was to include 
Russian Central Asia up to the Urals, the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Sinkiang, and 
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Afghanistan.
121  The benefit to the Japanese military of such an ‘empire’, especially 
one established under Japanese sponsorship, would be twofold.  First, the new 
‘empire’ could act as a buffer zone against Soviet Communist infiltration of China and 
Korea.    Second, a buffer zone in the region could also serve as a jumping-off point for 
a Japanese military assault on the Soviet Union, something that remained a serious 
possibility until at least July 1941.
122   
Whether or not the Japanese military really did expect to be able to create a 
‘Central Asian Muslim Empire’, there was a definite preoccupation with the apparent 
threat from the Soviet Union, as discussed earlier.  A number of contemporary 
Western observers during the 1930s noted that the Japanese military perceived Soviet 
infiltration into China and Korea as a distinct danger.    H. Hessell Tiltman claimed that 
to Japanese leaders, the threat had ‘assumed the dimensions of [a] phobia’ and that 
Japan sought to create a ‘cordon sanitaire of Japanese-controlled territories … to 
checkmate Soviet Russia in Asia’.
123  Harry Wildes accepted that the threat was real, 
declaring that to ‘guarantee the safety of Korea’ from Communism, ‘Japan must push 
back the Chinese and the Soviet menaces to the far interior of Asia’.
124   
As part of their attempt to counter the apparent Soviet threat, the Japanese 
authorities sponsored conferences in the early 1930s at which representatives from 
Western and Central Asia pledged joint opposition to the Soviet Union.  An initial 
conference was held in Kobe in May 1934, and was attended by a small number of 
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delegates from China proper, Korea, Manchuria and Japan.
125  A far larger conference 
was then held in February 1935 at Mukden, in Manchuria, with forty delegates, 
representing some 15,000-20,000 Turkis nationals, the blanket term applied to the 
various peoples of Western and Central Asia.
126  Among the delegates were followers 
of Ma Chung-yin, the Muslim separatist leader supported by the Japanese military at the 
time of the Manchurian Incident.  Ma’s followers are reported to have played a 
prominent role at this conference.
127   
With the apparent success of the military offensive against China in late 1937 and 
the imposition of Japanese military control throughout much of North China, the 
Japanese authorities began to take concrete steps, by using organisations such as the 
Zenrin kykai, to co-opt the Muslim population there.  Presumably, the intent was to 
divide the local population, thereby limiting the size of any organised anti-Japanese 
opposition, and, with luck, generating some positive support for the Japanese as well.  
In addition to the Zenrin kykai, the Japanese authorities established other organisations, 
such as the Chinese National Muslim League in Peking.  The purpose of this league, 
according to Peter de Mendelssohn, a German-born British national working as a 
British civil servant and writing in 1944, was to foster closer co-operation among China, 
Japan and Manchukuo, as well as to combat Communism and ‘promote faith in 
Islam’.
128    Presumably, ‘faith in Islam’ would encourage opposition to the Han Chinese 
and the Soviets.    No doubt, the Japanese authorities saw the league as a way to bring a 
significant proportion of the population under indirect Japanese control and to use its 
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anti-Communist sentiment to Japan’s advantage.  The league was generously funded 
by the Japanese authorities in Peking, apparently with an annual budget of half a million 
Chinese dollars (approximately US$148,000).
129    There were reported to be almost 400 
branches of the league throughout China by 1940.
130  It had a comparatively complex 
organisational structure, under which China was divided into six distinct administrative 
areas, including Outer Mongolia and the southwestern region of China, both of which 
were outside of Japanese control at the time.  While on paper the Chinese National 
Muslim League appears to have been a sizable organisation, the fact that it thus 
included areas that lay outside of Japanese control suggests that its ambitions may have 
been more fanciful than de Mendelssohn implied.  Moreover, the inclusion of Outer 
Mongolia, a region that could in no way be classed as ‘Muslim’ — only around five 
percent of the population were Muslim
131 — suggests that the purpose for which the 
Japanese authorities established the league may have been hazy.     
Japanese military agents were reportedly active in providing funds to separatists 
in some of the outlying areas for which the Chinese National Muslim League was 
supposedly responsible, including the Muslim strongholds of Ninghsia, Tsinghai and 
Sinkiang, the Chinese provinces adjoining Inner Mongolia and Tibet.    For example, in 
late 1937, monthly Japanese remittances to Muslim leaders in Sinkiang alone were said 
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to have amounted to more than three million yen in some months.
132  The  amount  paid 
to Muslim leaders in Ninghsia and Tsinghai is unknown.  Japanese support, though, 
appears to have been more than just financial, at least potentially:  one Muslim leader 
in the region was promised assistance by Japanese agents in May 1935, presumably 
military assistance, for an attempt to create a Sinkiang that was independent of China, 
after the pattern of Manchukuo.
133   
After 1937, official Japanese rhetoric reflected the new emphasis on courting 
Muslims in areas under Japanese control.    For example, the Japanese authorities made 
much of the harmony in which Mongols and Muslims were said to live together in Inner 
Mongolia.  When the Zenrin kykai reported the establishment of the new 
Mengchiang administration in November 1937, for instance, the association’s yearbook 
declared that ‘for more than three hundred years the Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese, 
and Muslim peoples have lived in harmony …’ (sanbyaku amari nenrai, Man · M · 
Kan · Kai · kanj yg shi, buji aianzeri).
134    In keeping with the ideal of the ‘harmony 
of the five races’, the proclamation called for co-operation among the ‘five yellow races 
– Japanese, Manchu, Mongol, Han Chinese and Muslim’, in particular against the 
‘spectre of Communism’.
135   
To foster such co-operation among the different groups in Mengchiang, the 
Zenrin kykai undertook much the same range of activities for Muslims that it had 
previously undertaken for Mongols both in the region and in Japan.    In June 1938, for 
example, the association established the Institute of Islamic Studies (Kaikyken 
kenkyjo) in Tokyo to research all aspects of the Muslim peoples and their faith.
136  
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According to Cemil Aydin, this institute was ‘Japan’s primary academic centre for 
research on Islam’, and was responsible for the production of academic works, public 
conferences, documentary films and radio talks.
137    Among the books published by the 
institute were a number of works on Islam and the Muslim world intended for the 
general reading public, including the 1939 Kaikyken (Muslim World).
138  Individuals 
connected with the facility also contributed articles to the Japanese press discussing 
Japan’s relations with the Muslims of Mengchiang.  For example, in November 1939, 
the well-known journalist It Kinjir
139  published an article in Ch kron about Prince 
Teh and the ‘new Mongolia’, that is, the Japanese-sponsored Mengchiang regime.  In 
part, the article focused on the apparent co-operation among the Mongols, Muslims and 
Han Chinese, claiming that, with Japanese assistance, the three peoples had indeed 
formed a united front to combat the spread of Communism.
140  By 1942, the Zenrin 
kykai was promoting the study of the Arabic, Turkish and Persian languages.  The 
head of the Institute of Islamic Studies, kubo Kji, a Turkish-language expert 
specializing on Central Asian studies,
141 was closely involved with the language 
program.
142   
The Zenrin kykai also acted as a welcoming committee for Muslim visitors to 
Japan.
143    The association greeted a number of groups that were either partly or entirely 
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made up of Muslims between September 1938 and May 1942.  In April 1938, for 
example, the association’s office in Tokyo hosted a welcome party for a group of ten 
Mengchiang Muslims, among whom were schoolteachers, government officials, doctors 
and religious leaders.
144    The visitors spent almost a month travelling throughout Japan.   
In a speech at a mosque in Kobe, the leader of the group declared that ‘ever since we 
arrived in Japan we have been under the impression of being not in a foreign country 
but in a land inhabited by a people whom we feel to be our brothers’.
145  Indeed,  some 
press commentators openly speculated that the group was offered ‘exceptional 
courtesies’ in light of the ‘ongoing revolt in Mohammedan Sinkiang’,
146 discussed 
earlier in the chapter.     
The visit to Japan by a party of ten Muslim women from Mengchiang in October 
1943,
147 and the fact that it was associated with the Zenrin kykai, attracted particular 
coverage even before the group arrived in Tokyo.  Press reports implied that the 
purpose of the visit was to allow the women to study Japan’s wartime mobilisation.
148  
The women were to visit the Greater East Asia Ministry, the Mongolian government 
offices in Japan, and Yasukuni Shrine, amongst other places.
149  Press coverage 
suggests that this visit was considered very important by the Japanese authorities,
150 
most likely because of the need to mobilise the regions under Japanese control to better 
support the war effort.     
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In Inner Mongolia, the Zenrin kykai’s activities aimed at the Muslim population 
followed much the same pattern as those aimed at the Mongols.  Beginning in 1939, 
for example, the association built medical clinics specifically for Muslims at a number 
of locations throughout Mengchiang.
151  Moreover, in June 1939, it established a 
training facility for Muslim medical students, presumably to provide a cadre of 
Japanese-trained Muslim personnel to staff the clinics.  While the number of students 
admitted for training was quite small, with only twenty-one in total receiving training, 
the course appears to have been a lengthy one, lasting between twenty and twenty-four 
months.
152   
Other educational opportunities were also provided.  In June 1939, for example, 
when the Zenrin kykai opened the Mengchiang Academy (Mky gakuin) at Kalgan, 
there were fourteen Muslims among its initial intake of sixty-six male students,
153 
representing almost twenty percent of the student intake, evidence of the preferential 
treatment that the Japanese authorities accorded the Muslim minority.  Some six 
months later, in January 1940, the Zenrin kykai also established a school specifically 
for young Muslim women, the Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School (Zenrin Kaimin jojuku).  
The first intake was tiny, a mere four students, and numbers remained small, with only 
twenty-four students admitted up until April 1943.
154  The proportion of Muslims 
admitted to the Mengchiang Academy and the subsequent establishment of a school 
specifically for Muslim girls, however, further points to the Japanese policy of targeting 
distinct groups within the region.     
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Figure 31:    Students of the Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School together with the 
Japanese staff of the Zenrin kykai’s Kalgan headquarters, June 1941, from 
Zenrinkai (ed.), Zenrin kykai shi:   Uchimko ni okeru bunka katsud, 
Tky:    n. publ., 1981, between pp. 250-1.     
 
The Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School probably also had considerable symbolic 
importance.  Its style may have been intended to emphasise similarities with Japanese 
schools, and hence, the success of ‘Japanisation’.    While early photos showed the girls 
attired in the traditional Chinese style of dress, a June 1941 photo is strikingly different.   
This photo of the students and the Japanese staff at the Zenrin kykai’s Kalgan 
headquarters showed the students dressed in a standard Japanese summer school 
uniform (Figure 31).  The change of uniform may have been intended to further 
demonstrate the ‘civilising’ nature of the Zenrin kykai’s activities.  There is nothing 
to mark the girls as Mengchiang Muslims, and they could just as easily be a group of 
Japanese girls on a school excursion.    The photo is also similar to the earlier image of 
the classroom of Mongol girls studying (see Figure 29), in that it highlights the physical 
similarities of the students and the Japanese teachers.    It is not known if the photo was  
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published at the time, but if it was, it was no doubt also intended to further promote the 
‘good work’ that the Zenrin kykai was carrying out on the continent.     
It is noteworthy that the Zenrin kykai considered education for Muslim girls 
important, or at least wished to be seen to be providing it.  The type of education 
offered echoed prevailing ideals in Japan:    according to one of the teachers, the express 
purpose of the school was to educate Muslim women to be ‘good wives and wise 
mothers’, thereby initiating a ‘new era’ in the region,
155 presumably under Japanese 
guidance.  A small number of these girls was also given the chance to study in 
Japan.
156   
As well as providing a school aimed solely at Muslim girls, the Zenrin kykai also 
sought to reach Muslim women in Mengchiang through a series of conferences.  
Between November 1941 and May 1942, the association staged conferences for Islamic 
women at Hohhot, Tatung and Kalgan, three of the major centres in Mengchiang.
157  
The association’s published history gives no details of these meetings, but the 
sponsorship of three conferences in the space of six months suggests that the 
mobilisation of Muslim women in Inner Mongolia was considered important.     
In addition to the Zenrin kykai’s Institute of Islamic Studies in Tokyo, the 
association was also connected with the establishment of the Northwest Research 
Institute (Seihoku kenkyjo) at Kalgan, the capital of Mengchiang, in March 1944.  
The Northwest Research Institute was a scientific facility headed by the noted 
anthropologist Imanishi Kinji, and counted among its staff a number of anthropologists 
who went on to post-war prominence.
158  While its primary focus was academic 
                                                 
155 Korenaga Toshiko, ‘Zenrin Kaimin jojuku no omoide’, in Rakudakai honbu (ed.), 
Kgen senri, p. 372.     
156  Kishi Yamaji, ‘Kaimin jojuku no shimai’, in ZKS, pp. 226-7.     
157 ‘Zenrin  kykai nenp’, in ZKS, pp. 416-17.     
158 Nakajima,  Toku-, pp. 165-6; Fujieda Akira, Haruyama Aki and Morita Kenji (eds), 
‘Seihoku kenkyjo no omoide:  Fujieda Akira hakushi danwa kiroku’, Narashigaku,  
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research, especially in anthropology and partly focused on the Muslim population of 
Mengchiang, the institute may also have been connected to Japanese military 
intelligence.
159  At the least, given the earlier instances of links between academia and 
the military discussed in Chapter Three, such ties cannot be discounted, but the 
evidence is vague and, at best, inconclusive.     
Along with the research facilities that the Zenrin kykai directly funded in Japan 
and Inner Mongolia, the association also maintained a connection with the Ethnological 
Research Institute (Minzoku kenkyjo), established in Tokyo in January 1943, under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Education, to carry out research that would contribute to 
the wartime policies of the Japanese government in its handling of the various ethnic 
groups living in its overseas territories.
160  Researchers from the Tokyo institute 
worked extensively in and around Inner Mongolia in co-operation with the Zenrin 
kykai-backed Northwest Research Institute.  In June 1944, for example, the 
Ethnological Research Institute dispatched a survey group to Kalgan, expressly to study 
the Muslim population in Mengchiang.  The team remained in Kalgan until August 
1945.
161    The institute dispatched another research group to Mengchiang in the summer 
of 1945, shortly before the end of the war, again with the aim of surveying the Muslim 
community.
162  While such a purpose was not overtly stated, it seems likely that these 
surveys were part of the effort by the Japanese authorities to win the ‘hearts and minds’ 
                                                                                                                                              
vol. 4, 1986, pp. 57-9; Shinji Yamashita, Joseph Bosco and J.S. Eades, ‘Asian 
Anthropologies:    Foreign, Native, and Indigenous’, in Shinji Yamashita, Joseph Bosco 
and J. S. Eades (eds), The Making of Anthropology in East and Southeast Asia, New 
York:    Berghahn Books, 2004, p. 5.     
159  Nakao, ‘Japanese Colonial Policy and Anthropology in Manchuria’, p. 249.     
160  Shinji Yamashita, ‘Constructing Selves and Others in Japanese Anthropology:    The 
Case of Micronesia and Southeast Asian Studies’, in Yamashita et al., Making of 
Anthropology, p. 94.     
161 Fujieda, ‘Seihoku kenkyjo no omoide’, p. 70; Akitoshi Shimizu, ‘Anthropology 
and the Wartime Situation of the 1930s and the 1940s:    Masao Oka, Yoshitar Hirano, 
Eiichir Ishida and Their Negotiations with the Situation’, in Shimizu and van Bremen 
(eds), Wartime Japanese Anthropology, pp. 66-7.      
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of the local Muslim population.  The surveys most likely assessed what the local 
population needed, as well as conditions in the region in general, with the aim of then 
using the Zenrin kykai to improve standards of living.     
While real efforts were made by the Japanese authorities to better the daily lives 
of the Muslims in Mengchiang through the provision of medical facilities and 
educational opportunities, success was not guaranteed.  One factor was undoubtedly 
that some of the Japanese personnel connected with these programs lacked religious 
sensitivity.  Fujieda Akira, a member of the Northwest Research Institute, notes that 
while graduates of the Zenrin Muslim Girls’ School were often employed as trainee 
clerks by the Zenrin kykai, the Japanese general manager of the institute had the 
unfortunate habit of holding parties, to which these women were invited, where alcohol 
and ham were served.
163  Given the Koran’s prohibition on the consumption of both, 
this manager appears to have been singularly lacking in cultural sensitivity.  Whether 
such behaviour was widespread among the Japanese staff is not known, but if his 
subordinates echoed such behaviour it most likely undid some of the positive feeling 
towards Japan that the Zenrin kykai’s activities might otherwise have generated among 
the Muslims of Mengchiang.     
 
Conclusion 
In the thirteen years that it existed, the Zenrin kykai was an important component of 
the Japanese authorities’ attempts to woo both the Mongol and Muslim populations of 
Inner Mongolia through ‘cultural diplomacy’.  While the work of the association 
doubtless did improve the daily lives of at least some Mongols and Muslims, the Zenrin 
kykai was not entirely successful in its endeavours.  As we have seen, Mongol 
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nationalists, for example, became disillusioned as to the purpose of the education that 
was provided by the Japanese authorities, and Japanese personnel may not always have 
behaved appropriately when dealing with the Muslims of Mengchiang.  Nevertheless, 
it is undeniable that relations between the Japanese and the inhabitants of Inner 
Mongolia were more harmonious than those between the Japanese and the Koreans or 
Han Chinese.  While the medical and educational services provided by the Zenrin 
kykai were never entirely based on altruism, the humanitarian work that the 
association undertook does set it apart from the other main agents of Japanese cultural 
diplomacy, the Kywakai and the Research Department of the South Manchurian 
Railway Company.  The Zenrin kykai, in short, deserves to be seen both as a crucial 
instrument of the Japanese imperialist project in the region, and as a reflection of the 
complexity of that project.     
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has demonstrated that between 1873 and 1945 Mongolia was far more 
important to Japan than previous studies have recognised.  Furthermore, the 
connection began quite early, five years or so at most after Japan’s reemergence on the 
international stage, and continued throughout the entire period.  One significant piece 
of evidence confirming the importance of Mongolia to Japan is the longstanding use of 
the term ‘Man-M’, a label adopted only by Japanese writers and in use even before the 
Russo-Japanese War.  The ambiguity of the term, moreover, is also important, as it 
reflects the unstable nature of Japanese understandings of and ambitions in the region, 
in a context in which the Japanese elites were seeking to co-exist with their continental 
rivals, Russia and China, and at the same time to carve out Japan’s own sphere of 
influence on the continent.     
There were a great many agents involved in the relationship from the Japanese 
side, and a variety of interests were intertwined.  Military considerations were the 
dominant single element, but they were always combined with other factors, in ways 
that make the relationship with Mongolia unique among Japan’s imperial relationships.   
These factors included perceptions of a shared ancestry in ethnic terms, a shared 
religion in Buddhism, the supposed need to assist indigenous activists to break away 
from Chinese control, and a somewhat romantic view of the Mongols as a people.  
Admittedly, some of these arguments were also used elsewhere.    The promotion of the 
concept of shared ethnicity, for example, was not unique to Japanese-Mongolian 
relations:  as Peter Duus has noted, the same claim was also made about Japan’s   310
relationship with Korea in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
1  T h e  
additional emphasis on a shared religion, the perceived need to support indigenous 
activists, and the sense of romance that surrounded Mongolia in Japanese discourses, 
however, set Japanese-Mongolian relations apart.     
As noted earlier, Koreans and Chinese were typically described in Japanese 
writings as ‘uncivilised’ and ‘dirty’, even if the Chinese were also portrayed as heirs to 
a great civilisation.
2  The Mongols, on the other hand, were presented in a quite 
different light.    Where Japanese writers made much of the squalor they encountered in 
Korea and China, in writings about Mongolia they tended to emphasise instead the 
similarities between the two peoples.  Fukushima Sadako’s choice of photographs in 
her work about Kawahara Misako may well have had this effect; certainly, Suda Kanji’s 
lyrical passage about the taste of sheep cooked in miso must have done.
3  I n  s u c h  
writings there is often the sense that with Japanese assistance, the Mongols might 
reclaim their former glory, and even in the present, they were shown to have a kind of 
dignity, albeit a relatively powerless one.  In the 1930s the Zenrin kykai could even 
trumpet that ‘tomorrow’s Asia comes from Mongolia’,
4 suggesting that there was 
something inherently special about the region.  Such a comment implies a definite 
respect for Mongolia, even if such feelings were balanced by a conviction of Japanese 
superiority.   
                                                 
1 See Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword:  The Japanese Penetration of Korea, 
1895-1910, Berkeley:    University of California Press, 1995, pp. 399-406 for discussion 
of Meiji Japanese views of Korea.     
2 Ibid., pp. 400, 402; Donald Keene, ‘The Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95 and Its 
Cultural Effects in Japan’, in Donald H. Shively (ed.), Tradition and Modernization in 
Japanese Culture, Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1971, pp. 133-43; Tan’o 
Yasunori and Kawada Akihisa, Imji no naka no sens:  Nisshin · Nichiro kara reisen 
made, Tky:    Iwanami shoten, 1996, pp. 13-14.     
3 Fukushima  Sadako,  Nichiro sens hishich no Kawahara Misako, opp. pp. 72-3; Suda 
Kanji, Ysha, Tky:    Kokin shoin, 1939, pp. 103-5.     
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Moreover, as Duus notes, while Japanese writers might have ‘lampooned or 
exoticized’ the Koreans, they never romanticised them.
5  The sense of romance that 
many Japanese projected onto Mongolia is one thing that makes this relationship 
distinctive.   Romantic associations with Mongolia can be found across a broad swathe 
of Japanese writings, including Kawahara Misako’s account of her time at the 
Kharachin Banner in the early part of the twentieth century, the press reports of 
businessman  kura Kihachir’s sojourn in the Gobi desert in the 1920s, and even 
Nishimura Shinji’s 1942 examination of Mongolia’s economic potential for the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.
6  It may be true that Japanese colonialism produced 
‘no Japanese Kiplings’;
7 yet, Mongolia clearly touched the consciousness and the 
imagination of a certain group of Japanese writers in a very particular way.     
Shared religion was also a powerful drawcard for some Japanese.  While Korea 
was Buddhist too, this fact does not appear to have impressed itself upon Japanese 
writers at any point during the period under examination in discussions of the shared 
characteristics of the two peoples.  In Japanese-Mongolian relations, however, much 
was made of the common religion.    As shown in Chapter One, it was Buddhist monks 
from Kyoto’s Honganji Temple who probably made the first Japanese contact with 
Mongolia in the modern period, and contacts between Buddhists continued until 1945.     
While the activities of the various agents involved in Japan’s relationship with 
Mongolia differed, they also form a pattern in which there were some more or less 
                                                 
5 Duus,  Abacus and the Sword, p. 400.     
6 Ichinomiya Misako, Mko miyage, Tky:  Jitsugy kono Nihonsha, 1909, p.1; 
‘Mko yuki wa – makiba suita no yji – kura Kihachirshi dan’, Yomiuri shinbun, 21 
February 1925, p. 8; ‘A Passion in the Desert – Baron Okura’s Expedition’, Japan 
Chronicle Weekly Edition, 21 May 1925, p. 642; Nishimura Shinji, Dai T-A kyeiken, 
Tky:    Hakubunkan, 1942, pp. 130-1.     
7 Marius B. Jansen, ‘Japanese Imperialism:  Late Meiji Perspectives’, in Ramon H. 
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constant elements.  The first, and undoubtedly most important, was the strategic 
significance of Mongolia for the Japanese military and political elites, a factor that 
previous studies have recognised, although generally only as an adjunct to Japanese 
ambitions in Manchuria.  These studies, moreover, usually date Japanese ambitions in 
Mongolia only from around the time of the Russo-Japanese War, but, as I showed in 
Chapter One, there is ample evidence that the military and political elites recognised the 
strategic importance of Mongolia at least thirty years prior to this.  A second element, 
as I have illustrated throughout this thesis, was the high degree of continuity among the 
groups and individuals in Japan that developed connections with Mongolia.    Alongside 
the military and political elites can be found religious groups, academics and business 
figures, some of whom constantly reappear in Japan’s Mongolian ventures.  Thus we 
find important individuals, among them Fukushima Yasumasa, Kawashima Naniwa, 
Torii Ryz and kura Kihachir, as well as lesser-known figures, such as Morishima 
Kadofusa and Maekawa Tsuneyoshi, whose association with Japanese schemes for 
Mongolia spanned, in many cases, three or more decades.     
This thesis has also demonstrated that Japan’s relationship with Mongolia, 
whether driven by strategic considerations or by other factors, changed over time 
according to the shifting priorities of the Japanese government, the impact of events in 
China and other external factors.  In the late nineteenth century, as Japan first 
tentatively advanced onto the continent, contact between Japan and Mongolia was 
sporadic and often undertaken in a clandestine fashion, as shown in Chapter One.    This 
changed as the Japanese government became more confident in itself and in its own 
position in the region, especially after its victory over China in 1895 and over Russia a 
decade later.    Then, following the collapse of the Ch’ing Dynasty in 1912, the Russian 
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Revolution in 1917, and the various upheavals that plagued Northeast Asia in the early 
1920s, as examined in Chapter Two, the Japanese military launched a number of 
attempts to gain control of significant portions of Mongolia.  Although none of these 
attempts was ultimately successful, they illustrate the lengths to which some in the 
military and political elites were prepared to go to achieve Japanese domination of the 
region.    Importantly, they also demonstrate the development in the tactic of ‘gekokuj’ 
(overthrow of the senior by the junior) that occurred in connection with Mongolia, and 
that, perhaps, set the pattern for the better-known instances of ‘gekokuj’ of the late 
1920s and early 1930s.     
Following the Japanese withdrawal from the Russian Far East in 1922, a change 
in modus operandi occurred in relations with Mongolia, with greater prominence being 
given to non-military activities, especially economic ones, in accordance with the 
general trend of the 1920s in other areas of Japanese activity, a development examined 
in Chapter Three.  As the international and domestic climate worsened at the end of 
the 1920s, there was renewed military effort to gain control of Mongolia, which was 
combined with a cultural push, both within and outside of Japan, as illustrated in 
Chapter Four.    All of these factors — the military’s desire to gain control of Mongolia, 
along with academic justification for such control, and economic and religious 
ambitions in the region — came together in the early 1930s with the formation of the 
Zenrin kykai, an organisation discussed at length in Chapter Five, and a means by 
which the various groups and individuals in Japan connected with Mongolia could 
extend their influence in the region.  The overwhelming demands of war elsewhere, 
however, spelled the decline of Japanese activity in Mongolia, and while the Zenrin 
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kykai continued to operate until Japan’s defeat in 1945, military activity in Mongolia 
came to an end altogether.     
While Japanese military operations in Mongolia thus ceased in August 1945, this 
was not the end of the relationship.  In the postwar period, Japanese academics 
continued to write about the region; the best-known example is Egami Namio’s 1967 
work in which he argued that the Mongols and their horses had played an important part 
in Japan’s prehistory.
8  Moreover, as Junko Miyawaki-Okada has noted, Mongolia’s 
romantic image survived Japan’s military defeat and can still be found in writings about 
the region to this day.
9  The ties between the two countries have continued.  Perhaps 
the most surprising development has been in the field of sport, with the dominance of 
Mongolian wrestlers in sumo, that most Japanese of contests.     
 
 
                                                 
8 Egami Namio, Kiba minzoku kokka:  Nihon kodaishi e no apurchi, Tky:  Ch 
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Adachi Takanari ("lr2) (?-?) 
Aida Tsutomu (	Q) (?-?) 
Aoki Nobuzumi (u;$W) (1859-1924) 
Aoyagi Katsutoshi (u@4) (1879-1934) 
Araki Sadao (];e) (1877-1966) 
Banzai Rihachir (am) (1871-1950) 
Babujab (),T,) (1875-1916) 
Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang) (.![) (1898-2001) 
Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin) (.
t) (1873/1875-1928) 
Chao Erh-sun (Zhao Ersun) (hK*) (1844-1927) 
Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) (_S) (1887-1975) 
Chin Shu-sheng (Jin Shuzheng) (oIe) (?-?) 
Chinda Sutemi (NQ3() (1856-1929) 
Prince Ch’ing (Qing) (1bM) (1838-1917) 
Deguchi Onisabur (
Mm) (1871-1948) 
Doi Ichinoshin (+j) (1866-1949) 
Doihara Kenji (Zg) (1883-1948) 
Egami Namio (EH) (1906-2002) 
Feng Yü-hsiang (Feng Yuxiang) (wLU) (1882-1948) 
Fu Tso-yi (Fu Zuoyi) (
Y) (1895-1974) 
Fujieda Akira (`?9) (1911-98) 
Fukuda Masatar (VQsm) (1866-1932) 
Fukushima Sadako (V&e) (1882-1975) 
Fukushima Shir (V&m) (1874-1945) 
Fukushima Yasumasa (V&"B) (1852-1919) 
Fuse Tatsuji (,7iG) (1880-1953) 
Genghis Khan (Chingis Khan) (Jenghiz Khan) (26D) (2/D) (1162-1227) 
Güngsangnorbu (Gung) (fAcK,) (0M) (0bM) (1871-1931), also known as 
Prince Kharachin (Qaracin) (FM) 
Hagino Suekichi (^n<) (1860-1940) 
Han Shao-hong (vX#), also known as Kanjurchap (POKT,) 
Hanada Nakanosuke (\Q) (1860-1945), alias Shimizu Shgetsu (JC=:) 
Hara Kei (5) (1856-1921) 
Hasegawa Haruko (qd'8) (1895-1967) 
Hasegawa Yoshimichi (qd'k) (1850-1924) 
Hatakeyama Ktar (R% m) (?-?) 
Hayashi Daihachi (>) (1884-1932) 
Hayashi Senjr (>pm) (1876-1943) 
Hayashi Yasakichi (>-) (1876-1948)   316
Hazama Otohiko (Tn+) (1915-?) 
Hino Tsuyoshi (1i*) (1865-1920) 
Hioki Eki (1SM) (1861-1926) 
Ho Hsün-cheng (He Xunzheng) (Zb) (?-?) 
Honda Kumatar (6Eh) (1874-1948) 
Hoshino King (3ij) (?-?) 
Hsü Shu-cheng (Xu Shuzeng) (,<l) (1880-1925) 
Ichij Sanetaka (8"!) (1880-1959) 
Ichinomiya Misako (#/ ) (Kawahara Misako) (1875-1945) 
Ichinomiya Reitar (#kh) (1870-?) 
Iiyama Tatsuo (t%fq)  (1904-93)   
Ijin Hikokichi (	ro+) (1864-1924) 
Igaue Shigeru (	cX) (?-?) 
Imai Takeo (>) (1900-1982) 
Imanishi Kinji (_m) (1902-92) 
Inoue Kanekichi () (?-?) 
Inukai Tsuyoshi (Hu?) (1855-1932) 
Ishizuka Tadashi (O-) (?-?) 
Isomura Toshi (P7)) (1876-1961) 
It Hirobumi (	\0) (1841-1909) 
It Kinjir (	\j=h) (1892-1964) 
It Rytar (	\9h) (?-?) 
Kanjurchap (KJFQ() (Han Shao-hong) (?-?) 
Karakhan, Lev Mihailovich (1889-1937) 
Katakura Tadashi (G^) (1898-1991) 
Kat Takaaki (\v2) (1860-1926) 
Katsura Tar (:h) (1848-1913) 
Kawabe Torashir (@g]h) (1890-1960) 
Kawahara Ch (@-) (1852-?) 
Kawahara Misako (@/ ) (Ichinomiya Misako) (1875-1945) 
Kawakami Sroku ('/) (1848-99) 
Kawase Tatsuo (@Dwq) (?-?) 
Kawashima Naniwa ('&Be) (1865-1949) 
Kawashima Yoshiko ('&W ) (1906-48) (formerly Chin Pi-hui (Jin Bihui) (jd)) 
Kazami Akira (s`R) (1886-1961) 
Kerenskii, Aleksandar Fedorovich (1881-1971) 
Kimura Hisao (57U
L) (1922-89) 
Kimura Naoto (57N) (?-?) 
Kiyoura Keigo (CA) (1850-1942) 
Kodama Yoshio (
Ia) (1911-84) 
Koiso Kuniaki ($P4) (1880-1950) 
Kolchak, Aleksander Vasilevich (1873-1920) 
Kuhara Fusanosuke (.) (1869-1965) 
Kuropatkin, Aleksiei M. (1848-1925) 
Kuwabara Jitsuz (;p[) (1870-1931) 
Kuz Yoshihisa (YLV) (1874-1958)   317
Li Yüan-hung (Li Yuanhong) (zL) (1864-1928) 
Lu Chan-k’uei (Lu Zhankui) (Vw) (?-1924) 
Ma Chung-ying (Ma Zhongying) (va) (1911-?) 
Maekawa Tsuneyoshi (4<!) (1886-1946) 
Makino Nobuaki (Pr
u) (1861-1949) 
Matsui Iwane (C
YD) (1878-1948) 
Matsui Shinsuke (C
M) (?-?) 
Matsumuro Takayoshi (C-*_) (1886-1969) 
Minamoto no Yoshitsune (N^]) (1159-89) 
Miyazato Yoshimaro (.p(y) (?-?) 
Morishima Kadofusa (U2g>) (1886-1946) 
Moriyama Toshit (+0m) (?-?) 
Nakajima Manz (2bc) (1907-99) 
Nakano Seig (rG) (1886-1943) 
Narita Yasuteru (=R,j) (?-?) 
Nishikawa Torajir (f4eEn) (1865-1944) 
Nishikubo Hiromichi (f:l) (1863-1930) 
Nishimura Shinji (fBXE) (1879-1943) 
Ogawa Heikichi (/47!) (1869-1942) 
Okano Masujir (1r%En) (?-1946) 
Oki Teisuke (JZ) (1874-1904) 
kubo Kji (&8E) (1888-1950) 
kuma Shigenobu (&sq) (1838-1922) 
Okumura Ioko ('B	T)) (1845-1907) 
kura Kihachir (&#n) (1837-1928) 
shima Ken’ichi (&2) (1858-1947) 
shima Matahiko (&2;) (1872-?) 
shima Yokichi (&2k!) (?-?) 
shima Yutaka (&3i) (1900-78) 
tani Kzui (&hQ) (1876-1948) 
Oyabe Zen’ichir (/hon) (1867-1941) 
Pu-yi (Puyi) (O) (1906-67) 
Sakaguchi Ango ($ ,") (1906-55) 
Sasaki Yasugor (A,	n) (1872-1934) 
Sasame Tsuneo ([W<t) (1902-97) 
Sat Yasunosuke (d,) (1871-1944) 
Sawada Gennai (KRN) (?-?) 
Semenov, Grigorii Mikhailovich (1890-1946) 
Sheng Shih-ts’ai (Sheng Shicai) (U?) (1895-1970) 
Shidehara Kijr (6#qn) (1872-1951) 
Shimagawa Takezabur (24Hn) (1867-?) 
Shimizu Shgetsu (MIC@), alias of Hanada Nakanosuke (`R) (1860-1945) 
Shimoda Utako (RF)) (1854-1936) 
Shinoda Toshihide (\Ra) (1858-?) 
Shinohara Ichinosuke (\5) (1909-40) 
Shiratori Kurakichi (Sx9!) (1865-1942)   318
Soloviev, Vladimir Sergeevich (1853-1900) 
Prince Su (Shan-ch’i) (Shanqi) (QYI) (1863-1922) 
Suda Kanji (kKLA) (1892-1976) 
Suematsu Kench (5:ZG) (1855-1920) 
Tachibana Zuich (?J^) (1890-1968) 
Taga Muneyuki (] 	) (1872-1935) 
Takayanagi Yasutar (m<b) (1869-1951) 
Tanaka Giichi (KS) (1863-1929) 
Tanaka Hisashi (K) (1892-1969) 
Tanaka Rykichi (Ki) (1893-1972) 
Prince Teh (Demchugdongrub) (/I) (1902-66) 
Teramoto Enga ($6j) (1872-1940) 
Terauchi Masatake ($BD) (1852-1919) 
Tj Hideki (98U@) (1884-1948) 
Tokugawa Iesato (/("a) (1863-1940) 
Tokutomi Soh (Iichir) (/#Hb) (1863-1957) 
Torii Ryz (n&oV) (1870-1953) 
Tyama Mitsuru (l'F) (1855-1944) 
Tserenchimed (1869-1914) 
Tuan Ch’i-jui (Duan Qirui) (C1J) (1865-1936) 
Uchida Yasuya (Ksai) (K,) (1865-1936) 
Uchida Ryhei (KT*) (1874-1937) 
Uchida Yahachi (K.) (1855-1920) 
Uehara Taichi ()) (?-?) 
Ungern-Sternberg, Roman Nicolaus Feodorovich von (1886-1921) 
Utsunomiya Tar (c!b) (1861-1922) 
Wang Ching-wei (IRW) (1883-1944) 
Wu Chün-sheng (Wu Junsheng) (
h) (?-?) 
Yada Shichitar (OKb) (1879-1957) 
Yamagata Aritomo ('N34) (1838-1922) 
Yamamoto Jtar ('68b) (1867-1936) 
Yamamoto Kiyokatsu ('6E) (1848-91) 
Yamanashi Hanz ('=`) (1864-1944) 
Yano Jin’ichi (Oe) (1872-1970) 
Yasuda Yojr (K_db) (1910-81) 
Yasui Tetsu () (1880-1945) 
Yokogawa Shz (>(M) (1865-1904) 
Yokoo Yasuo (>%) (1899-1985) 
Yonaiyama Tsuneo (P'-) (1888-1969) 
Yonebayashi Kiyoshio (P;f) (?-?) 
Yosano Akiko ([e2) (1878-1942) 
Yosano Tekkan (Satoru) ([eg+) (1873-1935) 
Yoshida Heitar (K*b) (1867-1934) 
Yoshimura Chz (70) (1889-1972) 
Yü Pao-cheng (Yu Baozheng) (
\) (?-?) 
Yuan Shih-k’ai (Yuan Shikai) (X) (1859-1916)   319
Yui Mitsue () (1860-1925) 
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APPENDIX TWO 
 
 
LIST OF MONGOLIAN AND   
CHINESE PLACE-NAMES 
 
 
 
The Wades-Giles system is used, with Pinyin in brackets where appropriate.     
 
Abagar (L') 
Alashan (L,) 
Altai (
<#) 
Barga ('<) 
Buriat (	) 
Chahar (&<) 
Changchiakow (Zhangjiakou) ((%) 
Changchun (K.), later known as Hsinking (-) 
Chao-Uda (Juu uda) (/:H) 
Cherim (Jerim) (J0) 
Chili (Zhili) (?M), renamed Hopei in 1928 
Chosotu (Josoto) (A) 
Dairen (Dalian) ( G) 
Daur () 
Dolonnor (
E<) 
Eastern Inner Mongolia (1D/1ID) 
Eastern Mongolia (1D/1ID) 
Ejine (N7@) 
Fengtien (Liaoning) ("!) 
Gobi Desert (*48) 
Hailar (6,<) 
Harbin (<9) 
Heilungkiang (Heilongjiang) (OP2) 
Hohhot () (Suiyuan, Kweihua) 
Holunbuir (
F<) 
Hopei (Hebei) (5) 
Hsingan (Khingan) (C$) 
Ikh-Chao (Ikuchao) (/) 
Ili (Kuldja) (=) 
Inner Mongolia (D) 
Jehol (Rehe) (;5) [province] 
Jehol (Chengde) (+)) [town] 
Kalgan (Zhangjiakou) ((%) 
Kansu (Gansu) (>B) 
Khalkha Mongolia (<D) 
Kharachin (3)   321
Khorchin (84.) 
Kirin (Jilin) (-) 
Kulong ($), also known as Urga 
Kupeikou (Gubeikou) () 
Kwantung (Guandong) (D,) 
Kweihwa (") 
Kiakhta (') 
Liaotung (Liaodong) (>,) 
Manchukuo (Manzhouguo) (2!) 
Manchuli (Manzhouli)(2!B) 
Manchuria (2!) 
Mengchiang (Mengjiang) (:6) 
Mengkukuo (:!) 
Mongolia (:) 
Mukden () 
Nanking (Nanjing) (
) 
Ninghsia (Ningxia) () 
Nomonhan (Khalkin Gol) () 
North China (() 
North/Northern Manchuria (2!/?2!) 
North/Northern Mongolia (:/?:) 
Ordos (A4)) 
Outer Mongolia (:) 
Pailingmiao (Bailingmiao) (7F%) 
Paotou (Baotou) (
H) 
Peking (Beijing) (), known as Peiping (Beiping) (#) between 1928 and 1949 
Port Arthur (Lushun) (+G) 
Shanghai (1) 
Shankaikwan (Shanhaiguan) (1D) 
Shansi (Shanxi) ( <) 
Shantung (Shandong) ( ,) 
Shensi (Shaanxi) (E<) 
Silingol (Silinghol) (C-@	) 
Sian (Xian) (<) 
Sinkiang (Xinjiang) (*&), also known as Chinese Turkestan 
South/Southern Manchuria (
2!/
?2!) 
South/Southern Mongolia (
:/
?:) 
Suiyuan (9=) [province] 
Suiyuan (9=), also known as Kweihwa (") [town] and renamed Hohhot () in 
November 1937 
Sunid (Sunit) (;5) 
Tangku (Tanggu) (/) 
Taonan (
) 
Tatung (Datong) () 
Tientsin (Tianjin) (0) 
Tsinan (Jinan) (3
)   322
Tsinghai (Qinghai) ($) 
Tsinghai Mongolia ($ ) 
Tsitsihar (Qiqihar) (&) 
Tumed (%) 
Uchumuchin (Ujumuchin) () 
Ulan Ude (Verkhneudinsk) (
	) 
Ulanchap (Ulaanchab) (!) 
Urga (), renamed Ulan Bator in 1924 
Western Buriat ("
) 
West/Western Mongolia (" /"# ) 
Wuchang () 
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